THE NATIONAL INTEREST

The Price of Information
Eric Jones

The American Way

Or How the Chaos, Unpredictability, Contradictions, Complexity, and Example of Our System Undid Communism and Apartheid.
John Chettle

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Essays & Comments:
Barbara Amiel, Thomas Donnelly, J.J. Jewett, James Kurth, Kati Marton, Henry Rowen and Owen Harries

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Contents

ARTICLES

The American Way
John Chettle 3

Is There Life After Victory? What NATO Can and Cannot Do
Josef Joffe 19

Lost Time—The Forgetting of the Cold War
Ian Gambles 26

The CIA Vindicated
Bruce D. Berkowitz
Jeffrey T. Richelson 36

There Are No Moderates—Dealing With Fundamentalist Islam
Daniel Pipes 48

Foreign Policy by Posse
Richard N. Haass 58

Korea and Our Asia Policy
Chalmers Johnson 66

Who Won the Trade War?
Robert Zoellick 78

The Price of Information
Eric Jones 82

BOOKS

Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity by Francis Fukuyama
Charles Wolf, Jr. 95

The Next American Nation by Michael Lind
Harvey Mansfield 99

CORRESPONDENCE

Barbara Amiel, Thomas Donnelly, J.J. Jewett, James Kurth, Kati Marton, Henry Rowen 103

QUARTERLY

On Letting Go
Owen Harries 109

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The American Way

Or How the Chaos, Unpredictability, Contradictions, Complexity, and Example of Our System Undid Communism and Apartheid

John Chettle

"[T]oday, for the first time in our history, we face the stark reality that the [communist] challenge is unending. . . .We must learn to conduct foreign policy as other nations have had to conduct it for so many centuries—without escape and without respite. . . .This condition will not go away."—Henry Kissinger, 1977.

"White South Africans have chosen the path of Ian D. Smith. . . .A dismayed Archbishop Desmond Tutu said on Thursday that South Africa had entered the 'darkest age of its history.'" —Allister Sparks, *Washington Post*, May 10, 1987.

IN OUR LIFETIME, there have been two epochal events that almost nobody anticipated, certainly not in the way in which they came about: the fall of communism in the Soviet Union, and the fall of apartheid in South Africa, in both cases with very little bloodshed.

The most fundamental reasons for the fall of each regime were the same: loss of legitimacy and economic failure. But there are many other countries where the United States would wish to see a similar outcome—North Korea and Cuba among them—where legitimacy is long lost and where the economic situation is worse than it ever was in the Soviet Union and South Africa. Clearly, more was involved than just these two factors. The crucial extra element was the engagement of the United States in each country—but it was an engagement of a somewhat paradoxical kind. For the process by which those two systems were brought down is almost directly a product of the seeming chaos and unpredictability that characteristically surrounds the formation and implementation of American foreign policy.

The view that the United States played a significant role in the overthrow of these two systems of government runs counter, of course, to the widely-accepted notion of the limitations on U.S. power that have prevailed since Vietnam. To give one influential example, Seweryn Bialer of Columbia University wrote as late as 1986 that:

> [T]he ability of the West to effect change within Soviet Russia, let alone rapid change, is severely limited. . . .Even if the West were able to impose extreme economic choices, the system would not crumble, the political structures would not disintegrate, the economy would not go bankrupt, the leadership would not lose its will to rule internally or to be a global power.[1]

John H. Chettle, a former Rhodes Scholar, was for nearly two decades director of the South Africa Foundation for North and South America. He is now an American citizen and partner in the law firm of Freedman, Levy, Kroll & Simonds in Washington, DC.

[1]Seweryn Bialer, *The Soviet Paradox* (New York: Knopf, 1986), p. 354.

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Analysts were no more sanguine about America's ability to influence developments in South Africa. Two of the most respected Africanists in the United States, Helen Kitchen and Michael Clough, wrote in 1984 that the bipartisan consensus was that:

> The U.S. has only limited ability to influence developments in South Africa. Particularly in the short run, we do not possess any levers that can be used to *force* the white ruling group to move faster or further than its own assessments of risks and gains dictates, or to leverage blacks to adjust their priorities and tactics to our perception of reality.[2]

Even Chester Crocker, who designed the Reagan policy of constructive engagement towards South Africa, warned that the United States had only "limited influence" over the South African government, and that it must be "carefully husbanded for specific application to concrete issues of change."[3]

The belief that the United States had little influence appeared to be borne out by the reactions of the Soviet and South African governments to U.S. pressures. Both were sensitive to any impression that they could be bullied. In the 1970s the Soviets reacted sharply to the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which sought to pressure them into allowing more Jewish emigration, by actually curtailing it for several years. And in the immediate aftermath of the application of sanctions against South Africa in 1986, reforms skidded to a halt.

It was easy to conclude from these and other examples that U.S. pressure was almost always counterproductive, and to neglect the subtler, longer-term influence of the United States. Such a conclusion gratified many Americans: those who believed that the United States was suffering, in Senator Fulbright's words, from "the arrogance of power;" those who opposed on principle the policies in question; those whose business interests were adversely affected; and those who, in the tradition of Wall Street stock analysts, believed that influence, like a good stock, must show rising profits every quarter.

In truth, however, the nature and extent of American influence has been misunderstood. It was not just the armed might of the United States, nor its symbolism as the shining city on the hill, which was most effective in destabilizing these two regimes—it was rather the complex impact on closed societies of a powerful, appealing, seductive, and subversive society which carried within it, what was, for an autocracy, a virus as virulent as any Ebola. By helping to erode the core of belief that sustained each society, the United States contributed decisively to the overthrow of both regimes. The same process of erosion is now far advanced in China; while our reluctance to use that influence in North Korea and Cuba may inadvertently have prolonged communist rule in those countries.

The Power of American Complexity

THERE IS A superficial simplicity to the American philosophy of government that is deeply appealing to people around the world. The reality is something else. For all its marvelous balance and its success in preserving democratic government, that system is complex in the extreme, incoherent to the verge of chaos, conflictual often to the point of gridlock, and very unpredictable.

Part of the reason lies in the separation of powers, one of those decisions of the Founding Fathers that has mystified foreigners ever since. Then there is the habit into which the American people have fallen of putting Congress and the executive branch in different hands: in more than half of the last fifty years, at least one and usually both

---

[2]Helen Kitchen and Michael Clough, *The U.S. and South Africa: Realities and Red Herrings* (Washington, DC: CSIS, 1984), p. 15.

[3]Quoted in Pauline Baker, *South Africa: Time Running Out* (New York: Foreign Policy Association and Ford Foundation, 1989), p. 10.

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houses of Congress were under the control of the party in opposition to the president of the day. In the absence of a strong, disciplined party structure, too, there is the diffusion of power in Congress itself, both between the two Houses and within each House. (And there are the significant divisions among relevant agencies within the executive branch.) As George Shultz once complained, there is no such thing as a final decision in Washington.

Over and above these structural features, there are the multiplicity of interests and interest groups, the immense diversity of American society, and the excessive rhetoric that characterizes the conflict of those separated in fact by minor differences. From the 1960s through the 1980s there was one difference that was not minor: substantive disagreement on the central question of the nature of communism and how to deal with it. At its extremes, the difference was between a view of the Soviet Union as a ruthless and insatiable enemy that had to be confronted at every point, and one that saw it as a country not substantially different from other countries, whose encroachments offered no particular threat to the United States, and with whom we should be prepared at all times to negotiate. In a country that seldom strays too far from the middle of the road, neither extreme was often in control of policy; but these extremes always had to be taken into account by the Soviets, and their differences had real consequences.

American differences over how to handle South Africa also arose from the Cold War. For much of the period, apartheid was anathema to the vast majority of Americans. But at the same time South Africa was a friendly, staunchly anti-communist country that supported the United States in the Cold War. Those whose priority was the conflict with the Soviet Union resisted policies that might topple the South African government, whatever their reservations about its domestic misdoings. Those who were less impressed with the importance of the Cold War were more willing to help end apartheid.

These differences—symptomatic of similar differences that prevailed over a wide range of issues, including how to relate to China, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Chile—seemed to most observers to constitute an element of weakness in U.S. foreign policy. In reality they constituted one of its crucial strengths. In its crudest manifestation, the existence of this pattern of differences created a good cop/bad cop alternation which was not only difficult for America's opponents to deal with, but turned out to be profoundly destabilizing to dictatorial regimes.

Both the Soviet Union and South Africa were forced, by the sheer power of the United States and its capacity to damage their interests, to have a relationship with Washington. Both felt obliged, by the logic of that position, to attempt to improve their relationship, or at least to prevent its deterioration. Both sought to manipulate the U.S. system, usually by trying to ingratiate themselves with those in opposition to putative hard-liners. And both were confronted every day with the implications of their attempts at manipulation, as well as by the insistent, multifarious, and seemingly inconsequential demands of a free society: journalists seeking a visa, wanting to travel to forbidden areas, or sending out an adverse report; businessmen concerned about the conditions under which they had to operate; academics requesting collaboration with peers or use of research facilities; relatives of would-be emigrants seeking help; trade unionists angered by anti-labor policies; churches opposed to limitations on freedom of religion; peace groups calling for arms control; ethnic groups protesting Soviet policies; or politicians bombarded by aggrieved constituents, who could be any of the above.

There was no respite from this pressure, because there can be no respite from the demands of a free and powerful society. The only alternative for a despot was to insulate his country from contact with the United States, or to have it sealed off by the United

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States itself—in other words, to be like North Korea or Cuba. No doubt, other things being equal, the rulers of both the Soviet Union and South Africa would have often preferred insulation, but other things were not equal and neither was prepared to face the consequences that would flow from such isolation.

More Than a Negotiating Technique

THE PHRASE "good cop/bad cop" is in one critical sense misleading. It can imply a mere negotiating technique, as in the technical sense used by police, in which a suspect is induced to be truthful by alternating harsh interrogatory techniques with more understanding, sympathetic treatment. While this technique is used quite consciously by American diplomats from time to time, its success in the cases of the Soviet Union and South Africa came not from its use as a negotiating tool but from the perception—and the reality—that there were indeed powerful forces in the United States that were deeply hostile to both countries and wanted to use punitive measures against them. In other words, the success of the strategy resulted precisely from the fact that the Soviet and South African leaderships believed it was *not* just a negotiating technique.

This is the point that Chester Crocker, assistant secretary of state for African affairs throughout the Reagan presidency, misses in his otherwise highly perceptive account of his tenure:

> Ted Koppel had written in April 1985 that constructive engagement, conducted against the backdrop of an aroused public, could enable us to "calibrate" pressures and enhance our influence on P.W. Botha's government in Pretoria. Theoretically, this might make sense. But the good cop, bad cop analogy—arming a reasonable and balanced policymaker with the "threat" of a meaner alternative—does not always work well in American foreign policy. . . . Koppel's model would have worked if the good cop and the bad cop were working for the same police chief. In this case, the bad cop was not trying to help Reagan, Shultz, and me; he was trying to discredit, undermine, or replace us; and he sought to redefine U.S. policy.[4]

But it was precisely because the bad cop was *not* working for the same police chief that the "threat" posed by a potentially volatile U.S. policy to the South African government was credible. Had it come from an administration committed to engagement and driven by Cold War imperatives, it would not have been nearly as convincing.

The "crazy man" strategy used by Nixon and Kissinger at various times—in which the adversaries of the United States were confidentially warned against opposing President Nixon, because he was liable to go berserk and lash out in an incalculable way—is, of course, an imaginative variation of the bad cop strategy, exploiting the president's reputation as a strange man and as a loner. At times it even allowed Nixon himself to be simultaneously both good cop and bad cop. It was particularly useful in negotiations that conceded advantages to the Soviets, as a means of warning them against trying to take liberties with Nixon's flexibility.

All this is not to depreciate Crocker's remarkable contribution in bringing change to South Africa. Indeed, the influence of the good cop was essential in bringing about constructive change in both South Africa and the Soviet Union; and those changes weakened both regimes, and contributed to their fall when the bad cop took over. But the presence of the bad cop—sometimes in power, sometimes hovering in the background—made the blandishments of the good cop more appealing. Constructive engagement worked because destructive engagement was not merely possible but seriously proposed, and, in the case of South Africa, eventually implemented.

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[4]Chester A. Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa* (New York: Norton, 1993), p. 267.

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This is also an element that Fukuyama neglects in "The End of History?" Even while he brilliantly analyzes the philosophical and economic shortcomings of communist states, he is less clear as to why the United States was able to prevail in its struggle with the Soviet Union but not, say, against Cuba. Fukuyama points out that what made continued contact so necessary to the Soviet Union and South Africa, and what made isolation impossible as a policy option, was not just an awareness of American power but the realization that their own systems were failing. A communist system capable of mobilizing the industrial capacity of the 1950s proved incapable of mastering the technological innovations of the information age. It was clear by the late 1970s that the Soviet Union was not only falling behind the United States, it was not even keeping up with Singapore.

In a smaller way, but at more or less the same time, the effort of the South African government to run a modern economy while maintaining the fiction that 70 percent of its population would soon be going back to their own "homelands" became ever more absurd.

True, Fukuyama warns that we should not "underestimate the ability of totalitarian or authoritarian states to resist the imperatives of economic rationality for a considerable length of time,"[5] but that leaves unexamined the question of why some are able to do so while others are not. Why was there, in the case of the Soviet Union and South Africa, a voluntary decision by the old regime to cede power to a democratically-elected government, while such a decision has not been taken by Cuba or North Korea?

The answer lies in the relationship of each country to the United States. Divergent pressures from within the United States faced South Africa and the Soviet Union with a critical choice as to how to conduct their affairs. If each country continued to alienate powerful sections of American opinion, it would be denied important elements of the revolutionary new technologies. The good cop (the Right in the case of South Africa, the Left in that of the Soviets) wanted trade, contact and communication; the bad cop (the Left with South Africa, the Right with the Soviet Union) wanted sanctions, boycott, and breach. The cops were different in each case, but the effect was the same. The very existence of the bad cop made it necessary for despots to embrace the good. But in the cases of Cuba and North Korea, the *absence* of divergence has been the key. No good cop has been available to offset the bad; and they have thus been left without an option to engage.

Sir Richard Evans, Britain's ambassador to China from 1984 to 1988, well describes the identical choices now facing that country. The Sino-American Agreement of 1982, he writes:

> left China with two balances to strike: the balance between political independence at the cost of slow economic progress and rapid economic progress at the cost of at least some degree of political dependence on the United States; and the balance between an open door to Western ideas at the risk of generating political discontent and a door shut to such ideas at the risk of excluding industrial know-how. Much in China since 1982 has turned on the management of these balances.[6]

Those choices for China arise from the same contending forces in American democracy that dominated the debate on relations with the Soviet Union and South Africa: between a U.S. national interest narrowly construed and one that incorporated the traditional American commitment to liberty; between a stress on the limits to U.S. power and more expansive ideas; between traditional concepts of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries, and an equally tra-

[5]Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and The Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992), p. 95.

[6]Sir Richard Evans, *Deng Xiaoping and the Making of Modern China* (New York: Viking, 1994) pp. 261-2.

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ditional moral urge to interfere; between the United States as exemplar and as trader. And finally on a less elevated level, between periods when media and public attention are focused on a country, and times when they are not. In short, China, like the Soviet Union and South Africa before it, is now being subjected to the happy—and messy—unpredictability of U.S. foreign policy.

A Propensity to Bewilder

AMERICANS RARELY appreciate how unpredictable their foreign policy can be. As citizens of the most powerful country in the world, they have less reason to brood over long-term influences and consequences; they are involved in the here and now in a way that no other nation can afford to be. Geographical isolation, too, has allowed America to escape the ancient disputes and fractures that still haunt less fortunate countries. During the time that I had dealings with them as director of the South Africa Foundation in Washington, I found that State Department desk officers usually had superb command of the events of the last six months, but had sometimes never heard of the Great Trek, an event not much less significant in South African history than the shots fired on Fort Sumter are in American history.

One can count at least five sharp alternations in U.S. policy toward South Africa over the past three decades—changes which, to a smaller country confronted by the power of the leader of the free world, were both confusing and alarming.

Up to the end of the Eisenhower administration, the United States followed the policy of friendship and non-intervention that had prevailed since the Second World War. The United States abstained on UN resolutions critical of South Africa's race policies on the grounds that it was a matter that fell within South Africa's domestic jurisdiction. The first departure was to vote to condemn South Africa for the Sharpeville massacre in 1960. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations broke with Eisenhower's policy of benign neglect, instituting a voluntary arms embargo and voting to terminate South Africa's mandate over South West Africa, now Namibia. The Nixon administration changed policy again, though without fanfare, by adopting National Security Council Study Memorandum 39 (NSSM 39) of August 15, 1969, which proposed encouraging reform by broadening contact, on the assumption that "the Whites are here to stay, and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them."[7]

The Carter administration reverted to the tone of the Kennedy/Johnson period, supporting a mandatory arms embargo and calling for a one-man, one-vote system of government, at a time when few white South Africans could even contemplate such a change. The Reagan administration shifted back to a policy of "constructive engagement," which recognized South Africa's preeminence in Southern Africa, and sought to get its cooperation in solving other regional questions before turning to South Africa itself. The policy's central premise was that hostile external pressures were counterproductive, and served only to reinforce South Africa's intransigence. But much of that policy was in turn cut short by an impatient Congress, which forced a reluctant administration to introduce limited sanctions in 1985, and more comprehensive ones the following year.

Ironically, it was television pictures of police brutality against black demonstrators that caused Congress to act—and the South African government permitted such pictures to be taken because it wanted to impress upon the United States that, racial differences aside, it was a democratic state with a free press. In permitting wider revelations of

[7]National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Africa, *Study in Response to National Security Study Memorandum 39: Southern Africa* (AF/NSC 16) August 15, 1969, p. 27.

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the Stalin period as part of glasnost, Gorbachev made precisely the same miscalculation, and destroyed any remaining moral legitimacy for the continued rule of the Communist Party. Each regime adopted elements of democratic ideas partly because it thought it was the right thing to do, partly to avoid trouble, but also partly to make itself more acceptable to the United States; and each succeeded only in destroying itself. The most dangerous moment for a bad government, de Tocqueville famously argued, is when it starts on the path to reform. In effect, the United States acted as both the source of the ideas that began the process of reform and the instigator of a Tocquevillian revolution.

The Soviet case differed from the South African mainly in that U.S. policies toward it were much more reactive. The United States sometimes acted in response to Soviet adventurism or aggression, sometimes as a result of its own weakness, and sometimes because domestic opponents of U.S. policy forced changes upon an administration.

The Nixon/Kissinger détente is an example of a policy framework that arose largely from U.S. weakness—the result of the war in Vietnam, Watergate, and the need to prevent the Soviets using West Germany's Ostpolitik to destroy NATO. And yet it was a policy of profound importance that did as much to undermine the defenses of communism in the Soviet Union as any other American policy.

A different kind of détente was subsequently pursued by the Carter administration, which soon developed its own form of unpredictability in the form of basic differences in approach between Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. More from the pressure of events than from the differences among his advisors, the president who began his administration by rejecting an "inordinate fear of communism" ended it by initiating a defense build-up in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

But, again, this period of division and weakness in U.S. policy did much to undermine the Soviets. It lured them into overconfidence and complacency; Moscow overextended itself abroad, let down its guard at home, and became dependent on trade and investment with the West. The full consequences of this did not become clear until the Carter administration was succeeded by an administration more openly and definitively anti-Soviet than any since Truman's. The Reagan administration banned most trade with the Soviet Union, suspended Aeroflot's landing rights, reduced cultural, scientific, and exchange programs, held no summit meeting for over four years, restricted the entry of Soviet visitors, and generally intensified its efforts to isolate the "evil empire." Covertly, it sought to strike at the very sources of Soviet power, and, through the Reagan Doctrine, at its forays into the Third World.

The reasons for those sharp alternations of policy toward both countries varied. The interesting question is: What was the impact, not of the discrete policies themselves, but of their propensity to displace one another with such bewildering frequency?

A Profoundly Subversive Force

RICHARD NIXON APPEARED to give the Soviets something they desperately desired: a recognition of and legitimacy to their claims over Eastern Europe. While Nixon dismissed "The Basic Principles of Relations," the charter for détente, in two lines in his memoirs, to the Soviets it was the major achievement of the 1972 summit. But the fatal consequence of this achievement was the largest infusion of Western influence into Russia since Peter the Great.

The jamming of Western broadcasts was suspended. As a result, in any given week about 20 percent of the adult Soviet population was exposed to at least one of the four major Western broadcasters: the BBC, Deutsche Welle, the Voice of America, and

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Radio Liberty.[8] Vladimir Bukovsky tells the story of getting together with friends to sign a petition in support of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's 1970 Nobel Prize:

> As usual, Yakir. . .called around Moscow to collect the signatures of friends. Somebody jokingly suggested that he should ring Khrushchev—after all, it was on his orders that Solzhenitsyn had first been published. No sooner said than done. Nina Petrovna Khrushchev answered the telephone and passed it to Nikita.
>
> 'Have you heard the news?' asked Yakir. 'They've given Solzhenitsyn the Nobel Prize!' 'Of course, of course,' said Nikita cheerfully, 'I've heard. I get all the news from the BBC.'[9]

Trade and investment, cultural and scientific exchanges, tourism and cooperative ventures burgeoned, and with them, the number of Soviets who were exposed to reality, as opposed to the lies fed them by their government. In the course of the 1970s, Soviet trade with the West tripled, and the American share of Western exports to the Soviet Union grew from 8 percent in 1974 to 20 percent in 1979. The Soviet economy became intertwined with that of the West to the extent that the country was no longer autarkic.

This, in turn, made the Soviet Union vulnerable to economic pressure and global dislocations. Overall Soviet trade, for example, grew to $52 billion in 1982, before declining to $41.2 billion in 1986, a reflection above all of the collapse in the price of oil. This necessitated a sharp reduction in imports, particularly of food. Grain purchases fell 52 percent in value, even more in tonnage.[10] A 20 percent drop in overall trade is drastic enough, but in the light of what we subsequently learned about Western miscalculation of the size of the Soviet economy, the implications become even more devastating. As late as 1991/92, the CIA's *World Factbook* estimated the 1990 Soviet GNP as $2,660 billion. But the *World Bank Atlas* of 1992 estimated only $479 billion for Russia and $121 billion for the Ukraine, and *The Economist*'s publication, *The World in 1993*, guessed $137 billion for Russia and $9.7 billion for the Ukraine. In light of this very steep downward revision, we have to revise sharply upward our appraisal of the Soviets' dependence on Western trade to help transform their economy.

What made it doubly difficult for the Soviets was that the technology they were now acquiring itself undermined the very basis of internal Soviet power. In the early phase of computer development, large mainframe computers strengthened the capacity for centralized control. But as the emphasis shifted to decentralized systems, it came instead to threaten authoritarian control. Private possession of printing presses or copy machines was forbidden, but every computer or word processor connected to a printer became a potential source of subversion. To prevent that, to locate all computers in central institutions under official control, would sacrifice the technical efficiency of the new development. The impact of the computer revolution on the Soviet Union has been compared to the "creative destruction" that Joseph Schumpeter saw as characteristic of periods of major technological change. It was more than that. Schumpeter feared that capitalism might eventually destroy itself. Instead, one of the greatest ironies of the twentieth century is that capitalism, imported into the citadel of its greatest historical rival, ended up destroying communism.

The advance guard, peacefully storming

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[8]Ellen Mickiewicz, "Policy Issues in the Soviet Media System," in *The Soviet Union in the 1980's*, edited by Erik P. Hoffmann (New York: Academy of Political Science, 1984), p. 115; in 1950 only 2 percent of Soviet citizens had shortwave sets, but by the 1980s some 50 percent had access. Walter Laqueur, *The Dream that Failed* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 62.

[9]Vladimir Bukovsky, *To Build a Castle—My Life as a Dissenter* (New York: Viking, 1979), p. 138.

[10]Abraham S. Becker, "Main Features of United States-Soviet Trade," in *Soviet Foreign Policy*, edited by Robbin F. Laird (New York: Academy of Political Science, 1987), p. 68.

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the Kremlin walls, was business. Conservatives in the United States blanched when American business, as usual all but innocent of ideology, "cozied up" to the Communists; and liberals bent every effort to get American business out of South Africa. Both were wrong. Business was—and is—a profoundly subversive force. It is highly rational, which despotisms are not and cannot afford to be. It is focused on the consumers' needs and wishes, which despotisms never are. It comes laden with dangerous tools: intelligence, information, computers, telephones, faxes, xerox machines. In retrospect, it is clear that Lenin was wrong when he said that businessmen would manufacture the rope with which communism would hang them. Business may have made the rope, but it was communism that was strangled by it.

In the case of apartheid the process was slightly different, but the result was the same. In South Africa, U.S. businesses sought to demonstrate their principles and protect their position by applying non-racial standards throughout their operations—the so-called Sullivan Principles. Their individual actions may have been small, but when followed by other foreign and South African businesses, the cumulative result was revolutionary. It created a dynamic sector of the economy based on integration and racial equality. Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd, the architect of apartheid, recognized the danger to the regime when he said that he preferred a South Africa that was poor and separate to one that was rich and integrated.

The Vulnerablility of Elites

ENGAGEMENT WORKS for reasons that are so obvious that they are usually overlooked. Contact with other human beings makes an impact. It elicits information. It provokes comparison. It induces change. It subverts. It is ignorance that gives isolated and tightly-controlled states whatever coherence they possess.

This obvious point was resisted by both Left and Right in the United States for two reasons. Both Left and Right argued—with a fine disregard for consistency where it did not suit their ideological stance—that contact conferred moral legitimacy on the pariah state. And both feared that the United States would be taken for a ride. They feared that the controls in the Soviet Union and South Africa (and China, Nicaragua, Chile, Cuba, and North Korea, for that matter) were so pervasive and state power so great that the only contact would be with trusted officials who were somehow thought to be immune from the effects of interaction.

But they were not. Just as Gorbachev's long trips to France and Italy in the mid-1960s enabled him to see how starkly the imperialist camp differed from the portrait of it drawn in Soviet propaganda; and just as Alexander Yakovlev was influenced by his time as an exchange student at Columbia University and then his ten-year stint as ambassador to Canada, so were tens of thousands of others changed by exposure to the West. A new "yuppie" professional class emerged, in politics, in the KGB, in the military, the think-tanks, the scientific institutions, and among the intelligentsia. This class became progressively aware of the vast discrepancy between the truth and what they had been told; between states that were afraid to allow their own citizens to travel and those that were not; between states that worked, and those that did not.

And, of course, where communist societies were gray, dull, cautious, regimented, and conformist, capitalism was chic, stylish, noisy, irreverent. Tasteless often, no doubt, but American music—brash, appallingly loud, vulgar, with lyrics very properly condemned by Tipper Gore—captured the youth. Bukovsky has written vividly of the impact of the early Western contact:

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There was the World Youth Festival in Moscow in 1957, then the American exhibition in 1958—the first swallows from the West in our entire Soviet history. All this talk about "putrefying capitalism" became ridiculous. The importance of these events was comparable to the exposure of Stalin. Moscow was transformed before our very eyes. . . .The music drifting through the windows on summer evenings was no longer Utyosov's ersatz pop, but jazz and rock 'n' roll, bought secretly on the black market. It was recorded from radio onto X-ray films, and these "records" were then sold by the millions by enterprising individuals. If you held them up to the light you could see people's rib cages on them. . . .Young men started fitting themselves out with narrow trousers in the Western style—so narrow that it took a heroic struggle to get into them at all. And although the Komsomol vigilantes used to catch them at first. . . nonetheless the fashion caught on and soon the entire Komsomolarchy was going around in them too.[11]

A generation later, these new forms of influence began to make their impact on the other communist leviathan. David Shambaugh has sketched the "complex web of relationships" which has grown up since 1979 between American states and Chinese provinces, municipalities, universities, and professionals in many different areas of interest. Several million American tourists have visited China and, more important, around eighty thousand Chinese students and scholars, the cream of the Chinese intelligentsia and future leadership, are at any one time in American universities.

These relationships all develop their own dynamics, their own vested interests, their own subtle forms of influence. They bring to isolated and historically xenophobic societies a consciousness of their own backwardness, not only technological but political. Equally important, they also serve to mobilize U.S. groups with interests in specific aspects of policy toward the particular country in question—apart from businesses there are human rights groups, trade unions, churches, anti-abortion groups, arms control interests, media interests, and many more. Each brings with it some form of pressure, constraint, and control analogous to those imposed on policy by the democratic process itself. In a very real sense, the U.S. relationship invariably introduces aspects of a plural society into states dominated by a single party.

The very fact that the Soviet Union was a society in transition made it vulnerable when its supreme challenge came during the Reagan administration. It was a similar transition that made the South African government vulnerable at exactly the same time. While the challenge to the Soviet government came from the Reagan administration, and the challenge to the South African government came from Congress over the objections of the Reagan administration, the results were identical.

The South African transition has received less attention than the Soviet one. The social change within society was less noticed because the same government remained in power and there was no analogue to Gorbachev to dramatize the process. But, almost unnoticed, the basis of its support changed. By 1970 the proportion of Afrikaners still living on the *platteland* (the countryside) was 12 percent—down from 90 percent at the beginning of the century. The consequences of this shift were profound. It led inevitably to a decline in the control and conformity characteristic of a rural society. There was greater freedom and emancipation among the young and contact with a more cosmopolitan population with different values. The National Party ceased to be mostly a party of farmers and blue-collar workers as its supporters moved into business and the professions. This was accompanied by an explosive growth in education. The number of Afrikaners at university grew sevenfold in the course of twenty-five years. One

[11]Bukovsky, p. 139.

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result was to produce a better educated, richer, more widely traveled, and more experienced group, at the very time when similar changes were taking place among the blacks. The latter, in turn, were inspired by the American Civil Rights movement and Martin Luther King, Jr., just as the American political tradition helped to fuel dissident activity in the Soviet Union.

It was precisely a group like the Afrikaner Nationalists, deeply and genuinely religious, that was most susceptible to the moral disapproval of the world. They harbored a love-hate relationship with the United States. The United States was the leader of an embattled Free World in whose ranks they sought to include themselves, and it was the most powerful economic force, which a new generation was beginning to see in genuinely global terms. Like the Soviets, they sought every opportunity to visit it, to attend joint conferences, to be thought well of.

At the same time, in more or less the way that these things work in an interrogation room, both the South Africans and the Soviets developed personal relationships with the interrogator. Gorbachev came to treasure his relationship with Reagan. Similarly, one knew immediately when Pik Botha, South Africa's ambassador to Washington and then long-time foreign minister, had met with Henry Kissinger. For days afterwards his eyes would bulge and his moustache quiver as he described vast concepts of global balance and strategic macropolitics of which he had hitherto appeared to be innocent.

While still resentful, the Afrikaners believed that if they made some adjustments in apartheid, the United States would recognize their good faith. And either from calculation or ignorance, or just an amiable desire to please, the usual list of suspects—visitors, journalists, diplomats, and businessmen—were often prepared to suggest that that might be so.

"What Do You Want of Us?"

IN THESE WAYS, the American influence was profound. Consider the impact of NSSM 39, the denounced, derided, and somewhat duplicitous "study" memorandum on South Africa leaked by the Nixon administration. Although nobody admitted paternity for this document, it was, in fact, a singular success. It sought to influence South Africa in the direction of certain specific improvements of policy in return for some quiet relaxation in U.S. strictures and prohibitions. Within ten years most of the objectives in this ambitious wish list had been achieved, and within fifteen almost all of them had been, including the abolition of the pass laws, perhaps the most cruel and indispensable part of apartheid.

To an extraordinary extent these reforms were implemented before sanctions were enacted, and were put in place during the tenure of the Reagan administration, the most well-disposed administration since that of Eisenhower. The South African government found in Reagan a leader who did not hesitate to call South Africa an "old ally," and who shared its preoccupation with the threat posed by the Soviet Union. It was easier to concede to a friend what would have been strongly resisted if demanded by an enemy.

Easier, too, because Chester Crocker, the assistant secretary of state for Africa who had instituted the policy of constructive engagement, was himself coming under increasing pressure to change the policy as riots and police brutality in South Africa were translated into a congressional revolt against the policy. Of course, this was not the only pressure on the South African government: it was under siege at home and increasingly isolated abroad. But the American government was seen as the key to improving South Africa's position: "Let's get down to brass tacks," said Pik Botha, by now foreign minister, to Chester Crocker in February 1985, "What do you want of us, and in what timeframe?"[12]

[12]Crocker, p. 268.

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Crocker tells us that he finessed the question, but he is less than completely candid as to why. Crocker knew that the only solution that would be acceptable to the United States was the only solution that would be acceptable to the black majority in South Africa: black majority rule. Botha himself may or may not have known that, but it would not have been helpful to the process of reform for it to be said. And so the South African government was encouraged to change individual policies with the implicit hope that each change would make it more acceptable to international, and especially American, opinion.

The changes had dire consequences to the stability of the regime. Each one represented a further departure from the logic of apartheid (as each change in the Soviet Union was a retreat from the proposition that it was the true representative of its workers); each change made control more difficult, as indeed it did in the Soviet Union; each change represented a diminution in legitimacy and self-confidence; and each change was harbinger of the fall.

Eventually it became impossible for Nationalists to conceal the truth even from themselves. For who could believe that all was well after decades of pass law raids and a million arrests a year; after all the crude apparatus of racial division and classification, as officials passed pencils through hair to determine race; after parceling out millions of human beings into "separate" areas that could never remain separate; after all the efforts of a bloated bureaucracy to keep families apart and out of the cities, supposedly to create some native nirvana at home; after establishing those pitiful little "homelands," while the great masses of blacks moved inexorably into the cities in search of opportunity and a livelihood? After all the mindless cruelty and oppression, who could believe that South Africa knew best how different races should live together?

One of the first foreigners to understand what was going on was Conor Cruise O'Brien. In a prescient 1979 essay, he reported finding "an unexpected force among the political class who rules South Africa." That force, simply, was guilt. He told of an impression "of good men who had inherited certainties, which no longer convinced them, and who were now groping their way, in considerable intellectual, and some moral discomfort."[13]

Closer observers of South Africa knew that this unhappiness and moral ambivalence had existed for a long time. But while the system maintained its momentum, while belief in its ultimate success continued, and while fear of its retribution prevailed, it seemed impervious to the moral factor. When the Nationalists themselves began to doubt that the future would indeed be better, however, it called into question everything else. As was the case in the Soviet Union, when the core of belief rotted away, all that remained was inertia, careerism, the strength of the status quo, and plain fear.

The Role of the Bad Cop

THOSE, OF COURSE, were not inconsiderable obstacles; a state may last a long time even when sustained by nothing more. And this is where the bad cop was necessary, in the case of both countries. In retrospect, the economic issues look more important than they appeared at the time. It is becoming increasingly apparent that the proximate course of the fall of the Soviet Union was its over-extension, the systematic denial of resources to it, and the strains caused by its need to keep up with U.S. defense spending, particularly that related to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

And indeed, it is almost axiomatic that a country controlled by a clique, and under challenge from a bad cop, will spend too much on arms. Western analysts miscalculat-

[13]"The Guilt of Afrikanerdom," *Observer*, July 29, 1979.

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ed not only the size of the Soviet economy but the sheer burden of defense spending on the country. Nor were they alone. Georgi Arbatov, director of the Institute for the Study of the United States and Canada and a member of the Central Committee, maintains that "the leadership did not fully realize how unbearable our military burden was."[14]

We now know that the sustained economic pressure on the Soviet Union was part of a concerted strategy on the part of the Reagan administration to bankrupt that country.[15] The strategy encompassed the arms build-up, covert assistance to the Polish Solidarity movement and to the Afghan *mujahidin*, the denial of easy credits, and a campaign against Western support of the trans-Siberian pipeline. Most devastating of all, it sought to pressure the Saudis to increase oil production, thus bringing about a decline in its price. This had the double advantage of reducing U.S. expenditures while denying the Soviet Union foreign exchange. Indeed, it contributed to reducing Soviet oil revenues by a third.

Despite all this, it would be too great a leap to conclude that economic desperation alone caused the fall of the Soviet Union. Indeed, one might even conclude that the reform process was initiated in part because Gorbachev was influenced by the over-optimistic assessments of Western academics like John Kenneth Galbraith and Paul Samuelson. The latter, a Nobel Prize winner in economics, held as recently as 1985 that, "What counts is results, and there can be no doubt that the Soviet planning system has been a powerful engine for economic growth."[16] Gorbachev would not be the first political leader to have been misled by his own press reports, but he may have been the first to be misled by those of his adversaries.

Vladimir Bukovsky, no enemy of harsh measures against the Soviet Union, is surely right to conclude that while the Reagan strategy may have made perestroika inevitable, and shortened the existence of the Soviet Union by ten to fifteen years, it was not by itself responsible for its demise.[17] What is clear is that, its isolation breached by the need to respond to détente, its will sapped by a growing consciousness of its moral, political, and economic failure, the communist order was unable to parry the attack of the Reagan administration.

The South African economy was, if anything, in less obvious trouble, although the argument about sanctions has tended to direct scrutiny to the wrong places. In terms of their direct and measurable economic effects, sanctions were a failure. South African exports were higher when President de Klerk released Nelson Mandela from jail in 1990 than they had been when comprehensive U.S. sanctions were imposed in 1986. In 1984, South Africa had a deficit on the current account of its balance of payments, but from 1985 to 1989 it had a respectable surplus every year. Its real growth rate, which had averaged a meager 1.2 percent from 1980 to 1985, actually improved to 2.1 percent in 1987 and 3.7 percent in 1988—not spectacular, but not a reflection of the effectiveness of sanctions either.

And yet, contrary to what many opponents of the South African government, including myself, believed at the time, sanctions were important, perhaps vital, in sapping the will of the government. Though short on economic impact, their long-term associated and psychological effects were very great. The most devastating blow, though almost never mentioned in the debate on sanctions, was the flight of domestic South

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[14]Georgi Arbatov, *The System: A Life in Soviet Politics* (New York: Random House, 1992), p. 181.

[15]See Peter Schweizer, *Victory* (New York: Grove/Atlantic, 1994).

[16]Quoted in Arnold Beichman, "Seeing Capitalistic Light?" *Washington Times*, October 15, 1991.

[17]Vladimir Bukovsky, "Inside the Assault That Ended the Cold War," *Wall Street Journal*, August 8, 1994.

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African capital that occurred despite a seemingly rigid system of exchange controls. Depending on how one defines capital flight, South Africa may have lost as much as $32 billion between 1970 and 1988. In every year but one between 1972 and 1988 there was an outflow of capital, and on two occasions it may have been close to 10 percent of gross domestic fixed investment. This flight was above all a measure of the lack of confidence of South Africans themselves in the future of the country under apartheid. When we note that the capital flight between 1985 and 1988, the time during which sanctions were applied, is estimated at $10 billion, the connection with the imposition of sanctions is clear.

Almost as damaging was South Africa's decision in 1985 to declare a moratorium on repayment of its short-term debts, following the decision of Chase Manhattan Bank in July 1985 to freeze unused credits to South African borrowers and not to renew short-term loans. While this decision was made before the United States voted for comprehensive sanctions, it was taken in an atmosphere in which such a decision seemed increasingly likely. The Chase Manhattan decision, triggering similar action by other banks, was based on a prudent evaluation of its interests, but as a result loans to and investment in South Africa virtually collapsed. South Africa became a developing country with no funds from abroad for development; it was a capital-hungry country that was obliged to export capital.

But again, while the consequences of these two long-term developments were profound, they served to reduce the lifespan of apartheid, not to deal it a deathblow. While the pain—mainly in the form of unemployment—fell on those least able to bear it, it showed the ruling class that the bad cop was in earnest. They could resist only by turning the country into a Sparta, perpetually mobilized for the single objective of keeping down the Helot population.

It was at this critical time that a number of circumstances combined to push South Africa toward negotiation. The collapse of Soviet power removed one of the greatest fears of the ruling party. Quietly, without even notifying his closest associates, Nelson Mandela, still a prisoner, had begun discussions with the government. A number of pro-sanctions institutions in South Africa, including major church and trade union groups, began to temper their demand for further sanctions. And the United States, confronted by these developments and by the sharp move to the right in the 1987 South African election, paused in its progress towards further sanctions, while keeping open the option of future progress along that road. If the original shock of sanctions, passed over the veto of President Reagan, had been profound, this too was an interesting and effective use of American power. Merle Lipton, one of the shrewdest observers of sanctions, noted:

> If comprehensive, or even fuller, sanctions had been imposed on South Africa this would have strengthened the hand of the siege economy advocates in the internal debate. The fact that sanctions were gradual and limited and that their escalation was never inevitable, left open the possibility of normalizing South Africa's relations with the international community.[18]

In short, once again the alternation of good cop and bad cop was helpful in producing just the right mix of change and uncertainty.

It may seem paradoxical, but for an authoritarian regime, the easiest attitude to deal with is one of total opposition. It enables the autocrat to tap nationalist resentment of interference. No argument for compromise need be made because no compromise is attainable. The divisions that exist within every party, no matter how seemingly monolithic, cannot manifest themselves because they have nowhere to go.

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[18]Merle Lipton, *The Challenge of Sanctions* (London: London School of Economics, 1990), p. 29.

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No Contact, No Success

IT IS PRECISELY those states in which there has been little or no positive American involvement, only American hostility, that are most likely to maintain stable and despotic governments. In Cuba and North Korea, the United States has shown a gratifying unity of purpose—and uniform failure. One can lay down a general rule: Any despot inclined to maintain his position should avoid contact with the United States at all costs, even when—perhaps particularly when—the latter comes bearing gifts. Those rulers who have, for whatever reasons, lived by this injunction have enjoyed long and honored lives, and have been followed by crowds, weeping with apparent regret, at their funerals. Kim Il Sung of North Korea, Enver Hoxha of Albania, and Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran are testimony to this truth. Of course, these despots pay a price; nobody is going to spend an agreeable few days in downtown Pyongyang browsing through the antique shops—provided that leaders are prepared to preside over economic disaster areas, and don't mind their populace cycling to work, all is well.

But the moment Americans get involved—with their endless soul-searching, their endemic ethnocentrism, their constant moralizing, their relentless desire to do good, and their well-placed faith in the ability of their own system to provide good governance—a despotic regime is in trouble. Fortunately, most despotic governments do not realize this, or, to the extent they do, they have an unbounded faith in their own ability to take the Americans for a ride, or to control the process of change. Such an assumption is not, on the face of it, illogical. Most despotic governments preside over peoples cowed by police power. Most have large armies. Most appear stable. But despite all this, once isolation has been breached, the result is well-nigh irreversible.

This analysis of the American role in the downfall of communism and apartheid will perhaps be viewed by many as an example of American egocentricity or an irritating triumphalism. But the simple fact is that, in promoting the wider aims of democracy, no country other than the United States has either the interest, the idealism, or the muscle to do the job. Even with a comparatively unimportant country like South Africa, the European powers were less able to escape their dependence on its resources than the more autarkic United States. Most other democratic countries are too small or too peripheral to the despotic countries to be of concern to them. Some are too cynical or too polite to apply pressure.

In retrospect, it may have been a great misfortune for the Cuban people that its refugees in Florida worked so hard and established so profound a political influence in a key state that they removed Cuba from active debate in the United States. There were no conferences at which Castro's spokesmen could be publicly or privately challenged, no U.S. companies to erode the foundations of the regime, no tourists, no possible U.S. concessions held out at the price of a few of his own.

It is in this light, too, that one should judge the mission of former President Jimmy Carter to North Korea in June, 1994. Many believe he was naive to go there. Certainly his soliloquies on the reverence of North Koreans for Kim Il Sung have unhappy echoes of the fellow travelers of the 1930s who expressed their admiration for Stalin, or of the British government's recommendation to the queen that she give President Ceausescu a knighthood. But naiveté, in a sense, is essential. Someone has to play the good cop, and it is better played sincerely.

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The Moral Factor

I HAVE USED good cop/bad cop terminology for the sake of convenience. But it should not obscure the fact that the phenomenon I describe is serious indeed. The American foreign policy dialectic is a very potent force, a creative tension that the American system produces as a matter of course. And underlying it is the sheer power of the idea of freedom—an idea so powerful that not even those opposed to freedom condemn it, but are obliged to argue that their countries already have it, or that they are on the way to it, or that they are about to achieve a more perfect version of it, or that the freedom that the West enjoys is false.

In short, underlying the appeal of the United States—and of the West in general—is the moral factor, something easy to neglect, and often dangerous to rely upon. After all, the Soviet Union lasted for more than seventy years, and to have attempted to confront that power clad only in the armor of righteousness would have been folly. The realist school of international affairs looks with understandable skepticism at such woolly-mindedness, and rightly so. But for all that, the debate over whether realism or idealism should be the basis of U.S. foreign policy is misplaced—or, put differently, the very existence of the debate is a source of immense but unperceived power to the United States. Both realism and idealism are irrevocably a part of U.S. foreign policy. Sometimes the United States tilts to one side, sometimes to the other, but administrations can no more avoid the influence of both elements than they can avoid the next election.

In the end apartheid was brought down neither by sanctions nor by constructive engagement. The two were constructive allies. It was their coexistence that was so seductive. Similarly, peaceful coexistence combined with high defense budgets, we now realize, was the recipe for the peaceful extinction of the Soviet Union. In the end, the strategy of the United States, an unconscious reflection of its own complex nature, helped bring about the disintegration of these two hostile systems of government, making peaceful change possible. □

> The major advances in civilization are processes that all but wreck the societies in which they occur.
>
> —Alfred North Whitehead

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Is There Life After Victory?

What NATO Can and Cannot Do

Josef Joffe

HISTORY COUNSELS that defeat and victory are the two deadliest moments in the life of alliances. Defeat is nature's way of telling an alliance that it does not work, that its reason for being has vanished. Surrender is the end, dissolving both bonds and obligations. And so no coalition has ever survived capitulation.

But alliances also die when they win. The European-wide league against Napoleon had unraveled by 1822, if not sooner. The Western compact against Imperial Germany was a dead letter by 1920. The Soviet-American partnership of World War II survived victory by only a few months. These were not mere accidents of history. For victory, too, robs coalitions of their *raison d'être*. When the great threat disappears, so does the glue that binds nations in alliance. Worse, once partners no longer need to worry about their common enemy they begin to worry about one another: How will yesterday's comrade-in-arms use his unshackled power tomorrow? With nothing to absorb his might, will he not turn it against me? Rivalry resumes as the victors turn to face one another.

True, NATO still endures even in the year 6 A.C., (After the Cold War). No member has moved to dissolve it, none has even intimated a desire to abscond. Everything is still in place: the Brussels headquarters and the secretary-general, the infrastructure and the training, the doctrine and the maneuvers. Nonetheless, the longest-lived alliance of free nations cannot escape the question that confronts all victorious coalitions: What is its reason for being if the threat that spawned and sustained it is gone?

This article proceeds in three parts. First, it will define the problem of an alliance that remains all dressed up but with no place to go. Second, it will look at two solutions to the quandary of victory that have *not* worked, and explain why. Third, it will conclude by suggesting a modest remedy that might yet carry this indispensable institution into ripe old age.

The Curse of Victory

THE PROBLEM may best be described in the language of micro-economics. NATO finds itself in the position of a firm that, having been an exemplar of excellence for decades, suddenly faces a severe downward shift of the demand curve for its traditional wares. In NATO's case, the problem is the drastic decline of the strategic threat, and hence of the demand for its two best products: deterrence and defense. Faced with an ailing cash cow, what does such a company do?

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There are four, and *only* four, basic choices:

A. The firms sells its remaining assets and closes its doors.

B. The company downsizes *pari passu* with the decline in demand, hoping to regain an equilibrium between costs and revenues to keep shareholders from defecting.

C. It develops *new products* for its classical market in order to replace yesterday's "cash cow" with new "shooting stars."

D. The ailing firm tries to conquer *new markets* for its old product.

The last two of these four are precisely the strategies NATO has pursued in the past three years, but the returns have ranged from meager to downright negative.

New Products, New Markets

"*Out-of-area or out-of-business.*" Peacekeeping and peace enforcement in Europe, that is, in Bosnia, are the new products of strategy C, as reflected in this slogan. Hardly had the Cold War ended with Moscow's capitulation than a vast new security market opened up in southeast Europe. Demand for the new product emerged with Serbia's intervention against Croatia and Slovenia in 1991, leaping upward with the tripartite war that broke out in Bosnia in 1992. Yet no matter how high the demand, NATO could not deliver on the supply.

For a while, it looked as if a few newly designed goods would somehow satisfy the demands of the Bosnian security market. NATO bombed a bit, symbolically rather than tactically, let alone strategically, and the Bosnian Serbs retracted a bit.

But in the spring of 1995, a murderous gap opened between the meager security supply trickling off NATO's production lines and the burgeoning demand generated by the escalation of Serbian violence. Instead of intimidation, NATO reaped retaliation and provocation. An American warplane was shot down, UN forces were taken hostage, Tuzla was attacked in the most vicious manner, with seventy-one civilians killed in a single gruesome explosion. Nor did escalation end there. In July of this year, the ultimate (so far) provocation occurred when Serbian forces, taking UN soldiers prisoners on the way, broke into Srebrenica, a UN-designated safe haven for forty thousand starving inhabitants and refugees. Yet this time too, NATO did not act.

In short, what NATO had to offer in the way of defense and deterrence was woefully inadequate to the demand. The explanation for the failure comes in three parts, in rising order of importance and generality. First, by acting as "subcontractor" to the UN, NATO has imposed on itself an absurd chain of command: UNPROFOR must decide that it wants air support; that demand goes to Yasushi Akashi, the UN bureaucrat on the spot; thence it travels to Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the secretary-general of the United Nations, who will either do nothing or consult the Big Five; the Five, given China and Russia, will not agree; ergo, NATO cannot act.

Which leads to the second level of the explanation: Russia. After a brief period of retraction, even of subservience to the West, Russia began to act as tacit protector of the Serbs. The motive is not "pan-Slavism," the alleged bond of kinship with the Serbs. That familiar explanation does not wash. Where was that volkish tie from 1948, when Stalin had Yugoslavia expelled from the Comintern, to the break-up of the Titoist construction—essentially a Serb-dominated state? In those forty-odd years, enmity and fear, not ethnic comradeship, shaped the relationship.

Great-power politics offers the better explanation. Having emerged from the shock of defeat in the Cold War, Russia has reverted to a posture of rivalry. And so Russia *rediviva* will not allow the West to dominate a region where competition with the West has been the rule since the last third of the nineteenth century. Russia will play the not-so-tacit patron of the Serbs and undo Western military operations.

Faced with taking on Russia, which the West still wants to "socialize" into a cooperative relationship, the West has in effect granted Moscow a veto power in the Balkans. A recent example was the "rapid reaction force" of ten

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thousand that Britain and France designed for use in the Bosnian theater. In obeisance to Russian cues, the force was formally subsumed under UN mandates for Bosnia. While it is more seriously armed than UNPROFOR, it is not supposed to act on its own.

The third, and most general reason, why NATO was bound to fail in the manufacture of the new peacekeeping product has to do with the very nature of this alliance. We must ask: Why was the alliance so successful in the past? What enabled it to grow into the longest-lived of voluntary coalitions? There is a simple answer: because it did not have to *do* anything. In the affairs of men and nations, there is a world of difference between a passive and an active posture, a negative and a positive strategy, a deterrent and a compellent stance.

NATO's classic strategy withstood the vagaries of time because it was passive, negative, and deterrence-bound. It was "negative" in the sense that NATO was designed to *prevent* something: an attack on its members grouped within a tightly demarcated periphery. It was "passive" in the sense that the alliance—like Mount Everest—merely had to *be* there; the sixteen member nations did not have to decide anew on their common purpose as the sun rose each day. The objective was both simple and enduring: to preserve the status quo along the Elbe River, and the means was deterrence rather than compellence—having military power, not using it.

In other words, NATO was like a mutual-savings society that never had to hammer out a unanimous decision on how actually to *spend* its assets for this or that venture, a task at which sovereign nations rarely excel. To be a member in good standing, allies merely had to pay their dues in the form of appropriate defense budgets and dispositions; they did not have to go out and fight.[1]

The basic point—the reason for NATO's endurance—need not be labored. For nations in alliance it is more comfortable to agree on the status quo than to concur on its change. To stay in place is easier than to strike out a new road, especially if along that path lurk the incalculable risks of actually using force. Above all, NATO was built around an interest that was powerful, permanent, and all-embracing: the deterrence of Soviet aggression.

In Bosnia, however, the reverse is true on all counts. Here, NATO was asked to assume an active, positive, and compellent posture. And this made all the difference in the world. Now the alliance *had* to decide what to do with its savings. Now it *had* to contemplate real risks and costs, not in the future, but in the immediate present. Now it had to *create* consensus anew each day. And now, the members quickly realized that their interests were *not* alike.

The drama of divergent interests began in 1990-91 when Germany (with Austria in tow) took on the United States, Britain, and France over the recognition of the two break-away republics of Croatia and Slovenia. This skirmish (which Bonn won) was but a harbinger of worse to come. As force projection crept to the top of the agenda, the two key members of the alliance, the United States and Germany, simply opted out. While Germany claimed that its history and constitution forbade out-of-area operations, above all in the Balkans, the United States was only too happy to hear from the European Union (in the heady days of 1992) that Bosnia was Europe's business alone.

The painful irony was yet to follow. By the winter of 1994, NATO's mere attempt to open up a new branch for out-of-area business rocked the very core of the company. (Compare this to IBM's venture into the PC market, which delivered a nasty blow to its traditional mainframe line.) As Congress threatened "lift and strike," Britain and France stridently accused the United States of betrayal and abandonment. Lifting the embargo, London and Paris claimed, would expose their

[1]Even changing the status quo of its deterrent disposition proved perilous for NATO. In 1979, internal disarray stopped the deployment of the "neutron bomb." And though Pershing II and cruise missiles *were* fielded in late 1983, the alliance was almost rent asunder in the four-year struggle to arrive at agreement on the issue.

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UN contingents to murderous crossfire—making extraction impossible without American intervention. Yet—so their diplomats shouted from the rooftops—the United States would add indifference to injury by refusing to cover the retreat. Then they demonstratively assembled *à deux* in Chartres to establish a joint air force command for peacekeeping.

The slogan "out-of-area or out-of-business" thus turned into the opposite: "Out of area and we *shall* go bankrupt." Indeed, we have only to recall the Suez Crisis and the Vietnam War to find similar alliance-poisoning ventures. The underlying cause of conflict among brethren was the same in each case. The Western alliance does not fare well when the principals shift from deterrence in the central theater to compellence in a peripheral theater (Britain and France in Suez, the United States in Vietnam). For this is where another bane of all alliances begins to work its insidious ways: the fear of entrapment. Nations are loath to be dragged into conflicts not their own. And peripheral arenas, where interests by definition are not alike, are tailor-made for the entrapment syndrome, which is as corrosive of coalitions as is the fear of abandonment.

So what about the sudden fervor that pushed the alliance into a real bombing campaign at the end of August 1995? Was it the thirty-seven dead of Sarajevo? But NATO had passed up worse provocations before. Had NATO itself changed, suddenly opening up a reliable production line in the peacemaking business?

Actually, a constellation of exogenous variables had changed, the key one being the United States. For its own reasons, the United States shed its passivity, organizing a mini-version of the Gulf War coalition. Again, American planes flew most of the missions; again, the United States had laid the political groundwork by corralling key allies and persuading the Russians to stick to verbal return-fire only. Why did the United States cavalry ride into the Bosnian skies? Given Muslim-Croatian advances in the field, and with the presidential campaign only months away, there was a window of both opportunity and necessity.

Battering the Serbs some more would finally drive them to the bargaining table—just in time to extrude Bosnia from the election campaign. Was this, at last, "NATO peacemaking"? It was, alas, neither one nor the other. It was an American-led effort to make parts of NATO a party to the war. In the longer run, all of the alliance's problems remained unresolved—above all, how much force to commit, for how long, by whom, and for what purpose. The basics had not changed: the impossibility of imposing a durable peace on three local rivals, unless the United States and its ad hoc allies were willing to stay and fight *sine die*. The locals, trapped in an existential struggle, would stay forever whereas the would-be peacemakers had previously advertised not their steady commitment but their tacit conviction that Bosnia was not worth the risks and the costs in the face of overwhelming odds of failure.

"*Grow or Die.*" What about the fourth strategy, strategy D: selling the old product in a new market? In NATO's case this would mean enlarging the realm of security and deterrence to the new democracies in the East? Though by mid-decade, all principal members were talking publicly as if NATO enlargement were only a matter of "when," and no longer of "whether," NATO as we know it will not be extended eastward. If it is so expanded, it will not be the "Real Thing," but a sweetish concoction with only a faint resemblance to "Classic Coke."

One key reason is again an old one: Russia. As long as there is the shred of a possibility that Russia *can* be socialized, the West will act on the implicit premise that Moscow is more important than Prague, Bratislava, Budapest, and Warsaw. Hence, the West will yield to Russia the tacit veto power Moscow has been demanding ever more stridently since late 1994. And should that last shred ever disappear, it will be too late. In a neo-Cold War setting of explicit and harsh rivalry, nobody in

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the West will dare enlarge. Changing the geopolitical status quo on the brink poses too many incalculable risks.

Also, there are intrinsic reasons for hesitation that will move to center stage as NATO approaches the moment of truth. Alliances must think coldly, and so they will have to consider seriously whether enlargement is actually a net gain. When they do so, they will realize that the costs are certainly impressive. To list but a few:

•With twenty or more members, NATO will lose cohesion, especially since nations like Hungary and the Czech Republic, as a careful reading of their pronouncements will reveal, hardly relish the idea of "all for one, and one for all" when it comes to the prospect of using force. (At a recent meeting in Washington, the Czech ambassador was heard to muse whether his country would really want to go to war for Turkey.)

•These nations do not feel threatened by Russia; at least they do not articulate such fears. They have other concerns at the top of their agendas. Above all, they want to be part of the Western democratic and economic club. With the possible exception of Poland, their main quest is not for military security and the onerous obligations that entails.

•Who will pay the tens of billions of dollars required to bring the new armies up to NATO standards? The new democracies do not have the money, and the old ones do not relish exporting eastward the alleged "peace dividend" resulting from the speedy rush to disarmament.

•What about tangible guarantees, especially nuclear guarantees? Surely NATO will not move troops to a forward position on the eastern border of Poland. And we cannot look forward to the Article 5 debate in the U.S. Senate.

•What about those nations—the Baltics, Ukraine—that are most vulnerable but that will be left out? Whatever new line NATO draws in the East will in practice mark off new areas of influence. To do so will be a silent signal, indeed a veritable invitation to Russia to absorb the rest—from the Baltics to Bulgaria—into *its* sphere of power.

A cold reading of the facts reveals that (again with the possible exception of Poland) NATO will be taking in security consumers rather than producers, diluting whatever cohesion it still has. That prospect will hardly galvanize the enthusiasm of the old members, especially given the lengthening shadow of Russia and the overarching desire to forestall a new power contest in and over Europe.

What if NATO, driven by past commitments, bureaucratic momentum, and East European pressures, enlarges nonetheless? If NATO does move east, it will not purvey the "Real Thing," the security community that it has so successfully marketed in its traditional realm of business.

For one thing, Russia's consent to such an extension is only conceivable under two circumstances. One is that the core product is not sold in the Eastern market, meaning tangible guarantees like forward deployment and the insertion of nuclear weapons into the enlarged security equation. (In any case, neither purveyors nor recipients would happily countenance such a move.) That has of course also been true in the case of long-time members such as Norway.[2] But add three, four, or more à la carte members to the alliance, and you end up with two different animals in the same barn. In one corner will be the "real" alliance, in the other a *soi disant* one. And that will not be NATO as we know it, a system where members used to bear the same obligations and enjoy the same succor.

The more serious threat flows from the additional compensation Russia would exact for its consent. Russia would only concur if NATO closed down its core business: a deterrence and defense structure arrayed against the one country that has been and remains too "big" for Europe. We have known Russia's price for decades. Whatever the guise, from Stalin to Yeltsin, the proposals all boiled down

[2]Other examples of a special status are France (no American troops, no American nuclear weapons outside the integrated force structure) and Spain (no U.S. nuclear weapons, no membership in the integrated force structure).

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to exchanging the existing collective defense system (A plus B *against* X) for a collective security system (A plus B *with* X, the enemy not being pre-designated and a member of the set).

The new Russia's policy is not very different from that of the old Soviet Union. The basic thrust is to dissolve the Western alliance into a wider, "overarching" structure for the sake of amity, cooperation, and understanding. Yet apart from the fact that collective security never works when needed, such a system is the very opposite of alliance.[3] It lacks the commitment and the certainty that makes for cohesion. We might still call it "NATO," but if Russia becomes a member, whether tacit or formal, it will be but the old name attached to a new thing.

Let us return to the business analogy. Conglomerization—the adding of new branches to the parent company—is not a guarantee of higher profits or resurgent growth. The expected synergistic effect frequently comes out negative because knowledge gained in the traditional sector does not travel well to unfamiliar ones; absorbing new firms, especially shaky ones, diverts resources from the core business. How does this apply to NATO? Enlargement is a noble goal, but its underlying thrust has little to do with the alliance's traditional purpose. The idea is to spread the blessings of democracy and the market to the East; the new democracies want a home and a community, and we want to extend it to them.

These are laudable objectives, but they have nothing to do with the necessities of a cohesive and effective alliance. Take another example, that of a university which decides that it has failed the community. It will lower tuition and admissions standards in order to, say, get youths off the street and the underprivileged into the classroom. What happens next? First, the university ends up with a much larger student body but fewer resources per student. Then it will have to lower standards of performance to keep the drop-out rate down. As the quality of the product declines, the best teachers and students will leave; the flow of income from research grants and alumni pockets will decline. The moral? Having shifted into new goods—community solidarity, social justice, education for the masses—the university finds that it has sacrificed its traditional and foremost function: excellence in education.

And so with NATO. The critical problem of enlargement is a set of tasks that are not just alien, but noxious to the classic purpose of alliance. Bringing in new members that seek a home rather than a fort will dilute the compact. Paying the requisite compensation to Russia will more than just dilute; it will destroy. Whatever the nature of the deal—à la carte, second-rate membership for the ex-satrapies, or an inside role for Russia—NATO as we have known and cherished it will not survive enlargement.

If the new product ("peacemaking") fails woefully short of the demand, and if the new market (enlargement) holds out more poison than profit, what is left as the alliance faces the deadly threat of a downward-shifting demand curve? Where is the future of NATO, if any?

Downsizing For Survival

GIVEN THE lackluster record of strategy C ("peacemaking") and the dubious prospects of strategy D (enlargement), what about strategies A (folding up) and B (downsizing)? We must forcefully dispatch A and opt for B.

That we should *not* close up shop should be self-evident. First, there is the residual risk stemming from a threat by the name of Russia that requires a well-oiled defense machinery. Second, pulling down the production lines will require much higher start-up costs in the next round than are involved simply in keeping them going. Third, NATO has bequeathed a precious tradition of cooperation (a huge amount of "social capital," if you will), and closing up shop will necessarily entail the re-

[3]For an elaboration, see my "Failed Dreams and Dead Ends: Collective Security and the Future of Europe," *Survival* (Spring 1992).

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nationalization of Western defenses—perhaps even the return to the older game of nations that has brought so much grief to Europe in the past.

Which leaves strategy B: downsizing—that is, producing what NATO has done best, but on a lower scale that is tailored to the reduced demand. What is NATO's classic product? Again, we must invoke the immortal phrase of Lord Ismay, the alliance's first secretary-general: "Keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down." These three functions, suitably modernized, still deliver a potent rationale for the alliance.

Keep the Russians out. Russia will be neither fully democratic nor pacific for a long time. Indeed, the process seems to be reversing ever so slowly. Russia is trying to reconstitute the former Soviet empire: peacefully where possible, violently where necessary. In the Balkans and in the Gulf, it has reverted to a competitive stance. Whatever its domestic constitution, Russia is simply too "big" for Europe; it remains, as in the Czarist and Bolshevik past, a problem in the European balance. And a downsized NATO with a rapid reconstitution capability remains a critical counterweight in the equation. Indeed, the better NATO's shape, the more it can radiate security outward into Eastern Europe, to those very states that may not become members.

Keep the Americans in. This role, too, remains vital. Even with a reduced strategic threat, it is not at all clear that European security can prevail without Atlantic security. Europe has flourished because the United States has essentially become a European power—and Europe did not so flourish in this century when American power was not part of the balance. Moreover, everybody from Lisbon to Lodz wants the Americans in, even the cranky French who, deep in their heart, want them as counterweight to German and Russian power.

Keep the Germans down. Evidently, this function has changed long ago to "keeping the Germans integrated." But even in the new setting, this function has not lost its claim on the future. Germany, though the model of pacificity and liberal democracy, is again fully sovereign, Number One, and in the middle. It is again too big to be left alone, and not big enough to go it alone. But the good news this time is that the Germans know it. Multilateralism and community are unwritten articles of their constitution. The Germans know full well that NATO and the United States reassure everybody else by shortening the shadow of German power. It follows that to remain integrated, to produce security collectively, is good for Europe and good for Germany, and the Germans will accept and cherish such a setting as long as it is available.

Let us generalize the argument: deep in their hearts, all the Europeans dread the "renationalization" of their defenses. The Atlantic Alliance has spared the Europeans the need for autonomous defense policies, one of the most powerful causes of conflict and war. They know that non-autonomy, the integration of their defense policy under a powerful outsider, provided the benign stage on which they could forget their ancient rivalries and link hands in economic and political community.[4] And deep in their hearts, the Europeans suspect that they may not live as harmoniously without their big brother across the sea.

In sum, the old functions, suitably modernized, can still serve as the new rationale for the alliance as it moves toward the ripe old age of fifty, an age which no previous alliance has ever reached. But the middle aged should not do more than their constitution permits. The attempt at new products and new markets has not re-energized the NATO enterprise; indeed, the attempt has dramatized inherent conflicts among the sixteen shareholders. Which is why the classical, but downsized product line, plus a rapid reconstitution capability, mark out the best strategy as the alliance faces the twenty-first century. □

[4]For an extended argument, see my "Europe's American Pacifier," *Foreign Policy* (Spring 1984).

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Lost Time

The Forgetting of the Cold War

Ian Gambles

THE END OF the Cold War was the beginning of its long journey into history. Countless records in many media insure that its total disappearance from human consciousness—the fate of the wars of what we call pre-history, and of some of the darker periods of recorded history—is inconceivable. People who take the trouble will always be able to learn about the Cold War, analyze its events, and interpret it in ever-changing historical perspective.

But knowledge and memory are different. To remember—not merely in the sense of personal recollection, but in the sense of remembering the fallen, remembering Munich, or even remembering Ozymandias—is to endow knowledge with meaning. Individuals and societies alike are influenced in their decision-making and their behavior by the lessons they draw from history and the importance they attach to their own inheritance. History remembered is history active on the political stage of the present. Although we *know* about the Cold War, and will continue to study, explain, and understand it, I shall argue that it is in this sense a war we have already begun to *forget*.

Forgetting recent history is not the same as forgetting the distant past—say, the Punic Wars, which took place in a world so totally unlike ours that it is impossible to conceive of them being meaningfully remembered. Forgetting the Cold War means distorting the lens through which we view the present. Consciously or unconsciously, it is an act of denial and repudiation, asserting or imagining that what was, was not, and that what was not, was. It is un-remembering.

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How We Forget

THERE ARE TWO ways of forgetting recent history: conscious state forgetting and unconscious social forgetting. *State forgetting* is the deliberate silencing of a particular part of the past for political purposes. In its extreme form, it is the Stalinists' airbrush. Totalitarian regimes can use the apparatus of repression to control information and silence dissent to the point where people profess to believe, and frequently actually do believe, that experiences within their own lifetime did not in fact happen. The Chinese Cultural Revolution, for example—perhaps the most comprehensive and violent attempt ever to disown history—would itself have been much more difficult to launch had not the desperate famines of the Great Leap Forward, and Mao's personal role in inflicting them, been the subject of some effective state forgetting.

But it is not only totalitarian regimes that engage in state forgetting. England

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decided during the First World War to forget the Germanic origins of its own royal family, smoothing the path of jingoism by removing an inconvenient reminder of a pre-nationalist history. Fifty years after the Second World War, Japan has finally half-decided to start remembering its own war crimes. Time will tell whether the democratic, bureaucratic state forgetting in the schoolroom lessons and political speech of the postwar decades has done lasting damage to the new Japan or not.

In these milder forms, which do not involve altering records or punishing remembering, the state acts rather as an initiator and facilitator of *social* forgetting: a gradual, collective loss of interest in a part of the past that conveys an undesired self-image. The democratic state, creating power by working with the grain of society, chooses and is chosen to manipulate symbols in a popular manner, elevating one period of, or episode in, history to exemplary importance and consigning another to forgotten irrelevance.

Nothing better illustrates the extraordinary power of combined state and social forgetting than post-colonial nationalism in the Third World, which turned its back on a whole pre-colonial age of non-national, largely boundary-less history. Surviving as proudly non-European nations in a world where Europeans had defined nationhood—and mapped, counted, and recorded your nation with scant regard for pre-existing realities—required forgetting on an heroic scale.[1]

It is this combination of state and social forgetting that is beginning to erode the meaning of the Cold War in contemporary European and American politics. To a degree that varies—significantly—from country to country and region to region, we have begun to treat the era of the Cold War as lost time, imagining continuity where in fact there has been change, denying and disowning the reasons why we are where we are. There is probably nothing to be done to prevent this process.

The Illusion of Resumption

WHAT DOES IT mean to say that the era of the Cold War is becoming lost time? One of the things it means is that the business of international politics is being conducted as if there were continuity between the years before and the years after that era, as if history were being *resumed*. This idea is usually conveyed in the language of freeze and thaw. The structure of international relations is said to have been frozen by the *Cold* War, the natural processes of growth, evolution, and decay chilled into motionlessness by the dead hand of superpower confrontation. The year 1989 brought the thaw, the release of this icy grip on history, the return of spring after winter, light after darkness, awakening after sleep.

There is a lot of truth in this. At least in Europe, where a managed system of confrontation without conflict was developed, the Cold War certainly did inhibit change in international politics, as I will discuss further below. But the broad sweep of the metaphor carries us too far, into the dangerous territory of forgetting. Consider two significant features of the post-Cold War scene: the empowerment of the United Nations and the resurgence of nationalism.

One of the few comparatively clear things about the muddy concept of the "new world order" is that it involves a substantial role for the UN as the active agent of the will of the international community. Since the end of the Cold War, recourse to the UN has become a prerequisite for the legitimacy of any international political-military initiative. Operations by UN forces or under the authority of a UN Security Council resolution in Iraq, Cambodia, Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Haiti have left the Cold War UN far behind, and have pursued much more ambitious goals of making or enforcing peace, settling

[1]These ideas are brilliantly explored in the revised edition of Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1991).

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state borders and supporting efforts to constitute or reconstitute legitimate governments.[2]

This empowerment of the UN rests on a metaphor of thaw and a reality of forgetting; it is deeply problematic. The development of the UN at the end of the Second World War may in some ways have been a repetition of the fallacy of collective security inherent in the failed League of Nations, but there were at least deliberate and skillful attempts to correct some of the deficiencies of the League in constituting the new version. The resurrection of the UN at the end of the Cold War repeats the fallacy but *without the reconstruction*. The failure of the UN during the Cold War—its immobilization by superpower veto, its transformation into a powerless sounding board for the grievances of the Third World—is blamed entirely on the Cold War itself, rather than explained in terms of the subordination of the logic of internationalism to the logic of power politics, a subordination that is inherent in a system of sovereign states. Thus, newly thawed, the UN is expected to take up where it left off before it vanished into the freezer.

This cannot succeed. The UN's moment of true credibility as a representative world body was indeed only a moment—the moment of creation at the end of World War II, when the distribution of power in the organization reflected the apparent strength and apparent unity of the victorious allied powers, the helplessness of the defeated, and the willingness of the other members to take a subordinate role. In contrast, the unity of the great powers since the end of the Cold War is a transient phenomenon. The consensus behind the UN's authority structure no longer exists. The General Assembly is no more than a parody of democracy, while the Security Council is a sort of antiquated and unrepresentative directoire of some of the great powers, including several who are in decline but excluding some of the major actors. As the UN extends its scope of operations into ever more controversial territory, its shallow legitimacy will crumble in the face of renewed ideological or geopolitical stand-offs among the key players.

The phenomenon of nationalism resurgent is, if anything, even more closely bound up with the rhetoric of freeze and thaw and the amnesiac mind-set. In Europe, there is a worrying tendency to see the emerging post-Cold War settlement as a continuation and completion of the aborted post-World War II settlement.[3] Then, borders were adjusted and populations shifted (only in the central areas, and only where it suited the Big Four, of course) to achieve a close alignment of nations and states. Poland became ethnically homogeneous for the first time in its history. The Sudetens and other German minorities were sent packing to a shrunken Germany. Now, with the Cold War freeze ended, the process can continue. The Germans can be reunited, and—when the Cold War finally ends there too—so can the Koreans. Azerbaijanis, Ukrainians, Slovenes, Bosnians, and Croats can all claim their states from the wreckage of repudiated Cold War federations.

Some real calamities—themselves sure to be remembered by the participants—have been suffered thanks to this forgetting of

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[2]These trends are lucidly analyzed by Adam Roberts, "The United Nations and International Security," *Survival* (Summer 1993), and "The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping," *Survival* (Autumn 1994).

[3]A striking example of this kind of thinking is provided by Sidney Blumenthal's *Pledging Allegiance* (New York: Harper Collins, 1990). Blumenthal presents Gorbachev's "common European home" as a response, unfortunately delayed forty years by the Cold War, to Roosevelt's grand design of liberal internationalism at the end of World War II. "Astonishingly enough," writes Blumenthal, "what came into view at the end of the Cold War was the view at the beginning. After an enormous hiatus, the central issues of 1945 returned." (pp. 353-4).

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recent experience and reading back into the past. The nationalists have thrown down the gauntlet in the name of national self-determination, and responded to resistance and rejection by re-inventing ethnic cleansing, the elementary and brutal method of establishing the national state by throwing non-nationals out or killing them. But these are yesterday's ideas, as their generally hostile reception suggests. Major historical changes during the Cold War, some of which happened because of that conflict, some despite it, have quashed the legitimacy and relevance of nationalist and ethnic politics. Among the most important of these changes are the increased permeability of borders to information, capital and labor; the successes, partial though they may be, of the integrationist European Communities (now European Union); the collapse of Western empires and the appearance of over a hundred new "Third World" states for whom ethnic and tribal self-determination constitutes a real threat to a fragile sovereignty; the collective international repudiation of apartheid and racism in general; and the declining long-term viability of repressive methods of control and subordination.[4] Hypnotized by the rhetoric of release, remembering historical injustices and grievances, and forgetting the transformations of the intervening years, the nationalists fight on into the past.

Disowned Causes—Disappearing Effects

THUS THE freeze/thaw rhetoric encourages a misguided belief in the continuity of history from before the Cold War to after the Cold War, an illusion of resumption and returning that neglects the realities of change in the intervening years. The result of this amnesia is a distorted perspective, the consequences of which can be grave.

But there is a second way in which we have begun to treat the era of the Cold War as lost time: by denying and disowning the reasons why we are where we are. Some of the major changes in international society that took place in the Cold War period were brought about as a direct result of that phenomenon—were indeed effects of Cold War causes. The sudden end of the conflict and the implosion of the international structure it supported *may* lead to an unravelling of these changes. As we forget the Cold War, we slide gradually into the assumption that the international society it shaped is a starting point, a given, and that these recent changes are features of its basic structure, abstracted from the vanished causes we do not wish to remember. Of course, effects can outlive their causes, but it is unwise simply to assume that they will.

Easily the two most important such changes were the move toward inviolability of borders, and the re-limitation of violence. Before the Cold War, international boundaries were not inviolable. Changing them was not a trivial matter, and frequently led to or resulted from major international wars. But changes happened regularly, whether through Metternichian deals to manage the balance of power, Wilsonian conferences to give peoples the citizenship they wanted, or unequal treaties, appeasement, military conquest, and imperial expansion. The criminalization of aggression, despite its long pedigree and its significant advance at the Nuremberg trials and in the Charter of the United Nations, remained essentially aspirational law, a hope rather than an established and generally observed norm in international society.

The Cold War changed this, and established the inviolability of borders as one of the first principles of international order. Borders arrived at more or less by accident, like the inner-German border or the Taiwan strait, came to have the future of the world staked on them. Borders were locked in place

[4]John Lewis Gaddis takes an interesting look at "tectonic" changes during the Cold War in *The United States and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), ch. 9.

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by a pervasive climate of fear. Above all, the superpowers and their allies feared the bomb. The imminence of global catastrophe was so terrifying, and the dangers of escalation in a bipolar, ideological confrontation so great, that the superpowers stood in constant and imperative need of readily available, mutually tolerable formulae for cutting off conflict. Fear led to crisis resolution through "Schelling points," points of convergence devoid of any inherent merit but which had the virtue that they could end a crisis.[5] The Schelling point of crisis resolution is hardly ever a solution to the underlying problem, but simply a grudging return to the pre-existing balance. Thus the status quo, the boundaries that already happened to be lying on the map, acquired an unprecedented authority. The Korean War, a bloody battle from an arbitrary starting point to *the same* arbitrary finishing point, did a lot to teach this lesson.

A different fear, the security paranoia of the Kremlin, pushed in the same direction. Constantly anxious to assert the legitimacy of their illegitimate empire, Moscow first created a metaphorical iron curtain and later made it concrete in Berlin in order to insist on the permanence of a contested European map. This appearance of permanence later gained wider acceptance through the Helsinki Final Act, which made explicit the bargain of détente: a softening of the harshness of Europe's division in exchange for recognition of its legitimacy.

The inviolability of borders is now regarded as fundamental to the new world order, a cornerstone of international society. Saddam Hussein's aggression attracted near-universal opprobrium—to the quite remarkable extent of lining Arab troops up with Americans against fellow Arabs attacking Israel—because it violated Kuwait's borders and sought to extinguish its sovereignty. The Bosnian Serbs have become the villain of the piece in the complex Balkan war because they represent both an internal insurrection against the borders of the Bosnian state and an external imperialist attack on them. Wherever borders are in question, from Ireland to Israel, the determination at least to say that force will never move frontiers is a required theme of political discourse. And the hapless states *manqués* that have not made it into the club—Tibet, East Timor, Kurdistan—still get short shrift.

But force can change borders. It always has and probably always will be able to do so. The Cold War was a particular, static system of coercion which locked boundaries in place. It is too soon to say how quickly or in what way force will reassert itself, whether we will see the re-emergence of the border war as a standard feature of international politics or whether the inviolability of international boundaries will be re-established on new foundations. Clearly, however, international efforts to manage the evolution of this principle will not be helped by forgetting the particularity of its Cold War causation.

The Cold War also brought back limits to violence. It is an age-old moral idea that war is subject to its own complex set of principles and rules aimed at preserving human dignity and limiting destruction. The wars of the first half of the twentieth century took a terrible toll on this idea. National, ideological warfare pursued to the bitter end with ever more destructive and indiscriminate weapons brought us by 1945 to a point where war was experienced as an all-consuming and brutal chaos of unlimited violence. Non-combatants had been deliberately slaughtered in enormous numbers by both sides in the Second World War, and the Axis powers had committed genocide and abused prisoners of war. The mobilization of nations and empires meant that, in the right conditions, violence escalated and multiplied rapidly from a single flashpoint, penetrating throughout societies and spreading over most of the globe.

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[5]So called after the distinguished American social scientist Thomas Schelling. See *The Strategy of Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963).

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The Cold War was different in a significant way. While both superpowers committed shameful crimes, they both also collaborated in a system of restraint that prevented any recurrence of unlimited war and reinvented limited war, fought in other peoples' lands, as an instrument of policy. Continental conflagrations were avoided and international wars discouraged, while internal wars in Africa, Asia, and Latin America—so-called "proxy wars"—were deliberately fueled for geopolitical purposes. This re-limitation of violence, it is vital to understand, was due not to a rise in moral standards but to a structural change in international relations.

It is difficult to say which were the most important factors bringing this about. Nuclear weapons undoubtedly played an important part, both by making victory in superpower war all but impossible and by giving both sides a sense of themselves as global custodians. So too did the new techniques of summitry and crisis management that were developed, in part out of the imperative to signal accurately about the nuclear balance and one's intentions. But other factors, harder to assess, may have counted for much too. For all its ideological and rhetorical frenzy, the Cold War was waged between two states with little objective reason to interfere in each other's spheres of influence, and whose leaders and peoples never looked on each other with the depths of hatred and contempt reserved for traitors, neighbors, and ethnic rivals.

This measured and disciplined approach to conflict has become such an accepted part of normal international behavior that it is hard to swallow the idea that it might be ephemeral. But perhaps the principles of restraint that the world abandoned in the first half of the century were revived only because of the Cold War system, and will not survive without it. Nuclear weapons are still around, but the iron discipline of the nuclear balance is gone. Great powers still exist, but their capacity and their willingness to impose restraint on others is much diminished. Reluctant to acknowledge that the bad old Cold War system might actually have been a positive moral agent, people revert to the pre-World War I illusion. Unfortunately, there is no basis for this belief, and the horrors of Bosnia and Rwanda are a stark reminder that often the most bitter memories run deepest.

It is a truism that the Cold War world was more stable than the post-Cold War world. Yet statesmen continue to act as if it ought not to be so, as if the (non-existent) "peace dividend" should include a more manageable, law-abiding world. The fact is that the reasons the world was manageable during the last half century were the Cold War reasons we choose to forget and put behind us, and no amount of wishing or assuming will project an uncaused stability into the post-Cold War void.

Regional Memory

IMAGES AND MEMORIES of the Cold War vary from country to country and region to region, reflecting differences in the degree and character of that conflict's impact and the different ways it is settling into peoples' idea of their own past. This spectrum of memory deserves detailed research in a range of source materials in many languages. What is offered here is only an impressionistic survey of the situation in Europe and America.

Consider four regions: Russia, Central and Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and the United States. For Russia, rocked in a turbulent present of political and economic uncertainty, contrasting memories of the Cold War era turn and collide in the political wind, and serve competing purposes. On the one hand, the Cold War was part of a monstrous communist plot that has only recently been exposed: an economy wrecked by collectivization and militarization, a needless severing and souring of Russia's engagement in Europe, a fruitless saga of distant foreign

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entanglements that cost money and lives. On the other hand, the Cold War offered a recognition of Russian greatness that has now been suddenly lost. Rival of the United States on the world stage, master of a great Eurasian empire and hegemon of half of Europe, leader and lynchpin of a worldwide political movement, the Russia of the Cold War would have had no trouble dealing with handfuls of rebellious Caucasians. Least forgotten in Russia, the Cold War nevertheless is not remembered clearly, as a victory or a defeat might be. A swiftly and puzzlingly vanished order, the Cold War's image is already sufficiently clouded for it to be recreated in competing ways in a fetid political imagination.

In Central and Eastern Europe, the combination of forgetting and re-imagining is nearer to producing a consensus. The Cold War is remembered as a period of order and repression, and an initial tendency to forget about the order has given way to a tendency to forget about the repression. A curious unreflective forgiveness has taken hold in many countries, allowing reconstructed socialists to (re)gain power from the bewildered parties of liberation. Forgetting breeds more forgetting—the attempt to write off forty years of society's history as one enormous foreign crime, and to hark back to pre-Cold War political parties and pre-Cold War property and privilege, encourages the losers from that process to forget their complaints against the fallen regime.

Political differences of this nature, however, can be comfortably accommodated within the framework of democratic debate, and their impact is softened by a collective sense of self-liberation. A perfectly legitimate pride in the popular insurrections which ended Soviet-communist domination leads to a striking supposition in Central and Eastern Europe of the essential *irrelevance* of the Cold War itself. The ups and downs of East-West relations, the crises of superpower summitry and alliance politics, the proxy wars and the endless brinkmanship are all swept into the trash with the Soviet era.

In Western Europe, the Cold War is remembered only as a burden, and its role as a political guide-rail is forgotten. Glad to be rid of it, people relegate to recesses of the mind the memory that their neighbors to the east were callously cut off from them, that massed armies faced each other at the heart of the continent where exercises and encampments pitted the landscape, that Europe was the "theater" where the nuclear winter would begin. The dislocation of West European politics in the 1990s at both the national and the Community level—the loss of identity, agenda, and constituency on both the right and the left, the loss of drive in the EU project—is closely related to the fading of these memories. Clinging only to the basic Cold War distinction between poverty and repression, prosperity and liberty, them and us, Western Europe seems unable to remember either what it was fighting for or the substance of the real socio-political debate that flourished before "the end of history." (There is at least enough truth in Fukuyama's audacious—and fundamentally false—proposition that political actors in liberal democracies have found themselves increasingly at a post-dialectical loss for anything to say.) The very phrase "peace *dividend*" seems to imply that a long-term investment has suddenly come good, the stock can be sold, the books closed, and a rich retirement enjoyed. The issues of the intervening years can be quietly forgotten.

It is worth noting that the most powerful country in Europe, Germany, must accommodate both East and West European memories. The sharp discomforts of *Wessi/Ossi* politics may be primarily economic in origin, but they surely also owe something to a sort of national cognitive dissonance, an incompatibility of memories.

In the United States, the Cold War is being forgotten in the most familiar sense of the word. In a country historically sheltered from international upheaval, geographically oriented to a continent between two coasts and two oceans beyond them, and politically

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absorbed in the short term, the anomaly of intense and prolonged engagement in an essentially European conflict can be quickly erased. Except for the many losers in the military-industrial complex, the American way runs smoother without the Cold War, which was an obstacle to worldwide business and trade, and a pretext for the aggregation of power and revenues in the hands of the federal authorities.

The main problem with which comprehensive forgetting of the Cold War leaves the United States is that of leadership. U.S. global leadership did not derive from the Cold War, but from its political and economic position after the Second World War. The Cold War intervened—indeed, was deliberately deployed by the Truman administration—to crystallize the American role as post-war multilateralism became mired in rising geopolitical tensions. With no clear pre-Cold War model to recall, and the Cold War role remembered only as a duty discharged, perhaps the much-discussed crisis in U.S. leadership has deeper roots than the qualities of particular presidents.

A quick regional survey, then, reveals a slope of regretting, remembering, and reimagining. The further east, the more the Cold War is remembered, the more its passing is regretted, and the more drastically its history is reshaped in the imagination. The further west, the more the Cold War is forgotten, the more it becomes unregretted, unimagined, lost time.

Why Do We Forget?

THIS STILL LEAVES the question of *why* the Cold War seems to be so unmemorable. The most important reason is the dearth of powerful symbols. There is almost nothing to express the meaning of the Cold War in symbolic form, a form which simplifies complex realities and concentrates meaning, a form to which emotional significance can be attached and communicated across space and time. Chunks of graffiti-covered wall scattered around parks and living rooms hardly suffice to fill this symbolic gap.

The opposites of state forgetting and social forgetting are state memory and social memory, and both are heavily dependent on the medium of symbols. The state remembers victories, anniversaries of a decisive battle or a triumphant armistice, which vindicate anew the nation and its cause. It remembers, sometimes, defeats and anniversaries of humiliation or loss, which teach fresh lessons of vigilance or rekindle a unifying national grievance. It remembers days of independence or revolution, which assert its sovereignty and its ideological identity. It remembers heroes, occasional villains, and the glorious dead, to give the clarity of deeds and lives to the abstracts of honor and infamy, and, perhaps, to bless again "the old lie—*dulce et decorum est pro patria mori.*"[6] State memory is, even if individual bureaucrats are not conscious of it, purposive and manipulative; it seeks out symbols that reinforce its identity and its claims.

Society remembers things that touch large numbers of people in a significant, visible, and attributable way. Society remembers mass death from unnatural causes, death on a scale so large that everyone knows someone who lost someone. Society remembers atrocities, which imprint a desire for retribution even on those bound only by the imagined ties of modern community. It remembers journeys, treks, and other moments or episodes in which the *volk* became or rebecame a *volk* distinct from others and linked to a particular territorial or political destiny. It remembers events, in themselves modest

[6] "It is a sweet and honourable thing to die for your country." Wilfred Owen, *Dulce et Decorum Est*. The original line is from Horace (Odes III.2), who loved life very much and certainly had no intention of laying his down for the state; his only minor venture into battle was in the army of the tyrannicide Brutus.

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or even largely mythical, that triggered or articulated a shift in the national psyche, a turning of generations—the sinking of the *Titanic* for example.

The Cold War offers almost none of these. Because it was essentially a period of peace in Europe and America, and because what conflict there was tended to be limited, managed, and elsewhere, the Cold War did not produce the social shocks, the step changes in the life of the state that catalyze memory and generate symbols. Moreover, the Cold War was fought primarily among elites. The "Cold Warriors" of the West were, mostly, conservative politicians and commentators, military professionals, and some corporations, opposed by an intermittently effective peace movement led, mostly, by liberal intellectuals. The Cold Warriors of the East were high-ranking Communist Party officials, the military, and their ceaseless opponents in the various dissident movements. For the most part, the mass of the people was disengaged from the Cold War. This was true in many places even at its height, and became almost universally true during the generation-long atrophy of the conflict after the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Excepting only a handful of events, like the Budapest rising of 1956 and the Vietnam War, the war was not a war for most people in Europe and America. For most of them, after all, the decades it covered were ones of unprecedented and constantly increasing affluence. Of course the rhetoric of confrontation did seep into their lives and exact its price in terms of heightened political intolerance, shortages and food lines, lengthy military service for young men, pervasive enemy images and closed borders. But the price became lower and lower down the westward slope of forgetting, and even in Eastern Europe the impact of the Cold War did not sear the public memory in a manner comparable to the Second World War. Now it is gone and there are new problems to face.

Symbolic poverty and mass disengagement help explain why there seems to be so little to remember about the Cold War, why neither state nor society can focus on it. Hollywood is our most influential storyteller, and it is instructive to contrast the immense range and volume of Cold War movies made during the Cold War—from superb political films such as *Dr. Strangelove* to commie-bashing potboilers—with the present silence. After fifty years, World War II is still a live subject for the film industry. Five years after the Cold War, the shrewd moguls have already recognized that its images have lost the power to move the emotions or spur the imagination, and, perhaps, that we do not want to be reminded of it.

It remains only to explain why this is so—why we do not *want* to remember even this little, or to create new legends and stories to fill the symbolic gap. The answer seems to be embarrassment. This is odd at first sight. Is there not much to be proud of: as East Europeans and Russians, in throwing off the oppressor's yoke without massive bloodshed or vendetta; as West Europeans and Americans, in defending freedom without world war? Objectively, rationally—yes. Emotionally, politically—no.

There is a Western embarrassment and an Eastern embarrassment, but both reduce to the same basic problem. In the West, it stems from the sense of a hollow victory. When men used to rejoice to beat swords into ploughshares, they were celebrating a change in the needs and priorities of life. But if the swords of the Cold War were ever really needed—the missiles, tanks, submarines, and fighter planes—it was for the most part only for the theoretical purposes of deterrence. It seems uncomfortably as if it might all have been a gigantic waste of time, money, and commitment; and the carefully verified dismantlement of unused weapons is not as uplifting a spectacle as one might have imagined.

The uniquely wretched position of Russian servicemen, veterans, and others in the military-industrial complex finds some echoes everywhere; jobs are not part of the

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peace dividend and, at around 10 percent, unemployment in the major Western European countries is higher than at any time since the Great Depression. Many in the West are confused about why it fought the Cold War, how it won, and what the fruits of victory are; both the Cold Warriors and their opponents have been left at a loss by the sudden deflation of their respective nightmares.

In the East, it is the embarrassment—even the shame—of the dupe. The oppression of the last forty years or more was real enough, but what was it based on? The astonishingly rapid disappearance of the Communist Party throughout the whole of the Soviet bloc is disconcerting, whether the apparatchiks have simply torn up their party cards and walked away, or whether they have re-labelled and re-packaged themselves back into power. If the whole structure was such a house of cards, why was it allowed to stand for so long? Stalin was Stalin, but after him how did a great expanse of European civilization let itself be abused and misgoverned by a wrecking crew so incompetent, feeble, and faceless that hardly anyone now seems to be willing or able to punish them?

After the event, the Cold War looks too much like pretending. There was plenty of fiery denunciation and somber threats, plenty of diversionary action within the blocs and in other people's far away countries. But at the center, the confrontation itself, which in its own peculiar way was very real and dangerous, now feels as if it were all something of a shadow play.

The Cold War was an international war of a totally new type. It was both a world war *and* an elite war. It spanned the whole world, over most of the world's heads. No matter who gets the blame for starting it in the first place, ownership of the Cold War in its maturity belonged to a relatively narrowly based "international community," to the society of states and to the network of decision-makers and opinion-formers that controls it. But international society is not, in fact, a community, either in the familiar sense of an organic, solidaristic community, or in the modern sense of an imagined community built on shared understandings and concepts of identity. The society of states and its international elite network are just not connected in that way—not yet anyway—and so they have developed no true capacity to remember, no international memory. The Cold War was so much the creature of a community without memory, and left so light an impact on the living memory of states and societies, that it is already en route to oblivion. □

The Memory Hole

In its rush to "put the Cold War behind us," the Clinton administration in 1993 proposed legislation—House Resolution 3000, also known as the Friendship Act—to edit out a wide variety of congressional findings on past Soviet actions—even though these findings represent historical judgments and now have no legal impact on Russian-American relations. . . .

Such a suggestion trivialized our words and our history by suggesting that we should send into a memory hole any past statements about past actions if it makes some big country feel uncomfortable now. Most seriously, it would have constituted an Orwellian rewriting of history that would have vitiated the meaning of the American struggle in the Cold War for freedom and democracy, and for the possibility of being able to speak the truth. . . .

The legislation did not become law; that it was even proposed is—or should be—an embarrassment. The great Russian writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn has called on his countrymen to "live not by lies" as part of the process of recovery from the Soviet experience. Can the American government do less?

—adapted, with permission, from Paul Goble's "Let's Not Be Revisionists on Soviet History," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, December 1, 1993.

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The CIA Vindicated

The Soviet Collapse *Was* Predicted

—Bruce D. Berkowitz and Jeffrey T. Richelson

"The CIA failed in its single, overriding defining mission, which was to chart the course of Soviet affairs." —Daniel Patrick Moynihan, quoted by Bill Gertz, *Washington Times*, May 21, 1992.

"The CIA [has] come under legitimate attack from President Clinton for failing to predict the collapse of the Soviet Union."—Morton Kondracke, *Washington Times*, April 26, 1995.

"The CIA itself did not make much difference in the ultimate outcome of the cold war. Its analysts misjudged almost every major development in the post-World War II world, including the most spectacular misjudgment of all—the flat-out failure to predict the collapse of the Soviet Union." —David Wise, *Nightmover: How Aldrich Ames Sold the CIA to the KGB for $4.6 Million* (1995).

"Has any government department goofed up more than the Central Intelligence Agency? . . . Their most egregious and expensive blunder about the Soviet economy we are still paying for." —Mary McGrory, *Washington Post*, March 14, 1995.

"Never has so much money been allocated to study one country; never have so many academic and government specialists scrutinized every aspect of a country's life. . . . Yet when the end came, the experts found themselves utterly unprepared." —Richard Pipes, *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 1995).

"The CIA failed to alert the President and Congress about the inexorable Soviet collapse. The present DCI, in his starched white outfit wishing it all away, is in a curious state of institutional denial." —William Safire, *New York Times*, April 6, 1995.

ALMOST EVERYONE, it seems, knows that the Central Intelligence Agency failed to anticipate the collapse of the Soviet Union. Indeed, the belief that the CIA somehow missed the single most important event of the twentieth century pervades virtually all discussions of U.S. intelligence these days, and may, in fact, be one of the few Cold War events about which both liberals and conservatives agree.

This unanimity comes at an especially difficult time for the intelligence community. Under fire today for other shortcomings, including, notably, its handling of the Aldrich Ames case, the agency is struggling to explain and justify its mission in the post-Cold War era.

The perception of failure in the Soviet case has become a key piece of evidence in

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current debates over plans to reform the U.S. intelligence community, part of the rationale behind both the Commission on Intelligence Roles and Missions and the current organizational shakeup at the CIA under its new director, John Deutch. Senator Moynihan regularly uses the CIA's supposed failure to predict the Soviet collapse as ammunition in his proposal for abolishing the agency and dispersing its various components among the Departments of State and Defense.

There is only one small problem: *The critics are wrong. The intelligence community did not fail to predict the Soviet collapse.* Quite the contrary, throughout the 1980s the intelligence community warned of the weakening Soviet economy, and, later, of the impending fall of Gorbachev and the breakup of the Soviet Union. Moreover, within the intelligence community the CIA was the most skeptical about the ability of Gorbachev to maintain control, and that skepticism grew greater the deeper one went into the CIA. Within the agency, the Office of Soviet Analysis (SOVA) was the most concerned about Gorbachev's future, and said so flatly.

Some intelligence officials and other political figures have tried to make this point, but so far they have largely been ignored. After the 1991 coup that ultimately finished Gorbachev and the USSR, the chairmen of the House and Senate oversight committees rejected charges that the intelligence community had failed to alert U.S. leaders. Shortly thereafter, Acting DCI Richard Kerr defended the CIA's record in a letter to the *New York Times*. Former DCI Robert Gates has also argued that U.S. intelligence charting the decline and fall of the Soviet Union was on the mark.[1] Why then has the myth persisted? One reason is that, until recently, the intelligence itself has not been publicly available, and, even when the relevant documents have been released, critics of the intelligence community have not bothered to read them.[2] Hard data have often been neglected for the sake of clever argument.

Another reason is that the intelligence community has indeed failed in other cases, and it is often easiest to paint with a broad brush. The most famous example is probably the intelligence community's failure to alert U.S. policymakers of the weakness of the Shah of Iran, the strength of his opponents, and, in particular, the support enjoyed by the Islamic fundamentalists. In that case, the evidence confirms that the failure occurred because the United States, in trying to maintain friendly relations with the Shah and the Iranian intelligence service, failed to develop independent sources of information within Iran.[3] The Soviet case *looks* like the Iranian case—Uncle Sam betting on the wrong horse—and so people have assumed that it *is* the same.

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[1]See Richard Kerr, "CIA's Record Stands Up to Scrutiny," *New York Times*, October 24, 1991, p. A4; and Robert M. Gates, "The CIA and the Collapse of the Soviet Union: Hit or Miss?" Foreign Policy Association, New York, May 20, 1992.

[2]The most significant source is the case study prepared by Kirsten Lundberg for Ernest May and Philip Zelikow at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, *The CIA and the Fall of the Soviet Empire: The Politics of "Getting It Right"* Case Study C16-94-1251.0. We requested from the CIA some of the documents that the agency had made available for the study. These documents were supplemented by interviews with intelligence officials and U.S. officials involved in policymaking from 1989-1992, and by additional documents identified in the course of the interviews. See also Zelikow's letter to the *New York Times*, April 17, 1995, p. A16, in which he criticizes William Safire for failing to use the available documentation.

[3]U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, *Iran: Evaluation of Intelligence Performance Prior to November 1978* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office); and Martin F. Herz, ed., *Contacts with the Opposition: A Symposium* (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 1979), p. 4.

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Finally, critics have been able to claim that there was an intelligence failure simply because the United States seemed to fail to achieve its objectives: establishing a long-term partnership with Gorbachev and preserving the integrity of the Soviet Union. U.S. policy was thwarted by the sudden coup that eventually led to Gorbachev's demise; therefore, goes the argument, U.S. intelligence must have failed. But, as we shall see, the intelligence community—and the CIA in particular—performed well in anticipating the Soviet collapse. In some respects, its performance was exemplary.

Predicting the collapse of the Soviet Union involved three separate problems requiring analysis within progressively more restricted timeframes, and roughly analogous to those encountered in predicting whether an attack will be launched by a hostile power: a "strategic" problem, a "tactical" problem, and an "indications and warning" problem.

The "Strategic" Problem: Detecting Soviet Decline

THE FAILURE OF the Soviet economy and the unraveling of the Soviet social system were not as obvious as they may seem in retrospect. For much of the twentieth century, most experts in the West assumed that the Soviet system, though often brutal, was at least economically productive and politically stable.

Indeed, the Soviet economy did seem to work well during the 1950s and 1960s. The Soviet GNP grew at a rapid rate. In part, this growth reflected the fact that the Soviet Union was recovering from World War II, and in part that it was still in the initial phase of a newly industrializing economy, when growth rates are typically large. Moreover, the Soviet Union was very competitive in many areas of science and engineering (witness *Sputnik*), and was also able to sustain a tremendous military buildup. The Soviets, it seemed, were well on their way to building the industrial infrastructure that most Western thinkers believed was necessary for sustained economic growth.

True, the Soviets were behind almost everyone in producing quality consumer goods, but then so had the Japanese been in the mid-twentieth century. It is only in retrospect that mainstream opinion acknowledges that the Soviet heavy industry responsible for the apparent growth in GNP was inefficient, poorly planned, and, in many cases, environmentally disastrous. It is also important to remember that during the 1960s and 1970s many serious people actually debated the relative effectiveness of market economies and socialism. Thus, much of the problem of detecting the failure of the Soviet economy revolved around the difficulty of simply accepting the fact that such a failure was possible.

Even though there were debates during the 1970s over the size of the Soviet GNP and the size of the Soviet defense budget, the context was quite different from the debate that took place in the decade preceding the Soviet collapse. Intelligence analysts in the Defense Department argued during this earlier period that the Soviet defense budget and the Soviet share of GNP devoted to defense were both larger than that claimed by the CIA.[4] However, the point that the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was trying to make at that time was *not* that the Soviet Union was being stressed, but rather that the Soviet Union was able to *endure* stress. DIA claimed that by underestimating Soviet military expenditures the CIA was underestimat-

[4]The best-known critic from DOD was William T. Lee at the Defense Intelligence Agency; see his *The Estimation of Soviet Defense Expenditures for 1955-1975: An Unconventional Approach* (New York: Praeger, 1977). Also see Stephen Rosefielde, *False Science: Underestimating the Soviet Arms Buildup* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1982): and *A Dollar Cost Comparison of Soviet and U.S. Defense Activities*, SR 77-10001 U (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1977).

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AUTHOR'S NOTE: In reviewing intelligence products, it is important to understand which documents represent a particular organization's position. Intelligence Assessments (IAs) are issued by the CIA's deputy director for intelligence and represent the agency's viewpoint. Usually the Office of Soviet Analysis (SOVA) would take the lead in drafting an IA on a topic related to the Soviet Union. In a quick-turnaround situation, SOVA might issue a memorandum under its own name, or it might issue a memorandum for circulation within the CIA under its own name. National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are issued by the National Intelligence Council on behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence. NIEs are usually coordinated among all of the relevant agencies within the intelligence community—CIA, DIA, etcetera—and are supervised by the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) responsible for a given topic, in this case, the NIO for the Soviet Union.

ing Soviet military capabilities and the Soviet determination to achieve military superiority.[5]

By the late 1970s, however, it was clear that, whatever the absolute size of the Soviet GNP and defense budget, the Soviet economy as a whole was faltering. The CIA and defense intelligence organizations continued to disagree on whether this would affect Soviet military spending—the DIA insisted that it would not, even up to the point of Soviet collapse—but there was general consensus across the intelligence community that a slowdown was occurring.

Indeed, the stultified, stalled-out condition of the Soviet economy was an accepted truth and was the "given" context in which the new regime of Mikhail Gorbachev was analyzed. For example, within eight months of Gorbachev's assuming office as General Secretary, the intelligence community issued a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the prospects for Gorbachev and the Soviet economy. It stated:

> The growth of the Soviet economy has been systematically decelerating since the 1950s as a consequence of dwindling supplies of new labor, the increasing cost of raw material inputs, and the constraints on factor productivity improvement imposed by the rigidities of the planning and management system. The average annual growth of Soviet GNP dropped from 5.3 percent in the late 1960s to 3.7 percent in the early 1970s, to 2.6 percent in the late 1970s. Soviet GNP grew by only 1.6 percent per annum in Brezhnev's last years (1979-82). After reaching a low in 1979, GNP growth averaged 2.3 percent from 1980 to 1984. Growth in 1985 will probably be in the range of 2.5 to 3.0 percent. These recent improvements have been the result largely of disciplinary and incentive measures introduced under Andropov and Gorbachev. It remains to be seen if the upturn in growth can be sustained. . . .[6]

Thus, far from ignoring the Soviet economic malaise, by the middle of the Reagan administration the intelligence community understood as a matter of course that the Soviet economy had been consistently slowing down, slipping to mediocre—and, in some years, negligible—growth rates. The intelligence community also believed that Gorbachev knew that the Soviet economy was faltering. Its main question was whether Gorbachev was serious about economic reform, and whether he could implement reform without losing control and releasing forces that would bring down the Soviet system.

The intelligence community generally agreed that Gorbachev was determined, mainly out of necessity, to reform the Soviet system. It also generally agreed at the time that these reforms would not resuscitate the Soviet economy, but that the Soviet Union had not yet

[5]The debate peaked in 1977 when the intelligence community obtained empirical evidence that the CIA had been underestimating Soviet defense spending; the CIA doubled its earlier estimate.

[6]*Domestic Stress on the Soviet System*, NIE, November 18, 1985, pp. 1-4.

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reached a crisis stage. For example, the 1985 NIE stated:

> The USSR is afflicted with a complex of domestic maladies that seriously worsened in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Their alleviation is one of the most significant and difficult challenges facing the Gorbachev regime. . . .
>
> Over the next five years, and for the foreseeable future, the troubles of the society will not present a challenge to the system of political control that guarantees Kremlin rule, nor will they threaten the economy with collapse. But, during the rest of the 1980s and well beyond, the domestic affairs of the USSR will be dominated by the efforts of the regime to grapple with these manifold problems. . . .
>
> The underlying cause of most of these problems is the repressive nature of a political system that discourages initiative throughout the society on which economic and social progress depend, and that limits the private freedom Soviet citizens desire. . . .
>
> Gorbachev has achieved an upswing in the mood of the Soviet elite and populace. But the prospects for his strategy over the next five years are mixed at best. . . .[7]

In other words, the documentary record portrays an intelligence community that fully understood that the Soviet Union was in trouble; that the cause of these problems was the Soviet system itself, and its reliance on a command economy and political repression; and that Gorbachev faced a tremendous challenge in trying to reform the system without bringing it down around him.

It is notable that the five-year prediction of stability presented in the 1985 NIE stopped just short of the actual date of the Soviet collapse (1991), especially so in light of the assessment that the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence issued in July 1987, as Gorbachev began to establish a track record. This assessment was even more pessimistic and, as it turned out, on the mark in its anticipation of developments to come:

> Judgments regarding Gorbachev's situation will appear somewhat less sanguine than those found in earlier CIA papers, for two principal reasons. First, the papers reporting on Gorbachev's progress through the winter of 1986/87 focused primarily on his success in consolidating his power rather than the concrete and difficult choices he would face in exercising power. Second, since the plenum of the Central Committee in January 1987, an accumulation of evidence from Soviet sources suggests that indifference and opposition on the part of party and government leaders and the average worker are more deeply rooted than was thought six months ago. . . .
>
> Gorbachev's position could be undermined by the loosening of censorship over the written and spoken word and the promotion of limited democracy. If it suspects that this process is getting out of control, the party could well execute an abrupt about-face, discarding Gorbachev along the way. . . .
>
> Growth of Soviet GNP dropped from an average of 4.0 percent per year in the period 1966-75 to 2.3 percent in 1976-80, and to 2.2 percent per year in 1981-84.[8]

To be fair, the intelligence community can blame itself for at least some of the current controversy. In retrospect, it is clear that in trying to determine if the rate of growth was 2.0 percent or 2.5 percent, the CIA was pursuing false precision. In reality it is difficult to estimate—or, for that matter, even express—the actual size of a non-market economy in which there are no prices or true national accounts.

Henry Rowen, chairman of the National Intelligence Council from 1981-1983, recalls pressing analysts to focus even more on the non-quantitative signs that the Soviet economy was faltering, such as shortages of goods. Rowen devoted greater effort to highlighting how many

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[7]Ibid.

[8]Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, *Gorbachev: Steering the USSR Into the 1990s* (July 1987), pp. iii-1.

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Soviet economic activities that inflated GNP estimates actually yielded few productive benefits (e.g., high production of shoddy goods that went unsold). Rowen also began to emphasize the hidden costs that the Soviet military imposed on the Soviet economy (diversion of talent, unnecessary redundancy in production capacity).[9]

By attempting to estimate specific growth rates, the intelligence community diluted its main message, which was that the Soviet economy was stagnating and—even more important—that there were no apparent or available means for it to be reinvigorated. This basic message, which was accepted throughout the intelligence community and was repeated in official estimates over the course of several years, was right on the mark.

The "Tactical" Problem: Will Gorbachev and the Soviet Union Survive?

AS CONDITIONS in the Soviet Union continued to worsen, the main questions for the U.S. intelligence community were whether Gorbachev would be able to hold on to power, and whether the Soviet Union itself would break up. The United States had a major stake in both questions, and this is the real reason why the intelligence community is faulted for its performance in the final days of the Soviet Union.

By the late 1980s, U.S.-Soviet relations had improved significantly (as reflected by the signing of the INF treaty in December 1987) and Gorbachev was seen as being largely responsible. The Bush administration wanted to take these improvements in U.S.-Soviet relations even further. Under its policy of "moving beyond containment," the Soviet Union would be "integrated into the community of nations." While the Bush administration stopped short of referring to Gorbachev as an "ally," it did see him as a "strategic partner" in promoting stability in the world.[10] It was clear that U.S. leaders wanted Gorbachev to remain in power.

Critics claim that the intelligence community should have warned U.S. leaders that Gorbachev was in trouble. Such warnings, according to these critics, might have enabled the United States to aid Gorbachev, or hedge its bets by opening channels to other leaders. At a minimum, the United States could have avoided the stigma of having backed a loser and, as a result, undercut its credibility.

The record suggests, however, that the intelligence community, and particularly the CIA's Office of Soviet Analysis, were keenly aware that Gorbachev was playing with fire. The CIA grew even more pessimistic about Gorbachev's chances of political success throughout the first year of the Bush administration. In an April 1989 assessment, the CIA noted that:

> It will be very difficult for [Gorbachev] to achieve his goals. In the extreme, his policies and political power could be undermined and the political stability of the Soviet system could be fundamentally threatened. . . . anxiety, fear, and anger [of the Soviet political elite] could still crystallize in an attempted coup, legal removal of Gorbachev, or even assassination.[11]

In a September 1989 assessment, the CIA examined the gambles Gorbachev was taking in the nationality, economic, and political areas, characterizing his policies as being

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[9]Interview, Henry S. Rowen, June 8, 1995. See also his prescient article, "Living with a Sick Bear," *The National Interest* (Winter 1985).

[10]The policy was codified in NSD 23, approved on September 22, 1989. The directive remains classified, but was reflected in President Bush's speech at Texas A&M University on May 12, 1989. See Christopher Simpson, ed., *National Security Directives of the Reagan and Bush Administrations* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), p. 896. Also see Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, *At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993), pp. 69-71.

[11]See Directorate of Intelligence, *Rising Political Instability Under Gorbachev. Understanding the Problem and Prospects for Resolution* (April 1989), p. iii.

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based on "questionable premises and wishful thinking." It concluded that the "unrest that has punctuated Gorbachev's rule is not a transient phenomenon. Conditions are likely to lead in the foreseeable future to continuing crises and instability on a larger scale. . . ."

Of all intelligence agencies, the CIA had the most pessimistic view of Gorbachev's ability to fix the Soviet economy and retain power. In the 1989 NIE, *The Soviet System in Crisis: Prospects for the Next Two Years*, the consensus view was that the situation would remain bad, but that the regime would be able to tough it out. The CIA disagreed, however, arguing that the situation was not manageable.[12] By the following year, the intelligence community as a whole had come around to the CIA's position; the NIE on Soviet political conditions issued in November 1990, *The Deepening Crisis in the USSR: Prospects for the Next Two Years*, stated flatly in its key judgments that "the Soviet Union as we have known it is finished"—with the emergence of a loose federation of republics a possibility.

This reporting by the CIA had a direct effect on U.S. policy. Then-Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates recalls that in September 1989—two years before Gorbachev's fall, and at least in part as a result of the CIA's warnings—the Bush administration established a "contingency planning group" chaired by the director of Soviet Affairs, Condoleezza Rice.[13] The purpose of this group was to analyze specific options as to how to react if the Gorbachev regime fell. Knowledge of the existence of this group was strictly limited, so as not to increase concerns about Gorbachev's hold on power, but its creation represented a major move by an administration that was publicly committed to Gorbachev.[14]

As the crisis proceeded, CIA documents continued to paint the bleakest picture of Gorbachev's prospects. "The Soviet Cauldron," a fifteen-page memorandum prepared for the NSC in April 1991 by the director of the Office of Soviet Analysis, George Kolt, stated that "Gorbachev's credibility has sunk to near zero." A May 1991 Intelligence Assessment published by the Directorate of Intelligence, "Gorbachev's Future" stated that within a year "a major shift of power to the republics will have occurred unless it has been blocked by a traditionalist coup."[15]

In retrospect, the CIA was most prescient in anticipating events. Intelligence community assessments during 1989-91, and the CIA's in particular, were remarkable not only because the agency was willing to assert that the communist order was finished—a view that would have been unthinkable just a few years earlier—but also because of its sophistication in interpreting the interplay of factors that were at work, and how these factors constrained the range of potential outcomes. Specifically, the CIA:

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[12]Interview with Robert Blackwell, April 18, 1995; Blackwell at the time was the National Intelligence Officer for the Soviet Union and directed the drafting of the NIE. Blackwell himself at the time was less pessimistic about the long-term stability of the Soviet Union. Unless otherwise stated, all other references to Blackwell's views are derived from this interview.

[13]Interview with Condoleezza Rice, May 12, 1995; and Robert Gates, June 8, 1995. Unless otherwise stated, all subsequent references to Rice's and Gates' views are derived from these interviews.

[14]The reaction of Gates, while at the NSC, to the CIA's assessments and his use of intelligence were likely shaped by the fact that he had a hand in most of these assessments; Gates served as deputy director for intelligence at the CIA from 1982-1986 and deputy director of central intelligence from 1986-1989. He would later serve as DCI. We drew the description of the events related here from his forthcoming book, *From the Shadows: An Eyewitness Account of the Last Half of the Cold War* (Simon & Schuster).

[15]See Office of Soviet Analysis, "The Soviet Cauldron" (typescript intelligence memorandum, April 1991); and Directorate of Intelligence, *Gorbachev's Future* (May 1991).

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•Repeatedly mentioned a coup as a serious possibility, because the economy was in shambles and order was breaking down.

•Noted that, if a coup were launched, it would be cloaked in the form of a "committee of national salvation" that would claim it was imposing emergency measures to restore order and preserve the moves toward democratization and economic reform in the long term (almost exactly the formulation used by the hardliners in announcing their attempted takeover in August 1991).[16]

•Predicted, however, that the long-term prospects of a coup were not good, that events in the USSR were being driven by tidal forces. The wave of nationalism and decay of public support for the Bolshevik regime could not be reversed; a coup would not alleviate the economic failure that was in large part responsible for events. Even if hardliners did manage to seize power temporarily, they would not be able to consolidate control.

In addition, the intelligence analysis laid down markers—that is, it presented facts that a reader would have to refute in order to reject the analysis presented in the assessment. For example, "The Soviet Cauldron" noted four months before the August coup attempt that:

•Hardliners had raised the possibility of using the military to restore order in public statements;

•Military officers inclined to support democratization had been moved out of important posts or retired; and

•The military and security organizations had demonstrated the logistics and capability of moving large numbers of troops into Moscow on short notice and establishing a command structure to control them.

In order to believe that the hardliners would *not* launch a coup, therefore, one would need to explain why they would have taken such potentially risky or costly steps.

Although the record shows that the intelligence community was aware of the untenable situation in the Soviet Union and gave ample warning that Gorbachev was in jeopardy, former high-level U.S. officials disagree as to how aware they were of these warnings. Some officials at the middle levels of the National Security Council, such as Rice, knew of both the range of opinion within the intelligence community and the degree to which they agreed Gorbachev was in trouble. Other officials we interviewed who had less routine contact with intelligence analysts tracking the political situation in the Soviet Union were not aware of these differences, nor that the CIA had an especially pessimistic assessment of Gorbachev's prospects.

At the highest levels, Brent Scowcroft, President Bush's national security advisor, does not recall receiving warning that was sufficiently precise to support action on the part of the United States. He believes that, if such warnings were given, they were "lost in the fog" of the volume on information that passed by on a daily basis.[17] However, Gates recalls differently, and cites three separate events that would indicate these warnings reached their target.

The establishment of the "contingency planning group" was one. The second, according to Gates, was a memo he sent personally to President Bush in the summer of 1990 citing the CIA's warnings of the deteriorating Soviet political situation; Gates described Gorbachev as the "Soviet Moses"—that is, the leader who would take the Soviet people to the promised land, but would not himself survive the Exodus. The final indicator was another memo that summer in which, Gates maintains, he told Bush

[16]Compare the analysis of this aspect of a possible coup as presented in "The Soviet Cauldron" with the coup plotters' statements made during the attempted takeover, "Emergency Committee Issues Message," FBIS-SOV-91-160 (August 19, 1991) pp. 10-13.

[17]Interview Brent Scowcroft May 11, 1995. Unless otherwise stated, all subsequent references to Scowcroft's views are derived from this interview.

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that the United States should "stop knocking Yeltsin" because we "would eventually be facing him on the other side of the table." All of these actions, Gates asserts, were taken in light of the CIA's briefings and reports.

In any case, it is clear that the Bush administration chose to stand by Gorbachev *in spite of* the intelligence that argued his future was limited, not because U.S. intelligence suggested that this was a safe course to take. If a failure occurred, it was not an intelligence failure but a policy failure, and it may not have even been that. The administration had three powerful reasons for deciding to continue its support of Gorbachev, despite the intelligence at hand that suggested his position was precarious.

First, the Gorbachev regime had supported or acquiesced in many U.S. objectives—the reunification of Germany, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, withdrawal from Afghanistan, nuclear and conventional arms control, and, most significantly in 1991, the U.S.-led effort to liberate Kuwait in Operation Desert Storm. So even if Gorbachev could not hold power for much longer, there was a good argument to be made for backing him and working with his government while the opportunity was there. Not surprisingly, then, some administration officials say that they were indeed aware of the intelligence reporting that indicated Gorbachev was likely to fall, and that their response was to get as much as possible for the United States "before the window closed." These objectives included completion of strategic and conventional arms agreements, detailed agreement over German reunification, and final dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. They believed that if they could reach such agreements with Gorbachev, they would be "locked in" and accepted even if a harder-line government replaced him.

Second, administration officials did not believe that they had anyone better to support, even if it seemed that Gorbachev was doomed. Yeltsin had made an unfavorable impression on administration officials during his September 1989 visit to the United States. They did not believe that he was committed to democratization, and considered him personally unstable.

Moreover, administration officials did not believe that they had an effective means for supporting anyone other than Gorbachev even if they had chosen to do so. As Scowcroft put it, "Some of the analysts kept saying that we should 'move towards Yeltsin,' but I didn't know what that meant." Officials were also concerned that the very process of seeking alternatives to Gorbachev would have the effect of undermining him, possibly hastening his fall and leading him to become less cooperative. Robert Blackwell, the National Intelligence Officer responsible for the Soviet Union at the time, recalls that the feeling in the administration was, "if you undermine Gorbachev, you won't get Yeltsin; you'll get a successful coup."

Third, U.S. officials believed that they could influence events. That is, the intelligence may have said that, *as things stood*, Gorbachev would fall, but U.S. leaders were in a position to influence the conditions on which these assessments were based. The intelligence community's estimate was based on its evaluation of nationalistic sentiment and the willingness of hardliners to take risks. It was at least plausible that these attitudes could be shaped or moderated.

For example, Bush has been criticized for the speech he delivered in Ukraine in early August 1991, warning of the dangers of nationalism (the so-called "Chicken Kiev" speech). Some critics assert that it started U.S. relations with the independent Ukrainian state on a sour note; some argue that acquiescing in the dissolution of the Soviet Union was actually in the interests of the United States. Whatever one thinks of the policy, had the speech dissuaded the Ukrainians from total succession, it would now be viewed as a classic example in which

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the United States demonstrated leadership and influenced events.

The "Indications and Warnings" Problem: Has the Coup Started Yet?

SCOWCROFT SAYS unequivocally that he did not receive a warning that a coup was about to occur in mid-August 1991. He and other officials also note that they were in Moscow the week before the coup for the signing of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) agreement, and that not only were there no signs of the plot but many of the eventual plotters took part in the ceremonies.

According to Beschloss and Talbott, however, the President's Daily Brief (PDB) for August 17 led with a report warning of signs of last-minute opposition to the Union Treaty.[18] The treaty would have devolved most of the USSR's authority to the republics—exactly the development that previous CIA reporting had said might trigger a reaction by hardline Party, military, and KGB leaders. The PDB noted that the previous day Alexander Yakovlev had warned of an "influential Stalinist group" that was planning a "party and state coup."

Gates (who deals with this episode at length in his forthcoming book), recalls discussing the PDB report with President Bush at Kennebunkport on August 17. According to Gates, the president asked whether the report should be taken seriously, and he responded that, once the date was set for the Union Treaty to take effect, the conservatives would face their last chance to take action. Since the conditions that the intelligence community had set as critical warning markers had been met, he added, the warning should indeed be taken seriously.

In any case, part of the reason why the coup was not detected with certainty was precisely because it was poorly planned and thus lacked many of the tangible signs of a major military operation. In January 1991, for example, the intelligence community had provided good warning of the Soviet crackdown in Vilnius, the prediction having been based in part on intelligence observation of the preparations being carried out by the Soviet military, such as the movement of troops, establishment of communications links, and other traditional warning signs.

In contrast, many military and KGB units were not even told of their mission in the August coup. The plotters also failed to take effective steps to capture Yeltsin (indeed, Yeltsin reported to the Kremlin on the morning of the coup and was turned away) and little or no effort was made to take potentially hostile radio and television stations off the air. Much of the Soviet military leadership itself did not know of the coup until after it had begun.

Once the coup was underway, the intelligence community quickly determined that, precisely because the signs of adequate preparation were missing, the plotters had little chance of success. This analysis enabled the United States to adjust its position quickly as the crisis evolved. In his first response to the coup, President Bush had referred to the plotters' action as "extraconstitutional"; by the end of the day, the president denounced the coup as illegitimate and endorsed Yeltsin's demand that Gorbachev be restored to power.[19]

Lessons To Be Learned

THERE ARE A number of lessons to be learned from the myths concerning the intelligence community's performance during the final years of the Soviet Union. They pertain to observers of the intelligence community in and out of the government, the intelligence community itself, and policymakers.

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[18]Beschloss and Talbott, *At the Highest Levels,* p. 421.

[19]Ibid, pp. 424-425.

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1. The Danger of the Conventional Wisdom. The notion that the CIA seriously misread the situation in the Soviet Union quickly became accepted as fact—although there does not appear to have been any attempt by those making such a pronouncement to investigate the matter seriously. Even after CIA officials disputed the claims of Senator Moynihan, no major newspaper or other organization appears to have bothered to launch an in-depth investigation of his serious charges. Others have been quick to accept the essence of Moynihan's claim without demanding evidence or analysis to support it.

Aside from the unfairness of stigmatizing those who provided intelligence analysis, such unwarranted claims create a presumption that drastic changes are needed. But "fixing" things that are not broken can make things worse than they are.

2. The Limitations of Intelligence in the Policy Process. One reason why critics claim U.S. intelligence failed is that the United States did not achieve all of its objectives in responding to the collapse of the Soviet Union—specifically, preserving the integrity of the USSR and the Gorbachev regime. But the decision to follow this policy had little to do with an intelligence failure, and the intelligence provided to U.S. officials should have made them aware of the risks of this policy.

Undesirable outcomes are not necessarily the result of faulty intelligence. Intelligence analysts do not make policy; policymakers make policy. Most supporters of democracy and responsible government prefer it this way.

3. Intelligence Analysts Are Not Psychics. Policymakers sometimes complain that intelligence analysis is not sufficiently explicit to get their attention. Just as intelligence analysts may miss warning indicators in the noise of day-to-day events, policymakers may not appreciate the significance of an intelligence product that is presented to them in the context of their routine business.[20]

At times, the inability of intelligence to make the necessary impression on policymakers may reflect the fuzziness resulting from the process of coordinating national estimates, with compromise language replacing sharper language. But the complaint may also reflect an unrealistic expectation by some policymakers that specific future events can be precisely predicted well in advance.

Precise turning points in tidal changes such as the collapse of the Soviet Union depend on the confluence of many individual events that can not be predicted. As a result, it often is not possible to write the kind of specific, unconditional intelligence forecast that would cut through the noise (e.g., "hardliners will attempt a coup on the morning of August 19, and this will ultimately result in the collapse of the Soviet Union")—especially if one demands such a definitive forecast weeks, months, or years in advance.

George Kolt's "The Soviet Cauldron" is an example of brilliant intelligence *not* because it made a correct exact estimate of when the Soviet Union would collapse or a coup would be undertaken, but because it laid out the basic factors that were driving events in Soviet politics in mid-1991, and the possible logical consequences, in succinct, blunt terms. The memorandum presented evidence of several necessary conditions that existed for a coup, and then left it to the policymaker to either refute this evidence, alter the conditions, or consider the risk the United States was willing to tolerate in maintaining its existing policy of supporting Gorbachev. Contrast this analysis with a case in which an intelligence failure does appear to have occurred, such as the fall of the Shah, when the intelligence community reported that Iran did not appear to be in "a revolu-

[20]The standard reference describing the "signal to noise" problem intelligence analysts encounter is Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962).

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tionary or even pre-revolutionary" condition.

Clinton administration officials today must make a similar evaluation of any evidence they receive suggesting that democracy and reform in Russia may soon collapse. They have to determine whether they are willing to accept whatever case the intelligence community makes, based on their own assessment of the potential risks and available options. But, as in the case of the fall of Gorbachev, the *ultimate* evaluation will be made by policymakers, not intelligence analysts.

4. The Intelligence-Policymaker Relationship Needs To Be Improved. It is clear from our research that one problem limiting the usefulness of intelligence was that senior policymakers generally had to deal with intelligence analysts at arms length, through constrained channels of communication, and intermittently. As a result, policymakers were limited in their ability to appreciate why a particular conclusion had been reached, the assumptions or conditions on which it was based, and why there might be differing views within the intelligence community. The intelligence community can at least begin to address this problem by rethinking the intelligence process from its end.

Since World War II that process has been roughly as follows: Policymakers present the intelligence community with a problem; the intelligence community develops a consensus through a process of evaluating evidence and debating hypotheses; and policymakers are then presented with one set of conclusions that reflects the larger wisdom of the entire intelligence community (although a member of the community can note a dissent if it disagrees strongly with the consensus). The significance of this approach is reflected in the fact that community-wide products are generally accorded higher status than, say, products produced by a single agency (e.g., NIEs have higher standing than Intelligence Assessments produced by the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence).

This concept, which perhaps reflects the way people used information and analysis in the mid-twentieth century, may no longer be valid. Indeed, it runs counter to the way in which most consumers of information behave today. Because people have greater access to information and are generally less willing to trust authorities, they demand the opportunity to question the analyses with which they are provided, and to shop around for sources of expertise and analysis. They make their final decision based on a number of factors—some objective, such as the track record and credentials of a source, and some subjective, such as prejudice or self-indulgence.

Indeed, as noted above, policymakers in the real world make decisions by considering a multitude of views. A more realistic approach to providing intelligence support to top policymakers on broad policy issues such as the future of Gorbachev—or, today, the future of Yeltsin—would allow such officials greater interaction with the analysts. The intelligence community could facilitate such direct interaction through the use of modern secure communications systems and data retrieval systems—technologies that were notably absent when the classical concept of intelligence estimation was developed in the late 1940s.

Rather than attempting to generate consensus, the intelligence community should facilitate a process in which the intelligence consumer is fully aware of the different views held in the intelligence community and the reasons for these differences. Policymakers, who will decide which truth they will adopt anyway, should be the ultimate coordinators of intelligence, knowing that they will be held responsible for their decision. □

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There Are No Moderates

Dealing with Fundamentalist Islam

Daniel Pipes

IN EARLY FEBRUARY 1995, newspapers around the world featured a photograph taken in Cairo, which showed, for the first time ever, the prime minister of Israel standing side-by-side with the king of Jordan, the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the president of Egypt.

These gentlemen ostensibly met to discuss the faltering peace process between the Arabs and Israel. Yet this unprecedented event of an Israeli leader in conclave with Arab colleagues sent another signal too: four leaders who share a common problem—fundamentalist Islam—are ready to work together. According to the *Jerusalem Post's* account of the meeting, Rabin said that Israelis are the target of the fundamentalist attacks. Arafat jumped in and said, "Me too. They have threatened my life." At that point, Mubarak and Hussein both nodded their heads and said they too had personally been threatened by the radicals.

The photograph neatly symbolizes a great shift now taking place in Middle Eastern politics. Arab-Israeli issues remain formally the main item on the agenda but fundamentalist violence has become the greatest worry of nearly every government in the region. Through six decades, a politician's stance on the Arab-Israeli conflict defined more than anything else his standing in Middle East politics. No longer. Now, his position on fundamentalism, the single greatest threat to the region, primarily determines his allies and his enemies.

Why do Middle Eastern leaders feel so threatened by fundamentalist movements? Are they perhaps exaggerating the threat? And how is the U.S. government dealing with this novel issue?

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A Variety of Threats

THOUGH ANCHORED IN a religious creed, fundamentalist Islam is a radical utopian movement closer in spirit to other such movements (communism, fascism) than to traditional religion. By nature anti-democratic and aggressive, anti-semitic and anti-Western, it has great plans. Indeed, spokesmen for fundamentalist Islam see their movement standing in direct competition to Western civilization and challenging it for global supremacy. Let's look at each of these elements in more detail.

Radical utopian schema

Outside their own movement, fundamentalists see every existing political system in the Muslim world as deeply compromised, corrupt, and mendacious. As one of their spokesmen put it as long ago as 1951, "there is no [sic] one town in the whole world where Islam is observed as enjoined

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by Allah, whether in politics, economics or social matters."[1] Implied here is that Muslims true to God's message must reject the status quo and build wholly new institutions.

To build a new Muslim society, fundamentalists proclaim their intent to do whatever they must; they openly flaunt an extremist sensibility. "There are no such terms as compromise and surrender in the Islamic cultural lexicon," a Hamas spokesman declares.[2] If that means destruction and death for the enemies of true Islam, so be it. Hizbullah's spiritual leader, Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, concurs: "As Islamists we seek to revive the Islamic inclination by all means possible."[3]

Seeing Islam as the basis of a political system touching every aspect of life, fundamentalists are totalitarian. Whatever the problem, "Islam is the solution." In their hands, Islam is transformed from a personal faith into a ruling system that knows no constraints. They scrutinize the Koran and other texts for hints about Islamic medicine, Islamic economics, and Islamic statecraft, all with an eye to creating a total system for adherents and corresponding total power for leaders. Fundamentalists are revolutionary in outlook, extremist in behavior, totalitarian in ambition.

Revealingly, they vaunt Islam as the best ideology, not the best religion—thereby exposing their focus on power. Whereas a traditional Muslim would say something like, "We are not Jewish, we are not Christian, we are Muslim," the Malaysian Islamist leader Anwar Ibrahim made a very different comparison: "We are not socialist, we are not capitalist, we are Islamic."[4] While fundamentalist Islam differs in its details from other utopian ideologies, it closely resembles them in scope and ambition. Like communism and fascism, it offers a vanguard ideology; a complete program to improve man and create a new society; complete control over that society; and cadres ready, even eager, to spill blood.

Anti-democratic

Like Hitler and Allende, dictators who exploited the democratic process to reach power, the fundamentalists actively take part in elections; like the earlier figures, too, they have done dismayingly well. Fundamentalists swept municipal elections in Algeria in 1990 and won the mayoralties of Istanbul and Ankara in 1994. They have had successes in Lebanese and Jordanian elections and should win a substantial vote in the West Bank and Gaza should Palestinian elections be held.

Once in power, would fundamentalists remain democrats? There is not much hard evidence on this point, Iran being the only case at hand where fundamentalists in power have made promises about democracy. (In all other fundamentalist regimes—Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Sudan—military leaders have dominated.) Ayatollah Khomeini promised real democracy (an assembly "based on the votes of the people"[5]) as he took power. Once in charge, he partially fulfilled this pledge: Iran's elections are hotly disputed and parliament does have real authority. But there's an important catch: parliamentarians must subscribe to the principles of the Islamic revolution. Only candidates (including non-Muslims) who subscribe to the official ideology may run for office. The regime in Tehran thus fails the key test of democracy, for it cannot be voted out of power.

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[1] `Abd al-Qadir `Awda, *Al-Islam wa-Awda'una as-Siyasiya* (Cairo, 1951), quoted in Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), p. 65.

[2] Ibrahim Ghawsha, *Keyhan* (Tehran), October 31, 1992.

[3] *Ash-Sha`b* (Cairo), June 3, 1994.

[4] *New York Times*, March 28, 1980.

[5] Quoted in Hamid Algar, trans. and ed., Ruhollah Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations* (Berkeley: Mizan, 1981), p. 259.

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Judging by their statements, other fundamentalists are likely to offer even less democracy than the Iranians. Indeed, statements by fundamentalist spokesmen from widely dispersed countries suggest an open disdain for popular sovereignty.[6] Ahmad Nawfal, a Muslim Brother from Jordan, says that "[i]f we have a choice between democracy and dictatorship, we choose democracy. But if it's between Islam and democracy, we choose Islam."[7] Hadi Hawang of Partai Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) in Malaysia makes the same point more bluntly: "I am not interested in democracy. Islam is not democracy, Islam is Islam."[8] Or, in the famous (if not completely verified) words of `Ali Belhadj, a leader of Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), "When we are in power, there will be no more elections because God will be ruling."[9]

Anti-moderate

Fundamentalist Islam is also aggressive. Like other revolutionaries, very soon after taking power fundamentalists try to expand at the expense of their neighbors. The Khomeinists almost immediately sought to overthrow moderate (here meaning non-fundamentalist) Muslim regimes in Bahrain and Egypt. For six years (1982-88) after Saddam Hussein wanted to quit, they kept the war going against Iraq; and they occupied three small but strategic islands in the Persian Gulf near the Straits of Hormuz. The Iranian terrorist campaign is now fifteen years old and reaches from the Philippines to Argentina. The mullahs are building an arsenal that includes missiles, submarines, and the infrastructure for unconventional weaponry. In like spirit, Afghan fundamentalists have invaded Tajikistan. Their Sudanese counterparts reignited the civil war against Christians and animists in the south and, for good measure, stirred up trouble at Halayib, a long disputed territory on Sudan's border with Egypt.

So aggressive are fundamentalists that they attack neighbors even before taking power. In early February of this year, as Algeria's FIS was fighting to survive, some of its members assaulted a police outpost along the Tunisian border, killing six officers and seizing their weapons.

Anti-Semitic

Consistent with Hannah Arendt's observation about totalitarian movements necessarily being anti-semitic, fundamentalist Muslims bristle with hostility toward Jews. They accept virtually every Christian myth about Jews seeking control of the world, then add their own twist about Jews destroying Islam. The Hamas charter sees Jews as the ultimate enemy:

> [They] have used their wealth to gain control of the world media, news agencies, the press, broadcasting stations, etcetera. . . . They were behind the French revolution and the Communist revolution. . . . They instigated World War I. . . . They caused World War II. . . . It was they who gave the instructions to establish the United Nations and the Security Council to replace the League of Nations, in order to rule over the world through them.[10]

Fundamentalists discuss Jews with the most violent and crude metaphors. Khalil Kuka, a founder of Hamas, says that "God brought the Jews together in Palestine not to benefit from a homeland but to dig their

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[6]For documentation, drawing on audio cassettes of some thirty major Muslim preachers, see Emmanuel Sivan, "Eavesdropping on Radical Islam," *Middle East Quarterly* (March 1995).

[7]*Wall Street Journal*, November 4, 1993.

[8]Quoted in Abbas and Magnum Photos, *Allah O Akbar: A Journey Through Militant Islam*, (London: Phaidon, 1994), p. 137.

[9]Quoted by Saïd Sadi, *Le Point* (Paris), August 6, 1994.

[10]Article 22, quoted in *Contemporary Mideast Backgrounder* (October 1988), pp. 8-9.

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grave there and save the world from their pollution."[11] Tehran's ambassador to Turkey says that "the Zionists are like the germs of cholera that will affect every person in contact with them."[12] Such venom is common coin in fundamentalist discourse.

Nor is violence confined to words. Especially since the September 1993 White House signing of the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles, Hamas and Islamic Jihad have repeatedly targeted Israelis and other Jews, killing some hundred and fifty individuals.

Anti-Western

Unnoticed by most Westerners, war has been unilaterally declared on Europe and the United States. Fundamentalists are responding to what they see as a centuries-long conspiracy by the West to destroy Islam. Inspired by a Crusader-style hatred of Islam and an imperialist greed for Muslim resources, the West has for centuries tried to neuter Islam. It has done so by luring Muslims away from Islam through both its vulgar culture (blue jeans, hamburgers, television shows, rock music) and its somewhat higher culture (fashion clothes, French cuisine, universities, classical music). In this spirit, a Pakistani fundamentalist group recently deemed Michael Jackson and Madonna "cultural terrorists" and called for the two Americans to be brought to trial in Pakistan.[13] As Bernard Lewis notes, "It is the Tempter, not the Adversary, that Khomeini feared in America, the seduction and enticement of the American way of life rather than the hostility of American power."[14] Or, in Khomeini's own words: "We are not afraid of economic sanctions or military intervention. What we are afraid of is Western universities."[15]

Fearful of Western culture's hold over their own people, fundamentalists respond with vitriolic attacks denigrating Western civilization. It is crassly materialist, says `Adil Hussein, a leading Egyptian writer, seeing man "as nothing but an animal whose major concern is to fill his belly."[16] To dissuade Muslims from Westernizing, they portray our way of life as a form of disease. Kalim Saddiqui, the main Iranian polemicist in the West, deems Western civilization "not a civilization but a sickness." And not just any sickness but "a plague and a pestilence."[17] Belhadj of Algeria's FIS ridicules Western civilization as "syphilization."[18]

Operationalizing this hatred, fundamentalist groups have since 1983 resorted to anti-Western violence. Americans have been targeted in two bombings of the U.S. embassy in Beirut, the Marines barracks in Beirut, the embassy in Kuwait, and the World Trade Center. Lesser incidents include the killing of American passengers on several airliners, many hostages seized in Lebanon, and several fatal incidents on U.S. territory. We can only guess how many incidents (like the plan to attack the Holland tunnel and other New York landmarks) were foiled; or how many lie yet in store.

While the World Trade Center gang has pretty much held its tongue, a Tunisian named Fouad Salah conveyed the views of this violent element. Convicted in 1992 of setting off bombs that killed thirteen Frenchmen in a terrorist campaign during

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[11] Quoted in Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, *Intifada: The Inside Story of the Palestinian Uprising that Changed the Middle East Equation*, trans. by Ina Friedman (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989), p. 235.

[12] Islamic Revolution News Agency, August 9, 1993.

[13] *Philadelphia Inquirer*, February 13, 1995.

[14] Bernard Lewis, *The Shaping of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 145-46.

[15] Quoted in Shaul Bakhash, *The Reign of the Ayatollahs* (New York: Basic Books, 1984), p. 122.

[16] *Ash-Sha`b* (Cairo), July 22, 1994.

[17] *Tawhid*, Shawwal-Dhu'l-Hijjah 1412, pp. 154, 155.

[18] Quoted in Sivan, "Eavesdropping," p. 17

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1985-86, Salah addressed the judge handling his case: "I do not renounce my fight against the West which assassinated the Prophet Muhammad. . . . We Muslims should kill every last one of you [Westerners]."[19] He is hardly alone in harboring such sentiments.

Rejection of Co-Existence

Hatred against the West inspires a struggle with it for cultural supremacy. Fundamentalists see the rivalry as cultural, not political. "It is a struggle of cultures," a Muslim Brethren leader explains, "not one between strong countries and weak countries. We are sure that the Islamic culture will triumph."[20] But how is this victory to be achieved? By producing better music or coming up with a cure for cancer? Hardly, as Saddiqui, the Iranian spokesman in London, vividly makes clear: "American GIs clutching photos of their girlfriends would be no match for the soldiers of Islam clutching copies of the Koran and seeking *shahadah* [martyrdom]."[21] Islam will triumph, in other words, through will and steel.

Fundamentalists do not restrict their sights to the Muslim quintile of the world's population but aspire to universal dominance. Saddiqui announces this goal somewhat obliquely: "Deep down in its historical consciousness the West also knows that the Islamic civilization will ultimately replace it as the world's dominant civilization."[22] Men of action share the same ambition. The gang that bombed the World Trade Center had great plans. `Umar `Abd ar-Rahman, the Egyptian sheik who guides them, stands accused in a Manhattan court of seditious conspiracy, that is, trying to overthrow the government of the United States. However bizarre this sounds, it makes sense from `Abd ar-Rahman's perspective. As he sees it, the *mujahidin* in Afghanistan brought down the Soviet Union; so, one down and one to go. Not understanding the robustness of a mature democracy, `Abd ar-Rahman apparently thought a campaign of terrorist incidents would so unsettle Americans that he and his group could take over. A Tehran newspaper hinted at how the scenario would unfold when it portrayed the February 1993 explosion at the World Trade Center as proof that the U.S. economy "is exceptionally vulnerable." More than that, the bombing "will have an adverse effect on Clinton's plans to rein in the economy."[23] Some fundamentalists, at least, really do think they can take on the United States.

U.S. Policy: The Record

MISCHIEF BY fundamentalists on U.S. territory pales, however, in comparison to the danger they pose in the Middle East; their seizure of power in just a few countries there would likely create a new political order in the region, with disastrous consequences. Israel would probably face a return to its unhappy condition of days past, beleaguered by terrorism and surrounded by enemy states. Civil unrest in oil-producing regions could lead to a dramatic run-up in the cost of energy. Rogue states—already numerous in the Middle East (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Libya)—would multiply, leading to arms races, more international terrorism, and wars, lots of wars. Massive refugee outflows to Europe could well prompt a reactionary political turn that would greatly increase the already worrying appeal of fascists such as Jean-Marie Le Pen, who won 15 percent of the French vote in the recent presidential election.

What steps has the Clinton administration taken to protect Americans from such prospects? On the plus side, it has isolated and made efforts to weaken Iran; unfortunately, no other industrial power has agreed to commit itself in like fashion, virtually

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[19] *Le Monde*, April 4, 1992.

[20] *Ash-Sha`b*, September 27, 1994.

[21] *Tawhid*, Shawwal-Dhu'l-Hijjah 1412, p. 152.

[22] *Tawhid*, Shawwal-Dhu'l-Hijjah 1412, p. 153.

[23] *Resalat*, March 3, 1993.

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negating the impact of U.S. sanctions. Washington has also focused world attention on atrocities committed by the Sudanese regime.

But if the Clinton administration is sound on fundamentalists already in power, it has terribly misguided ideas about fundamentalists in opposition. Rather than oppose them, it has initiated dialogue with the Palestinian, Egyptian, and Algerian fundamentalist movements, and perhaps others. Why meet with these groups? As President Clinton, James Woolsey, Peter Tarnoff, Martin Indyk, and others have all explained, American policy opposes terrorism, not fundamentalist Islam. Most fundamentalists are decent people, serious individuals espousing (in the words of Robert Pelletreau, assistant secretary of state for the Middle East) "a renewed emphasis on traditional values."[24] So long as a group has no connections to violent activities, both we and its government should encourage it to pursue the political process.

We are in combat only with the violent extremists, they say. Actually, look closely and you'll see that these extremists are not even good Muslims, but criminals exploiting the faith for their own malign purposes. "Islamic extremism uses religion to cover its ambitions," national security advisor Anthony Lake maintains.[25] In other words, those who use violence in the name of Islam are not just marginal to the fundamentalist movement; they are frauds whose activities go against its praiseworthy aims.

This distinction between good and bad fundamentalist Muslims leads to an important policy conclusion: that the U.S. government should work with the former and against the latter. Yes: even as fundamentalists accuse the United States and Israel of the most horrible crimes and announce their hatred of us, the American government decides that these are people with whom we can do business. Hence our political relations with Hamas, Egypt's Muslim Brethren, and the FIS.

This is poor judgment and leads to bad policy. It would almost always be better not to work with such groups, the only exceptions being circumstances of dire necessity.

Bad Advice

IN PART, THE blame for misguided U.S. policies must fall on the shoulders of the usual suspects—academic specialists. While in the usual course of events the executive branch tries not to rely on advice from outsiders, on issues where it lacks expertise it does turn to specialists for help. Islam is one such issue. Since the Iranian revolution of 1978, diplomats have leaned heavily on Iranists and Islamicists to help them develop U.S. policy.

With almost a single voice, these specialists advise the government not to worry. Some say the fundamentalist challenge has faded. The usually sensible Fouad Ajami reports that "the pan-Islamic millennium has run its course; the Islamic decade is over."[26] Likewise, Olivier Roy, the influential French specialist, announced in 1992 that "the Islamic revolution is behind us."[27] Other analysts go further and say it never posed any danger in the first place. John Esposito, probably the most important of the academic advisors, published a book dispelling the notion of an "Islamic threat."[28] Leon Hadar, an Israeli associated

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[24]Robert H. Pelletreau, Jr., "Symposium: Resurgent Islam in the Middle East," *Middle East Policy* (Fall 1994), p. 3.

[25]Address by Anthony Lake, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 17, 1994.

[26]Quoted in Judith Miller, "Faces of Fundamentalism: Hassan al-Turabi and Muhammed Fadlallah," *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 1994), p. 124.

[27]Olivier Roy, *L'Echec de l'Islam politique* (Paris: Seuil, 1992), p. 10.

[28]John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

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with the Cato Institute, dubs the whole topic of fundamentalist Islam a "contrived threat."[29]

Specialists posit at least two benefits to be gained from American dialogue with the fundamentalists. First, they assume fundamentalists are bound to reach power (an assumption no less dubious than like predictions a generation ago about the inevitability of a socialist triumph) and counsel establishing early and friendly relations with them. Second, the specialists present fundamentalist Islam as an essentially democratic force that will help stabilize politics in the region, and so deserve our support. Graham Fuller, formerly of the Central Intelligence Agency and now at RAND, makes the case for fundamentalism as a healthy development: It "is politically tameable . . . [and] represents ultimate political progress toward greater democracy and popular government."[30] The Egyptian scholar Saad Eddin Ibrahim actually goes so far as to suggest that fundamentalists "may evolve into something akin to the Christian Democrats in the West."[31]

The trouble with all this is that the notion of good and bad fundamentalists simply has no basis in fact. Yes, fundamentalist Muslim groups, ideologies, and tactics differ from each other in many ways—Sunni and Shi`ite, working through the system and outside it, using violence and avoiding violence—but every one of them is inherently extremist. Fundamentalist groups have evolved a division of labor, with some seeking power through politics and others through intimidation. In Turkey, for example, the Nurcus and the Necmettin Erbakan's Refah Partisi accept the democratic process, while the Süleymancïs and the Milli Görus do not. In Algeria, much evidence points to FIS coordinating with the murderous Armed Islamic Group (GIA).

Non-fundamentalist Muslims understand that, by aspiring to create a new man and a new society, all fundamentalists in the end must work to overthrow the existing order. Non-fundamentalists know this because they have seen the gleam in the eyes of fundamentalists, heard their rhetoric, fended off their depredations, endured their murders. Deemed traitors, non-fundamentalists like Salman Rushdie and Taslima Nasrin are first in the line of fire, even ahead of Jews or Christians.

They tirelessly try to educate Westerners on the subject of fundamentalist Islam, with dismayingly little response. As the militant Algerian secularist Saïd Sadi explains: "A moderate Islamist is someone who does not have the means of acting ruthlessly to seize power immediately."[32] The pro-Western president of Tunisia points out that the "final aim" of all fundamentalists is the same: "the construction of a totalitarian, theocratic state."[33] The outspoken Algerian ambassador to Washington, Osmane Bencherif, echoes this sentiment: "It is misguided policy to distinguish between moderate and extremist fundamentalists. The goal of all is the same: to construct a pure Islamic state, which is bound to be a theocracy and totalitarian."[34] Perhaps the strongest statement comes from Mohammad Mohaddessin, director of international relations for the People's Mojahedin of Iran, a leading opposition force: "Moderate fundamentalists do not exist. . . . It's like talking about a moderate Nazi."[35]

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[29]Leon T. Hadar, "What Green Peril?" *Foreign Affairs* (Spring 1993).

[30]*Washington Post*, January 13, 1992.

[31]Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Civil Society and Prospects of Democratization in the Arab World," in Augustus Richard Norton, ed., *Civil Society in the Middle East*, vol. 1 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), p. 52.

[32]*Le Point* (Paris), August 6, 1994.

[33]*Le Figaro*, August 2, 1994.

[34]*Washington Post*, April 1, 1995.

[35]*Middle East Quarterly* (September 1995), p. 77.

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Approaches to Fundamentalist Islam

IF MODERATE fundamentalists do not exist, then the U.S. government needs a new policy toward fundamentalist opposition groups. But before proposing specific steps, three premises must be aired: the need to draw a distinction between Islam and fundamentalist Islam; the burden on Americans to prove themselves; and the reason why we should work with the Left against the Right.

Fundamentalist Islam is not Islam

Islam is an ancient faith and capacious civilization; fundamentalist Islam is a narrow, aggressive twentieth-century ideological movement. Whatever one chooses to call the phenomenon—extremist Islam, fundamentalist Islam, militant Islam, political Islam, radical Islam, Islamism, Islamic revival—it is the problem, not Islam as such.

Distinguishing between Islam and fundamentalist Islam has two important benefits. First, it permits the U.S. government to adopt a sensible attitude toward both. A secular government cannot have an opinion on a religion, especially when it is practiced by significant numbers of its own citizens. But it most assuredly can have an opinion on an ideological movement that is hostile to its interests and values. Second, this distinction makes it possible to ally with non-fundamentalist Muslims. Many of them, including some quoted here, are fearless speakers of truth. Their insights guide those of us outside the Islamic faith; their courage inspires us; and—when the fundamentalists or their apologists accuse us of being "anti-Islam"—their agreement legitimates us.

Demonstrate will

Fundamentalists see the West, for all its apparent strength, as weak-willed; it reminds them of the Shah's regime in Iran—rich, vainglorious, corrupt, and decayed. `Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, the Iranian hardliner, disdains the United States as "a hollow paper tiger with no power or strength."[36] To be sure, it disposes of wealth and missiles, but these cannot stand up to faith and resolve. Fundamentalists don't even bother to hide their contempt for Western countries. Iran's Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, for example, publicly asserts: "The British today are on their death bed. Other Western countries too are in a similar state."[37]

Such contempt obliges the West to act even more strongly and decisively than otherwise might be the case. Tough positions are needed both as an end in themselves and to show that we are not the flabby degenerates of the fundamentalist imagination. The U.S. government has to prove, however absurd it may sound, that Americans are not weaklings addicted to pornography and drugs, that, quite the contrary, we are a healthy people, resolute and ready to protect ourselves and our ideals. Fundamentalists are so enthralled by their own views of the West that these simple points have to be made over and over again. Soheib Bencheikh, a former fundamentalist himself, explains that the West must give them some of their own medicine: "To fight the fundamentalists one has to have been a bit like them oneself."[38]

Better the Left than the Right

Until five years ago, the Left had a global network that threatened American interests, while the Right consisted of isolated and mostly weak regimes. It incontrovertibly made sense to work with the friendly tyrants of the Right against the Marxist-Leninist complex on the Left. Since 1990, these roles have, roughly speaking, been reversed, especially in the Muslim world. Today, the Left consists of the odd shipwreck of a regime: the FLN (National Liberation Front) in

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[36] *Salam* (Tehran), July 27, 1994.

[37] Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, March 5, 1993.

[38] Quoted in Martine Gozlan, *L'Islam et la Republique: Des musulmans de France contre l'intégrisme* (Paris: Belfond, 1994), pp. 41-42.

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Algeria, or a General Dostam in Afghanistan. These governments stand for no ideas or visions; their leaders merely want to stay in power. However corrupt, however nasty, they pose fewer dangers to the Middle East or to the United States than do their fundamentalist counterparts. Further, as mere tyrannies, they have a better chance of evolving in the right direction than do intensely ideological regimes.

Instead, it is the Right, made up mainly of fundamentalist Muslims, who have built what Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel calls "an international infrastructure."[39] The network sends out practical aid; for example, the Iranians are reliably said to provide arms, money, cadres, political counseling, military training, diplomatic support, and intelligence to the Sudan. It also provides important psychological support. Fundamentalists feel much stronger for being part of a surging international alliance, somewhat as Marxist-Leninists did in previous years. This new network, like that old one, has the United States of America in its sights. For these reasons, the U.S. government should now—carefully, intelligently, selectively—join with the Left against the Right whenever circumstances suggest doing so.

What We Should Do

THE OVERRIDING GOAL of U.S. policy must be to keep fundamentalist Muslims from seizing power. Once they take over, as the mullahs in Tehran have so clearly shown, they will hold on tenaciously.[40] How, then, to keep the fundamentalists from taking power?

Do not engage in official or public dialogue

Dialogue sends signals that undercut existing governments without bringing any gains. President Husni Mubarak of Egypt counsels Washington along these lines. "To engage in dialogue with radical fundamentalists is a waste of time."[41] Actually, it is worse than that because it works both to legitimize fundamentalism and to confirm its belief in Western weakness. The U.S. government ought not to talk to fundamentalist groups, much less ally with any of them; meetings with Palestinian, Egyptian, and Algerian fundamentalists should stop.

Do not appease

As a former CIA specialist on Iran notes, "fundamentalism is a war fought primarily in Muslim imaginations. Private and collective dreams are not amenable to negotiations."[42] Like other totalitarians, fundamentalist Muslims respond to appeasement by demanding more concessions. Saïd Sadi, the Algerian secularist, advises his fellow countrymen not to give in to the fundamentalists "because if we made the slightest concession, all our freedoms would be threatened."[43] Again, Mubarak has it right: "I can assure you," he says, fundamentalist groups will "never be on good terms with the United States."[44] A change in foreign policy will not suffice because fundamentalists despise us not for what we do but for who we are. Short of adopting their brand of Islam, there is no hope of satisfying them.

Offer no help

With the end of the Cold War, this goal should be easier to achieve. To get Pakistani

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[39] *The Jerusalem Post*, December 4, 1994.

[40] The only exception is Turkey. Should fundamentalists be voted into office there, we should accept that outcome, and for two reasons: Turkey being a full democracy, the only one in the Muslim world, the fundamentalists will probably leave office if and when they lose an election; and if they do not, the military stands in the wings ready to force them out.

[41] *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), November 20, 1994.

[42] Edward G. Shirley (a pseudonym), "Is Iran's Present Algeria's Future?" *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 1995), p. 44.

[43] France-2 Television, September 20, 1994.

[44] Quoted in the *New Yorker*, January 30, 1995.

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permission to arm the Afghan *mujahidin* against Soviet forces in the 1980s, the CIA had disproportionately to supply the fundamentalists. Washington did as bidden, and rightly so, for it meant aligning with the lesser evil against the greater one. Now that fundamentalism is the greater evil—or, at least, the more dynamic one—this conundrum is less likely to arise. It is hard to imagine any scenario today in which the U.S. government should help fundamentalists.

Press fundamentalist states to reduce their aggressiveness

The West should pressure fundamentalist states—Afghanistan, Iran, Sudan—to reduce their aggressiveness and the aid they supply to ideological brethren in such countries as Turkey, Jordan, Egypt, and Algeria, as well as to Palestinians. The U.S. government and its allies have a wide range of commercial and diplomatic tools at their disposal with which to confront fundamentalist aggression, with a military option always reserved in the background if needed.

Support those confronting fundamentalist Islam

Governments in combat with the fundamentalists deserve U.S. help. We should stand by the non-fundamentalists, even when that means accepting, within limits, strong-arm tactics (Egypt, the PLO), the aborting of elections (in Algeria), and deportations (Israel). It also means supporting Turkey in its conflict with Iran, and India in its conflict with Pakistan on the Kashmir issue.

The same applies to institutions and individuals. As a curtain of silence and terror comes down around them, non-fundamentalists in the Middle East are losing their voice. To be celebrated by Americans would greatly boost their morale and prestige; and funds from the U.S. Information Agency, the Agency for International Development, and private sources could do much good. Again, this means working with some less than Jeffersonian organizations, notably the People's Mojahedin of Iran, despite the controversy that would probably arouse.

Be careful and restrained about democratization

The U.S. government must be very careful how it presses for democracy. Unfortunately, it has become common to equate democracy with elections, leading to a single-minded emphasis on them as ends in themselves. We should correct this, stressing democracy's connections with liberty and the rule of law.

Quick elections solve little. Often they make matters worse by strengthening fundamentalist elements, these usually being the best organized in societies in which the citizenry is not equipped to make fully informed electoral decisions. Instead, we should press for those prior conditions for successful democracy: political participation, the rule of law (including an independent judiciary), freedom of speech and religion, property rights, minority rights, and the right to form voluntary organizations (especially political parties). In short, we should urge the formation of a civil society. Elections are not the start of the democratic process but its capstone and finale, the signal that a civil society has come into existence. As Judith Miller of the *New York Times* summarizes the point, we should encourage, "Elections tomorrow and civil society today."[45]

In the end, the ideological battle of the post-Cold War era instigated by fundamentalist Islam will be decided by Muslims, not by Americans. The fundamentalist challenge will succeed or fail depending on what they and their non-fundamentalist opponents do. Still, Americans are important bystanders who can take significant steps to help our natural allies against our inevitable adversaries. □

[45]Judith Miller, "The Challenge of Radical Islam," *Foreign Affairs* (Spring 1993), p. 53.

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Foreign Policy by Posse

Richard N. Haass

THERE IS INCREASING consideration of (and, in some quarters, consternation about) what might be dubbed "the new unilateralism," the practice of the United States going it alone in the world. It merits attention. The 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama was a unilateral exercise, as for all intents and purposes were the interventions in Grenada and Haiti (at least in its initial phase). Sanctions against Cuba have become a mostly unilateral endeavor, as have those against Iran. The United States broke rank over NATO's enforcement of the Bosnian arms embargo, and Congress has tried to effect a unilateral abrogation of the embargo itself. Meanwhile, despite membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Clinton administration chose to confront Japan unilaterally, and again to threaten sanctions, over the marketing of automobiles and their parts.

The list could go on and no doubt will. Explaining why acting alone is as popular as it is in the United States is not all that hard, given the obvious advantages. It is much easier to act without having to gain the consent of others. No compromise is necessary and there is no one to slow you down. It is easier to keep secrets secret. And unilateralism has always been attractive to a people suspicious of the old world and wanting a free hand in dealing with matters closer to home.

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Two features of the post-Cold War international environment—less automatic resistance from great power adversaries and less dependable assistance from erstwhile allies—also strengthen the temptation, and at times create the necessity, to act alone. The unilateralist impulse was strengthened further by both Somalia and Bosnia, two multilateral undertakings widely perceived as failures.

It should be recognized that on some occasions unilateral action is surely the best choice. This is especially so when interests are narrowly national, and when the logistical support of others is deemed unnecessary or undesirable, lest surprise be sacrificed or a friend embarrassed. Both Panama and Grenada fit this bill. Retaliating against state sponsorship of terror, as the United States did against Iraq in the wake of the failed attempt on the life of former President Bush, was something best done by the United States alone. In this latter circumstance, new technologies, such as ship-launched cruise missiles, provide opportunities for the United States to strike a limited set of targets with little or no third country role.

But in many instances, including the most significant ones, unilateralism is neither wise nor sustainable. Most military interventions, for example, require either the indirect or direct support and participation of others. Access to bases, the right to overfly, intelligence support—all are usually necessary if an action is at all complicated or distant. Those operations that promise to be large in scale,

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or long-term, or both, need the active participation of others—their forces and equipment—for several reasons: to share the military burden, to distribute economic costs, and to assuage domestic political demands that the United States not assume a disproportionate share of the costs of acting in the world when the interests of others coincide with our own.

Burden sharing is increasingly relevant as a consideration in an era of flagging domestic support for defense and assistance budgets—and those budgets are all but certain to decline further in real terms over the next decade. Seen in the context of such increasing resource constraints, a penchant toward U.S. unilateralism would inevitably result in our progressively doing less overseas.

Economic burden-sharing apart, the support of others can also help politically. The endorsement of a course of action by the United Nations or a relevant regional body can add an aura of legitimacy and, in the eyes of some, legality to an undertaking. This can have several advantages: in generating domestic political support, in bringing about the military and economic participation of others, and in reducing resistance on the part of the target regime or its backers.

A pattern of seeking such international endorsement can also help inhibit intervention by those who would abuse their power. Russia, for one, might think twice before dispatching forces to its "near abroad" if it knew that the absence of a Security Council resolution endorsing its intervention made it more likely that criticism and even sanctions would follow.

Unilateralism on our part also carries the risk that it will encourage unilateralism by others. The best argument against unilateral abrogation of the Bosnian arms embargo is that it would encourage others to do the same with respect to, say, sanctions against Iraq. If we pay a price for multilateralism we also receive dividends; if we see an advantage for unilateralism we also must be sensitive to its costs.

Unilateral action in other realms—export controls and economic sanctions more generally come to mind—risks being feckless except in those circumstances where the U.S. component is so central that doing without or finding a substitute supplier is not a viable option for the target state. Increasingly, though, such U.S. dominance in the economic realm is rare, as others can provide comparable technologies, large markets, and substantial amounts of capital.

Thus, and despite its undeniable domestic political appeal, unilateralism is in most instances not a realistic foreign policy for this country. Putting aside those isolationists or minimalists who reject the need for any substantial foreign policy orientation, either because they discount the importance of overseas interests or want to focus attention overwhelmingly on domestic matters (or both), the real choice facing this country in the foreseeable future is not between unilateralism and multilateralism but among forms of the latter.

Standing Alliances

THERE ARE THREE forms that a multilateral foreign policy can assume. The first type is the most familiar because it was often at the heart of U.S. foreign policy throughout the Cold War. It depends on formal alliances and other standing organizations as the principal vehicles for U.S. engagement in the world. A second approach is to create powerful international (and, in some cases, supranational) institutions, or to focus on making those that already exist—the United Nations, the World Court and others—more capable. A third approach is to build temporary coalitions to address specific challenges, be they problems or opportunities.

The traditional organizational approach that has characterized American foreign policy over the past half century was exemplified by NATO, although there were politi-

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cal and economic institutions to match. The North Atlantic Council was paramount in the political realm; in economic matters, the International Monetary Fund and the OECD were created to help manage monetary coordination. The World Bank was given the task of promoting development. Although there was no counterpart trade body—the International Trade Organization was stillborn—there was the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which provided rules of the road concerning government trade that served much the same purpose in favoring liberalization, and in offering a venue and process for dispute settlement.

Such institutionalism was possible because the international situation was, for all its potential dangers, essentially stable. If they are to function, standing alliances and other organizations require predictability, both as regards the source of problems and the friends and allies who can be counted upon to act in responding to them. There is time to consider scenarios and to prepare plans and capabilities for addressing them. NATO was made possible by the potential for a Soviet/Warsaw Pact attack on Western Europe, and the collective readiness of the United States, Canada, and NATO's European members to resist aggression in that location.

As useful as these institutions were, they had (and have) their limits. As associations of sovereign members, they were unable to force governments to do much of anything. France could not be compelled to remain in NATO's united military command. Several European governments balked at supporting the deployment of intermediate range missiles. Trade disputes festered. Chronic surplus and debtor states could not be forced to adjust their currencies or underlying economic policies. The need for consensus and voluntary adherence to collective decisions often became an explanation—or an excuse—for inaction.

Such standing bodies also tend not to deal well with non-core issues. NATO, for example, stood nearly helpless to contend with problems between its members—the conflict between Greece and Turkey comes to mind. It also had little to contribute to solving internal problems experienced by any of its members, or with challenges that could affect most or all members but fell outside the area covered by its charter. At the same time, formal organizations of any sort could not be successfully created and maintained in those regions of the world where friends and allies were few and/or weak, where perceptions of threat were not shared, and where scenarios were many but uncertain. The failure of CENTO (along with the Baghdad Pact before it) and SEATO provided demonstrations of how difficult it was to establish and maintain capable standing alliances, even in an international setting as highly regulated as the Cold War.

With the Cold War over, the limitations of standing alliances are even more obvious. They have become less relevant and at times counterproductive. Groups of countries that once shared common purposes now no longer do, or do so only in circumstances increasingly less common. NATO is again the classic case. The core mission—protecting members against a hostile external threat—has essentially disappeared. Meanwhile, NATO's unsuccessful attempts at undertaking ambitious new missions, as is the case in the former Yugoslavia, reveal a lack of consensus in the alliance. In this instance at least, the alliance has become an obstacle to effective action rather than its agent. Clearly, it would be better for NATO to concentrate on lesser but still important tasks: preserving a residual capacity to carry out its basic mission, integrating new members, and providing support for efforts undertaken by selected members in their individual capacities.

Western economic institutions are having a somewhat better time of it. The end to Cold War competition did not change the economic environment significantly. Nevertheless, they too are having trouble adapting to the emergence of massive pools

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of privately held funds that can overwhelm what governments or existing institutions do.

The Supranational Way

A SECOND FORM of multilateralism would go far beyond the initial and apparently abandoned impulse of the current administration—what was termed "assertive multilateralism"—to create supranational capabilities. In the security realm, it would involve creating a standing military force responsible to the Security Council and, in some circumstances, to the secretary-general. Such a force could be dispatched quickly to help prevent conflicts or (under Chapter VII of the UN Charter) to enforce Security Council resolutions. An expanded multilateralism of this sort could also seek to establish machinery (a strengthened World Court, for example) for resolving political disputes between states that would constitute arbitration, not just mediation. Economically, this form of multilateralism would require not simply rules regulating trade but mandatory dispute settlement mechanisms and strict monetary coordination.

There are obvious difficulties with multilateralism of this sort. National sovereignty may be much battered but it is still alive and kicking. Few governments (including, notably, our own) would be prepared to cede to some supranational agency or set of agencies, run by international civil servants, the independence governments enjoy in the political, economic, or military realms. Moreover, even if there were some desire to do so, building such organizational capacity (especially in the military sphere) would be a monumental undertaking, given the expense and the forces that would oppose it.

Less unrealistic but still problematic would be a scaled-down version of such multilateralism, one that would concentrate on trying to strengthen and make more independent existing international institutions. To some extent the United States has taken or is considering taking some modest steps in this direction, both in the form of efforts to create a stand-by force responsible to the Security Council and by agreeing to follow certain WTO procedures to resolve trade disputes.

The problem with even this more modest, sub-supranational form of internationalism stems from the reality that we ourselves are not prepared (and rightly so) to give up our freedom of maneuver in those situations where we disagree and where important national interests are at stake. Given that others tend to feel the same, such multinational efforts are often no stronger than the weakest or most adamantly opposed member in possession of a veto. Again, sovereignty—not as an abstract norm but as a political reality—precludes almost any form of multilateralism that would override or take the place of domestic autonomy to a significant degree.

Multilateralism that Makes Sense

THERE IS A THIRD approach to multilateralism, one more informal in nature and more achievable in practice. It differs from the first in its rejection of reliance on standing, formal organizations, and differs from the second in eschewing interest in universal, supranational authorities. At its core is the idea of selected states and organizations coalescing for narrow tasks or purposes—and in most cases disbanding once the specific aim has been accomplished. Membership is available to those able and willing to participate, and this approach is thus sometimes referred to as "coalitions of the willing." Less formally it can be described as foreign policy by posse.

Examples of this approach are multiplying. The most famous cases, and in some ways the model for the idea, were Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Here, in response to a specific crisis, namely, the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait, the United States fashioned a multilateral coalition that over the course of the next seven months proved

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victorious on the battlefield. Like many inventions, it was born of necessity: there was no standing Gulf security organization to fall back upon, the UN lacked the capability, and it was too much for the United States alone to undertake.

The Gulf coalition was one in which tasks and roles differed according to both the desire and ability of governments to make a contribution. Some countries simply gave moral and political support by voting in one or another forum for action against Iraq. Others limited their participation to providing funds. In the military realm there was a wide disparity. The United States contributed more than a half million troops and equipment of all sorts. Some others, notably Great Britain and France, also committed sizable, balanced forces. Others, for political or military reasons or both, contributed much smaller forces and sometimes only for particular missions—say, sanctions enforcement or defense of rear areas.

The coalition that won the war disbanded as soon as it ended. But a more narrow coalition continues to work together in the war's aftermath to promote Iraqi compliance with various resolutions and to protect Iraqi citizens from their own government. The United States, Turkey, Great Britain, and France operate in and over Iraq's north to protect the Kurds. It is the United States, together with Great Britain, France, and several Gulf states, that maintain a no-fly zone over the predominantly Shi'a areas of Iraq's south. Both efforts are undertaken "pursuant to" authority judged to be implicit in Security Council resolutions in what amounts to a collective decision to act.

Other coalitions are longer standing. One set includes so-called supplier groups, i.e., those coalitions of states that agree not to provide designated technologies or capabilities to selected states in order to slow their efforts to develop certain military capacities. Right now there are supplier groups in the realm of nuclear, biological and chemical, and ballistic missile technologies. Membership of these groups obviously reflects relevance—only those who could provide such technologies are potential members—and a willingness to forgo exports. They operate much as cartels, with their effectiveness depending on the extent of their reach: that is, what it is they sanction and whether there are non-members ready and able to provide what they will not.

Ad hoc coalitions are also appearing in the economic sphere. The Mexican bailout is an interesting case. Viewing the potential failure of the Mexican economy as a major threat to U.S. and world economic health, and realizing that no existing institution or set of arrangements could provide the Mexican government the backing it required, the Clinton administration lashed together in early 1995 an ad hoc coalition that included, in addition to itself, the International Monetary Fund, the Bank for International Settlements, Canada, a consortium of Latin American governments, and several private banks. Although the private banks subsequently dropped out, the multi-billion dollar bail-out appears to have worked in allowing Mexico to weather the immediate crisis.

Diplomacy, too, increasingly turns to informal coalitions. The management of the Middle East peace process since the October 1991 Madrid Conference is coordinated by the United States (with Russia as nominal co-sponsor) that involves not only the immediate protagonists but also Egypt, the Gulf states, the European Union, and others. Similarly, diplomacy toward Bosnia—admittedly, not (yet) a shining example—is informally coordinated by a contact group consisting of the United States, Russia, France, Great Britain, and Germany. An earlier contact group, one that included the United States, Great Britain, France, Canada, and the then Federal Republic of Germany, was instrumental in helping to negotiate a political settlement in southern Africa in the 1980s.

An Asian example of foreign policy by posse is the informal coalition brought about

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by the October 1994 "Agreed Framework" between the United States and North Korea, which established the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Corporation (KEDO). The United States is in charge, with the Republic of Korea and Japan in principal supporting roles, and many other governments participating in lesser capacities. The purpose is to provide light water reactors and alternative energy (in this case, heavy fuel oil) to the North Koreans on economic terms they can afford and political terms they can accept.

What these and similar efforts have in common is that they tend to be U.S.-led groups that come together for a finite set of tasks. They are voluntary as regards membership participation in particular actions. Their charter is their own. They are often put together for a limited span of time. They tend to have little in the way of headquarters or permanent staff. They are better understood as an activity than an organization.

It is not difficult to imagine other applications, including a different approach to Bosnia. Rather than trying to force policy through a divided NATO or a UN with a different set of priorities, the United States would have been wiser to build a small coalition of like-minded states that would have been in a position credibly to threaten, and carry out as need be, military actions ranging from making the designated safe-areas safe to the so-called "lift and strike" option combining arms supplies to the Bosnians and attacks on Serbian positions. Some form of ad hoc coalition may prove useful in the future if, as seems likely, the NATO/UN phase of the conflict comes to an unhappy and unsuccessful end.

The United States will likely have to forge a small coalition to deal with North Korea's nuclear program if the current negotiated approach should come up short. This could prove the best way to tackle sanctions, in order to avoid the certain delay and possible Chinese veto in the Security Council that working through the UN would involve. It would be unavoidable if military action were to be taken. Indeed, given the controversial nature of preventive strikes, both as regards the act itself and the risk of retaliation against states near the target, it will almost always be necessary for the United States to create posses for such tasks. The same can be said of special sanctions regimes where something more formal or universal is simply not a realistic option, given the existence of opposition in the Security Council or among major trading partners of the target state. Indeed, the challenge for the United States in its policy toward Iran is to transform what is essentially a unilateral approach into something broader, if still ad hoc.

Obviously, the informal coalition approach is not without its drawbacks. By definition, such groups do not exist before the problem or crisis emerges, and they therefore offer no deterrent effect—although, if formed quickly enough, they can still provide a preventive or preemptive function. But informal coalitions take time to forge and not every protagonist will, like Saddam, provide months for a coalition to get up to speed. They will often lack clear political or legal authority and a means of reliable financing, the absence of which tends to detract from public and international support. The United States will more often than not have to act and provide the bulk of the impetus and resources. And, as is the case with any variant of multilateralism, informal coalitions constrain as well as facilitate. The Gulf War demonstrates that both strategic aims and tactical choices need to be negotiated among members of the coalition.

There are, however, important advantages. The United States has the inherent capacity to create posses where and when it chooses. They do not require much in the way of prior investment. Coalitions of the willing bring with them some of the advantages that derive from collective effort (resources, specialization, diplomatic co-support) without the need for consensus or prearranged authority. They also enjoy some measure of international legitimacy.

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More than anything else, though, posses or coalitions of the willing (and able) constitute an approach to international engagement that reflects the basic personality and characteristics of the post-Cold War world. This is a time in history when there are: multiple great powers involved in relationships that resist clear definition and range from the cooperative to the competitive; a growing number of small and medium sovereign entities; proliferating regional and international bodies, as well as non-governmental organizations; an increasing diffusion of power in all forms; and new sorts of problems (or old problems on a new scale) for which institutions do not yet exist. What is needed as a result is an approach to foreign policy that is inherently flexible, one able to respond to unforeseen situations in unprecedented ways.

The posse approach thus offers a valuable supplement to a world in which regional and international institutions are limited to what they can usefully contribute. Moreover, posses come with the further advantage that they can become more structured and institutionalized if the need and consensus to move in that direction exists. The supplier groups already mentioned reflect this potential, as does the G-7, which over the years has evolved into a quasi-institution for helping to manage a diverse set of political and military, as well as economic, challenges. It may prove possible to adapt or expand the role of other regional or international institutions. Until then, posses can selectively draw on the available assets and resources of such organizations.

Again, though, there will be limits to what we can predict and prepare for. Hence, informal coalitions of the willing increasingly will offer the best vehicle for this country to act effectively in the world when it matters most. Indeed, the real question hanging over the future of this approach to multilateralism is not so much its utility as the willingness of the United States to lead and participate: a posse without a strong sheriff is far more likely to get itself into trouble than to accomplish something of value. □

The Hand on the Tiller

In seeking the best course of action now, we should bear in mind the need to find a coherent strategy. We must anticipate the further consequences of any course of action that we now choose. Repeated changes of direction will only reduce our credibility and our influence. In matters such as these, which frankly are marginal to our interests, it is at least as important to have a firm hand on the tiller as it is in deciding on the precise direction. We must avoid giving false impressions. We must avoid seeming to act impulsively. . . .

It is sometimes said that the United States has no serious national interest in what is going on in the former Yugoslavia. That is no longer true. We do have a vital interest, one that cannot readily be conveyed in television images—but remains real, if intangible, nonetheless. Our allies are now engaged on the ground. We must ultimately come out of the Balkans with the North Atlantic Alliance reasonably intact. If a choice has to be made, NATO is far more important than Bosnia.

—James R. Schlesinger, testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, June 15, 1995.

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

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Korea and Our Asia Policy

Chalmers Johnson

ON JANUARY 30, 1995, in response to a question in a Diet committee, Japanese Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi* said that Japan is partly responsible for the division of the Korean peninsula after World War II. The following day, January 31, Murayama retracted his remark, saying "I spoke of Japan's responsibility for the Japanese colonial rule of Korea in the past. I want to make it clear that Japan has no responsibility for the division of Korea into North and South Korea."[1]

Japan may not be responsible for the division of Korea, but like China, it seems utterly comfortable with two Koreas and stirs itself only when it looks as if there might be some progress toward unification. The ostensible reason for Murayama's reversal is that Japan does not want to accede to North Korea's demand for compensation for the division of Korea. But the real issues behind Japan's ambiguous stance are: the place of Korea in the future of East Asian international relations, whether Japan will always have the American nuclear umbrella and thirty-seven thousand American troops in Korea to provide the first line of defense, what would happen to the Japanese-American "alliance" if the Americans ever again had to use force in Korea while the Japanese merely looked on. And indeed there is the even more fundamental question of why American troops are still there forty-five years after the outbreak of the Korean War and five years after the end of the Cold War.

The United States' position is no less ambiguous. Together with the former USSR, it *does* bear responsibility for the division of Korea after World War II, but that is something long forgotten. (In 1945 the Americans and Russians glanced at the map and chose the 38th parallel as the dividing line between the zones where the two putative allied armies would take the Japanese surrender.) Other things the Americans prefer to forget are those aspects of the Korean War that made it a civil war as well as a response to North Korean aggression; the American role in delaying democracy in Korea by its passivity in the face of Chun Doo Hwan's military coup d'état in 1979 and his massacre of civilians at Kwangju the following year; and their continuing military presence in a nation twice as populous and sixteen times as rich as its northern rival. The United States is also an ally of Israel, a country with a population of five million, compared to South Korea's forty million, and surrounded by enemies; but the United States does not station American soldiers in Israel to defend

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*In this article Japanese names, as well as Korean and Chinese names, are given in the Asian manner, surname first.

[1] *Kyodo News Service*, as reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: East Asia* (FBIS-EAS-95-021, February 1, 1995), p. 6.

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it. Arguably, the Americans have a greater stake than any other external power in the unification of Korea, but current policies, particularly the determination to keep U.S. ground forces there until 2015 (according to the so-called Nye Report of February 1995), directly contradict long-term American interests.[2]

The Chinese, Korea's first colonizers, are the big winners in this situation. Not unlike the Tang Dynasty's relations with the three kingdoms of Koguryo, Silla, and Paekche, China today enjoys diplomatic relations with both the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, with its capital in Pyongyang, and the Republic of Korea, with its capital in Seoul. The Chinese prefer a structurally divided Korea that is unable to play its full role as a buffer between China, Russia, and Japan, thereby giving China a determining influence on the peninsula. China's greatest worry has been that the North might collapse due to economic isolation and ideological irrelevance, thereby bringing about a unified Korea. This could make Korea an independent actor in northeast Asian politics, one the size of, and potentially as rich as, the former West Germany—and possessing a good army with nuclear weapons. This is not a development the Chinese would welcome. They would prefer to see the Americans, as outsiders, performing the dual role of continuing to protect the South while also propping up the regime in the North economically—and getting their South Korean and Japanese allies to help pay for the latter.

The Russians no longer have much influence on the Korean situation, although until the U.S.-North Korean agreement of October 21, 1994, they were the second most important source (after China) of fuel oil for the North. Today the Russians increasingly look to the Chinese as trading partners and as models of how to get capitalism before, or possibly without, democracy, and for the time being they seem to be following China's lead with regard to Korean policy. But that is not a path one can expect the former superpower to pursue indefinitely.

Meanwhile the Koreans themselves, both North and South, try to deal with this ambiguous environment, their own legacies of civil war, and their disputed claims to resistance or collaboration with the Japanese colonialists. And, of course, there are the broader questions raised by South Korea's capitalist miracle and North Korea's failed autarky, the learning curve spawned by the collapse of the Soviet empire and what happened to those countries that tried to jump directly into Anglo-American capitalism, and the opportunities and dangers posed by the shift in the global economic center of gravity to East Asia.

Variables and Constants

WE MUST LOOK at the strategic choices of both North and South Korea in this age of profound ambiguity, particularly as they relate to and are influenced by the United States and Japan. The latter two are the important variables in the equation. China is the major constant. I take as given that China—for reasons of geography and history—is the most important external power vis-à-vis the Korean peninsula and that it desires a perpetuation of the status quo. Its policy is one of "no unification, no war." (It is worth remembering that what the United States calls the Korean War turned out actually to be a war between the United States and China, fought on Korean territory. Had it remained strictly a "Korean" war, the United States would have won it and Korea today would not be divided.)

I also take it as given that China, Japan, and South Korea will never join the United States in genuine sanctions against the North and that the North knows this; that Japan will never join in the use of force in the Korean peninsula, and that this effectively makes the American military presence there both

[2]See Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region* (Washington, DC, February 1995).

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expensive and not credible; and that the Americans will never staff their government with genuine experts on the countries of East Asia, but will do so instead with economic and military theorists who will always have trouble knowing what is going on.

This last is the reason why virtually everything the Americans say officially about North Korea lacks strategic insight into the world as it appears from Pyongyang, as well as into what will be required to prevent the many blunders of the past from exacting high costs in the future. The U.S. news media have characterized North Korea as a "rogue state" (whatever that might mean), and Kim Jong Il as "the mad prince of North Korea whose troops (and nukes) make him the Saddam Hussein of North Asia;" Secretary of State Christopher (testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) argued very implausibly that only the threat of UN Security Council sanctions brought North Korea to the negotiating table.[3]

It must be acknowledged that no one knows much about the North Korean leaders and how their decisions are made. The only absolutely certain facts to emerge from the dramatic events of 1994 were that Kim Il Sung met Jimmy Carter in June and shortly thereafter died. Whether there is any relation between these two occurrences or, indeed, whether Kim died a natural death are still open questions. What we do know about North Korea, combined with a general knowledge of international relations, suggests that it is less a rogue state than a desperate one. In response to being driven into a corner, however, it offered the world a textbook example of how to parlay a weak hand into a considerable diplomatic and economic victory over a muscle-bound but poorly-informed competitor.

Without a Patron

THE TEARING DOWN of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 precipitated an acute crisis in North Korea. Even if it was not prepared to acknowledge that it had to reform its economic system of *juche* (self reliance), North Korea still could not help observing that the end-game of the Cold War was particularly dangerous for players on the communist side. The former leaders of Romania were put up against a wall and shot, the former leaders of East Germany were tried and given heavy sentences by the courts of a unified Germany, and the United States persisted in its boycott of Cuba even though it no longer posed any kind of threat. (Recently asked why Cuba was still being shunned, a "senior administration official," speaking on condition of anonymity, said with a smile, "To my knowledge they do not have a nuclear weapons program."[4])

This, in a nutshell, is the secret of how the two Kims caught the Americans' attention. Kim Il Sung and his son appear to have spent the first five years after the Berlin Wall came down thinking hard about how to avoid the same fate as Nicolae Ceausescu, and how to obtain some leverage over the big nations, chiefly the United States and Japan, that were arrayed against them.

With the end of the Cold War, Korea lost the patronage of the Soviet Union. For the previous forty years, Moscow had competed with the People's Republic of China to curry favor in Pyongyang, allowing North Korea to become independent of both. In 1974, following the first OPEC oil crisis, North Korea's Soviet ally sponsored it into the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) so that the Soviets could help North Korea develop a nuclear-power generating capability. In 1985, North Korea adhered to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), also at Moscow's behest. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korea lost not only Soviet nuclear aid and any continuing reason

[3] *Privileged Information* 1:3 (March 1995), p. 4; statement by Secretary of State Warren Christopher before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 24, 1995.

[4] *Associated Press*, "American Foreign Policy: Nukes Speak Louder than Refugees," September 1, 1994.

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to participate in Western-dominated atomic control regimes, but it also lost its second most important source of fuel oil.

The Chinese compounded these difficulties by asking North Korea to begin paying in hard currency for Chinese oil imports, on which North Korea suddenly depended (the Chinese have accepted some barter payments since 1992, when they first asked for hard currency). North Korea also imports smaller amounts of oil from Iran, Syria, and other Middle Eastern countries for which it pays with shipments of its Nodong I and Scud C missiles. It is worth noting that the amount of crude oil previously supplied by Russia, approximately five hundred thousand tons per annum, is the amount that the United States has now agreed to supply well into the next century, under terms of the October 1994 agreement. According to Japanese government estimates, by the early 1990s North Korea had only a half-year's oil reserve. The Japanese feared that when the North got down to only a three or four months' supply, it would invade South Korea as a desperation move.[5]

By the early 1990s, it became clear to the North that it had to break out of the trap in which the end of the Cold War had left it. The first experimental efforts were directed toward South Korea and Japan, not the United States, which it regarded as implacably hostile and with a large expeditionary army—something considerably more than the "tripwire" the Americans describe—in South Korea.

North Korea has long claimed greater legitimacy in the struggle against Japanese colonialism than South Korea, a claim that many students in South Korean universities accept. Moreover, until well over halfway through the Cold War, North Korea was considerably richer than South Korea in terms of per capita GDP. This situation slowly changed with South Korea's extraordinary economic achievements and the democratization set in motion in the 1980s.

As a result, as of 1994 it appeared that eventual unification on South Korea's terms was almost certain. With the Seoul Olympics of 1988, the end of the Cold War and the discrediting of communist ideology, the recognition of Seoul by both Russia and China, and particularly the December 1992 election of Kim Young Sam as president of the Republic of Korea and his subsequent implementation of liberal reforms, the Korean peninsula had come to look like a case study for Francis Fukuyama's thesis on the "end of history" (i.e., that liberalism had become the only ideologically possible form of government). The North did not like this, but it had also not totally foreclosed adjusting to it. Ever since it began reacting to the end of the Cold War, North Korea had very tentatively opened itself up to discussions with unofficial South Koreans, while also trying to protect itself from the much greater economic influence the South could bring to bear. In 1990 a North Korean leader said to the Chinese, "What we have hung out is not an iron curtain, but a mosquito net. It can let in breezes, and it can also defend against mosquitos."[6] When Kim Il Sung died on July 8, 1994, he was scheduled to meet with Kim Young Sam in an unprecedented Korean summit meeting.

Kanemaru's Last Hurrah

NORTH KOREA HAD also been trying to establish diplomatic and other relations with Japan. The breakthrough in North Korean-Japanese relations came about as a result of the Kanemaru Mission to Pyongyang of September 1990. This is still one of the most controversial issues in contemporary Japanese politics. Only a few weeks after President Roh Tae Woo of South Korea had met with Mikhail Gorbachev in San Francisco, the then vice president of the Liberal Democratic Party in

[5]Aso Iku and the *Bungei shunju* staff, eds., "Seifu naibu bunsho o nyushu, Kita Chosen wa ko ugoku" (Internal Government Document: How North Korea Will Act), *Bungei shunju*, July 1994, p. 199.

[6]*U.S. News & World Report*, July 25, 1994.

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Japan, Kanemaru Shin, led a joint LDP-Socialist delegation to the North Korean capital. This was entirely the initiative of Kanemaru and was opposed by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, it was widely supposed in South Korea at the time that Japan was trying to undermine the increasingly friendly relations between South Korea and the USSR, just as it was assumed in North Korea that Kanemaru, as the representative of Japan's long-standing one-party government (in that sense, similar to the government of North Korea), was an official Japanese spokesman.

It turns out that Kanemaru's visit was actually just a last hurrah by one of Japan's most corrupt politicians to further line his pockets. As Toshikawa Takao has put it:

> It was very much a personal initiative: a last chance for diplomatic glory in old Shin's declining years, and also a brazen attempt to generate huge kickbacks out of the flow of grants, yen credits, etcetera, that would flow to Pyongyang once the principle of paying reparations was established.

While in Pyongyang, Kanemaru, "drunk and slightly senile, is suspected of having promised the North Korean strongman [Kim Il Sung] grants and low-interest loans totaling ¥100 billion."[7]

Ever since this meeting the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has denied that what took place there was official Japanese policy and, more specifically, has argued that the so-called "three-party agreement" resulting from Kanemaru's visit must be abrogated before any further steps are taken toward North Korean-Japanese diplomatic normalization. That is more or less where things stood in early 1995—at impasse.

This impasse was complicated by the fact that the government of Japan during North Korea's 1994 nuclear initiative was led by a left socialist, Prime Minister Murayama, allied with the LDP, a party with a long record of hostility to Pyongyang. Japanese political observers have interpreted the Socialist-LDP alliance forged during 1994 in various ways: as a sign of the utter degeneracy of Japanese politics, as evidence that the Socialists are mere ornaments free-riding on the LDP's uninterrupted rule, and as another example of the Japanese establishment's use of domestic leftists for diplomacy with communist regimes. Whatever the case, the Japanese Socialists still claim to have direct access to Pyongyang and do not like being usurped by conservatives holding direct talks with North Korea. As explained below, the Socialists are also major sources of hard currency for North Korea. This disarray within the Japanese government stymied most efforts to continue the dialogue started by Kanemaru. Nonetheless, all Japanese factions were concerned that the breakthrough of October 1994 in U.S.-North Korean relations would leave them out in the cold—except (as in the Persian Gulf War) for the Americans sending them the bill.

Equally important from a North Korean point of view, Kanemaru began losing influence in Japanese politics during the autumn of 1992, culminating in his March 1993 arrest on bribery and corruption charges.[8] Japanese analysts believe that Kanemaru's downfall convinced Pyongyang that its Japan initiative was not working.[9] It therefore began dealing directly with the United States, opening its campaign with a brilliant stroke: in March 1993, North Korea gave notice of its intention to withdraw from the

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[7]"An Ill-fated Night in Pyongyang: Curse of Kanemaru Strikes Again," *Tokyo Insideline*, No. 34 (November 30, 1994), p. 3.

[8]See my "Puppets and Puppeteers: Japanese Political Reforms," in *Japan: Who Governs?* (New York: Norton, 1995), pp. 212-31.

[9]Igarashi Takeshi, Sumiya Mikio, Wada Haruki, and Yasue Ryosuke, "Setogiwa gaiko kara no dakkyaku o" ([North Korea] Should Stop Brinkmanship Diplomacy), *Sekai*, August 1994, pp. 195-96.

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NPT. The Americans, who had not really thought about their basic strategy toward Korea for almost fifty years, despite keeping a full division of troops there, woke up with a start.

A Truly Audacious Ploy

AMERICAN POLICY ON nuclear non-proliferation has long been filled with contradictions, and the officials in charge of it, through overreaction and an almost total ignorance of their adversary, played right into North Korea's hands. The Americans seem not to have noticed that proliferation has already occurred in Israel, India, and Pakistan; that South Korea, Japan, Sweden, Brazil, Argentina, Algeria, and Taiwan have technologically already proliferated without testing; and that Iraq was able to pursue a clandestine nuclear weapons program while complying with IAEA inspections.

Non-proliferation also ignores the efforts of Iran and Libya to purchase arsenals from the former USSR, the fact that four republics of the former USSR now have thousands of nuclear weapons, and the notion that there is something flawed—unprincipled, one might say—about permiting some nations to have nuclear weapons but not others. As Oh and Hassig have put it:

> This [was] a truly audacious ploy [on the part of North Korea]: an isolated and bankrupt nation [pinned] its hopes for political survival on a small nuclear program. . . .The emphasis the United States placed on the North Korean nuclear issue turned this into Pyongyang's strongest bargaining chip.[10]

The world does not actually know much about the history of the North Korean nuclear power program or about whether it really has diverted plutonium into weapons-building. North Korea has ample reason to build a nuclear-power generating capacity, given its vulnerability to a cut-off of crude oil. And, from a North Korean national security standpoint, Japan's own nuclear power capacity, its fast-breeder reactor program, and its plutonium stockpile could all plausibly appear threatening to a country that was once colonized and exploited by Tokyo. Japan has some forty-one nuclear plants generating 30 percent of its electricity, with another ten under construction. It has set a goal of meeting 43 percent of its demand for electricity through nuclear power by the year 2010. Many in Taiwan suspect that North Korea is reacting to Japanese nuclear developments, or conversely that Japan is using North Korea's attempts to gain energy independence as a pretext for its own nuclear proliferation, or both. "We cannot help suspecting," the *China Times* editorial page of July 18, 1994 stated, "that Japan's exaggeration of North Korea's nuclear threat is for its pretext of rearmament or the development of nuclear weapons."

Whatever the mix of reasons—including fears of Japan, energy demands, and post-Cold War isolation—North Korea developed a small nuclear weapons capacity, or at least convinced the IAEA that it had. The initial American reaction was belligerent. The Pentagon talked about "surgical strikes," à la the Israeli attack on the Iraqi reactor at Osiraq in 1981, and transferred Patriot missile brigades to Seoul. The U.S. military—and many civilian analysts and commentators—seemed intent on using force on the Korean peninsula.

The Japan Factor

BUT A MILITARY option in Korea, particularly one initiated by the United States, was and is wholly unrealistic. Not only was South Korea bitterly opposed (Seoul is, after all, only thirty-five miles from Panmunjom and was totally destroyed during

[10]Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, "Korea as a Pawn in the Global Non-Proliferation Conflict," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* VI:2 (Winter 1994), pp. 157-77.

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the last Korean war), but a new Korean war would almost certainly end the Japanese-American alliance. Since the Americans would inevitably take casualties and the Japanese would not participate at all militarily, the American public would want to know why. The Japanese-American Security Treaty was strained by a similar pattern during the Gulf War; a repetition in Japan's "backyard" would snap it. The Americans therefore tacitly gave up on a military option (since there actually never was a real one) and started talking about sanctions against North Korea if it did not rejoin the NPT regime and allow the IAEA to resume inspections of its nuclear facilities.

The threat of sanctions also proved meaningless, although it did reveal to the Americans how little their ideology fit the actual complexities of the region. The legal basis for imposing sanctions would have to be Articles 41 and 42 of the United Nations Charter, and China would have vetoed the use of either. Moreover, it is not clear that there ever was any legal basis for sanctions because North Korea had formally declared its intent to withdraw from the NPT.

The actual use of sanctions would have involved some combination of the following: interrupting telecommunications, cutting off remittances of money, prohibiting people and vessels from going to North Korea, and stopping trade. Pyongyang promptly announced that it would regard any blockade as an act of war and would retaliate directly against Seoul. This caused the South Koreans to lose some of their enthusiasm for sanctions.

Even more clearly, the proposal that Japan join the use of sanctions against North Korea proved acutely embarrassing to Tokyo, both because it revealed the extent to which Japan was already involved in propping up North Korea economically, and because of Japan's guilty conscience about its own treatment of the resident Korean population. Most Koreans living in Japan support North Korea as a matter of traditional anti-Japanese nationalism. During the last days of the Hosokawa administration, just as the Americans were starting to talk about sanctions, the Japanese government ordered a full-scale analysis of what might be involved. Though secret, this document was subsequently leaked to the press and published in the monthly magazine *Bungei shunju*.[11] This study revealed that Japan is North Korea's second most important trading partner, after China. During 1992 Japan exported to North Korea some ¥28.3 billion worth of goods—textiles (27 percent), machinery (18 percent), electrical equipment (11 percent), and transportation equipment (8 percent)—while it imported from North Korea some ¥32.7 billion worth of apparel made from Japanese textiles. This trade earned for North Korea a surplus in vitally-needed hard currency of ¥4.4 billion (44 million U.S. dollars). By contrast two-way trade between China and North Korea was about $700 million, plus another $100 million of uncontrolled trade along the Sino-Korean border.

More important than trade, the survey revealed that the organization of Koreans in Japan allied with North Korea, Chosen Soren, remitted huge amounts of foreign currency to North Korea, and that it also made large shipments of prohibited cargo such as computers and integrated circuits. All the large Japanese banks, including Daiichi Kangyo, Fuji, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Sakura, Asahi, Sanwa, and the Bank of Tokyo, have correspondence agreements with North Korean banks. Individual contributions of money to North Korea amount to at least ¥60 to ¥70 billion per annum—an amount equal to the trade with China—and Korean operators of *pachinko* parlors (pinball machines), many of whom are allied with the Socialist Party, have in the past contributed as much as ¥100 million on Kim Il Sung's birthday. The Ministry of Finance could

[11]July 1994, pp. 198-211. On the Association of North Korean Credit Associations, also see, in Japanese, *Shokun*, December 1994, pp. 78-85.

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attempt to freeze these assets in Japan under Article 16 of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law, but the government's report concluded that this would be ineffective since most private remittances and shipments go to third countries first and then through China into North Korea.

It must also be noted that during 1992 some 6,600 Koreans living in Japan and 4,300 Japanese visited North Korea, while 510 North Korean vessels visited Japan. Equally important, the Association of North Korean Credit Associations in Japan (a federation of credit unions where Koreans deposit their money) held assets worth ¥2.4 trillion and is close to Ishii Hajime, former member of the Takeshita faction of the LDP and today part of the opposition Shinshinto. Ishii is an advocate of normal relations between Japan and North Korea. Thus, even if the Americans had gotten UN approval of sanctions and avoided a Chinese veto, Japan's report concluded that its government could not have implemented them.

A Win-Win Solution

IN THIS CONTEXT Jimmy Carter undertook his personal diplomacy. His mission was actually quite similar to the Nixon-Kissinger opening to China undertaken twenty years earlier. Both missions reflected a growing American understanding that communism in China, Korea, and Vietnam was a vehicle for Asian nationalism, that Kim Il Sung wanted recognition of his accomplishments as a guerrilla fighter against the Japanese, and that the Americans had misjudged both the Chinese Communist and North Korean (to say nothing of the Vietnamese) revolutions—even if the Americans did not dare to say any of this publicly.

The Carter visit achieved a breakthrough. Whether Kim Il Sung was personally satisfied, we do not know. But clearly he did not want to negotiate with the International Atomic Energy Agency, since it had nothing to give him in return for his compliance with its inspection requirements, whereas the Americans did. They could deliver some goods North Korea needed, and they could also wring some more from the Japanese and South Koreans. Kim Il Sung therefore froze his nuclear program and opened negotiations on what he would require in order to permanently stop his weapons project and shift to a Western-approved form of nuclear-power generation.

So ended the first phase of one of the most serious confrontations of the post-Cold War era. It should go into the textbooks as a cardinal achievement of U.S. diplomacy and of successful nuclear blackmail. It was an unusual example of a true "win-win" solution. Had the Americans followed the advice of their military, they would have produced only their own version of Chechnya; had the North Koreans pursued their nuclear program (as they may still decide to do), they would have achieved only a Libya-like status as the true pariah of East Asia. The United States could have avoided this confrontation had it opened some channel to Pyongyang years ago; North Korea should also have quit playing the old Korean role of "hermit kingdom."

Talks to implement the Carter-Kim agreement opened on July 8, 1994, the day Kim Il Sung died, and as a result were immediately suspended. The death of Kim and the lack of credible information about his son, Kim Jong Il, might have set back the negotiations but actually seemed to have little effect on North Korea's discussions with the United States. They did however create serious problems in South Korea. The South Korean government prohibited any public expressions of grief, banned a church-sponsored human chain of people holding hands up to the demilitarized zone on the anniversary of liberation from Japan, released letters that Boris Yeltsin gave to Kim Young Sam when he visited Moscow in June that allegedly proved Kim Il Sung had started the Korean War, and sent police into the elite

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Seoul National University to arrest some fourteen hundred students who were calling for U.S. troops to get out of Korea and quit blocking unification.

It is possible that South Korea feared the sudden death of Kim Il Sung would lead to a political and economic collapse in the North and a human tidal wave of refugees moving south. In any case, the South's actual reaction to Kim's death was a disaster insofar as building mutual trust was concerned and revealed a deep-seated lack of confidence in itself. In retaliation, North Korea hardened its position on relations with South Korea.

On August 5, 1994, talks between North Korea and the United States resumed in Geneva. They led to a so-called "Agreed Framework" that the two sides signed on October 21, 1994. According to this framework the United States agrees to arrange for the construction by the year 2003 of two 1,000 megawatt light-water reactors in North Korea to replace its current graphite-moderated reactors (a Soviet design from which plutonium can more easily be extracted). It also agrees to provide fuel oil to replace the energy lost by the closing of North Korea's current reactors, and assures Pyongyang that it will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons in Korea. For its part North Korea agrees to freeze and then dismantle its current reactors, ship its used nuclear fuel rods out of the country, remain a party to the NPT, and allow IAEA inspection of its nuclear sites. The agreement has a self-enforcing quality in that either side can drop out at any time if the other does not appear to be living up to the agreement.

The truly astonishing thing about this agreement is that the United States negotiated a deal, in the words of Oh and Hassig, "whose central incentives—LWRs [light-water reactors] and oil deliveries—are to be paid for by other nations." The total cost of the reactors is estimated in the range of $4- to $4.5 billion. Japan at first balked, and opposition political strongman Ozawa Ichiro said that disposal of any possible North Korean nuclear weapons should be a precondition for financial assistance, especially since the inspections the North agreed to will not actually occur for more than five years.[12] But by March of this year Japan and South Korea had agreed to pay for the reactors; and all three countries—the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan—had set up a new organization called the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) to do the actual construction work. Japan supplied an initial $5.8 million so that KEDO could go into operation.

The Neglected Ally

MEANWHILE, THREE days after the agreement was signed, then South Korean Foreign Minister Han Sung Joo told the National Assembly that "The new, safer reactors promised to North Korea in Friday's deal would be designed by South Korea, which would play a major role in their construction." And, indeed, in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in January, Secretary of State Christopher confirmed that "almost all financing for the LWRs will come from others, primarily South Korea and Japan." And that was the rub. North Korea would not accept reactors from South Korea, although there were indications it might do so if they were disguised in some way (the so-called "plain brown wrapper" solution).

Pyongyang was clearly testing the degree of coordination between Washington and Seoul to see if it could avoid openly taking aid from the Republic of Korea. South Korea refused to back down. Some of its leaders contended that the Clinton administration had rushed to sign an agreement and should have held out for a stronger one. Presented with this unexpected resolve on the part of its erstwhile client, the Americans adopted a less flexible negotiating position. Given its worsening economic situation, North Korea had

[12] *Sankei shimbun*, December 22, 1994, p. 3.

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no choice but to take the best terms it could get. This it did in Kuala Lumpur on June 13, 1995. It agreed to accept reactors from South Korea but only with no mention of South Korea and with an American firm named as "program coordinator." It also asked for and got emergency shipments of rice from both South Korea and Japan.

These negotiations have resulted in the most important accords reached on the Korean peninsula since the 1953 Korean War armistice. They have also revealed growing differences in outlook between the United States and the Republic of Korea, differences that are more openly recognized in Korea and Japan than in the United States. It should be recalled that only on November 30, 1994 did the United States finally transfer operational control of the South Korean armed forces from the U.S.-led Combined Forces Command to the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff. Until then a U.S. general had been in command of the ROK army, a fact that caused the people of Kwangju and the students of Seoul to conclude that the United States acquiesced in the Korean army's massacre of civilians in 1980. Given the military coups, incidents of torture and killings, and military corruption, the end of 1994 was a very late date indeed for the United States to begin to clarify who is actually in charge of and responsible for the ROK army.

In many other ways the United States had cut out its Korean ally. The armistice that ended the fighting in the Korean War itself was an agreement among only North Korea, China, and the United States, and did not include South Korea. Equally important, the United States and the Republic of Korea now seem to be talking past each other about the nature of the continuing U.S. commitment in Korea and East Asia. Through its nuclear blackmail, Pyongyang has gained some valuable time and foreign investments, but Seoul knows that unification is inevitable. Korea is the last of the states divided by the Cold War. Unification will be expensive—over $100 billion is the current estimate—but that is not an impossible figure to put together in newly rich East Asia. The North might still cause serious political and perhaps military problems and the Chinese will not like what is happening. But there is nothing about unification that must necessarily cause conflict, so long as each side's face is preserved, and so long as there is no subsequent American presence on the peninsula to threaten China's security.

From Seoul's point of view, the serious problems are Japan and the United States. As Oh and Hassig put it, "Before Seoul can pursue a new Nordpolitik, it must fashion a new and more independent Westpolitik to realign its relations with Washington." The American military supports the status quo in both Korea and Japan, as it unequivocally states in the so-called Nye Report, but in terms of the future of East Asia it favors Japan. "There is no more important bilateral relationship than the one we have with Japan," asserts the Department of Defense. "[It] is the linchpin of United States security policy in Asia." However, if the Americans really believe this, they should withdraw their ground forces from Korea and distance themselves from any final flare-up of the Korean civil war, since such a conflict would almost certainly sour their relations with the "linchpin."

At the same time, Koreans have good historical reasons to fear and distrust Japan. Even though South Korea's economy is today almost inextricably intertwined with that of Japan, it has to distrust Japan's stockpiling of plutonium, its pretensions to be the leader of a new Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and its growing independence from the United States. On the fiftieth anniversary of the liberation of Korea from Japanese colonialism, the Koreans are still angry over Japan's refusal officially to compensate the women it conscripted into its wartime army brothels, its refusal to apologize to the nations it victimized during World War II while pretending that it was

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merely liberating Asia from the "white race," and its claims to represent East Asia to the rest of the world, either in the G-7 summit meetings or in the UN, where Japan aspires to a permanent Security Council seat.

Incredible as it may seem, in early June of this year former Japanese foreign minister and a strongman of the LDP, Watanabe Michio, blurted out to the press that in his opinion the Koreans in 1910 had voluntarily agreed to become a Japanese colony. As usual, the U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense had no comment even as South Korean public opinion exploded in outrage. The South Koreans also remain furious that the United States has approved a nuclear fuel reprocessing capability for Japan, but not for South Korea.

South Korea is comparatively rich; its economy grew 7.8 percent during 1994 and will grow at least 7 percent during 1995. The high yen is causing other Asian economies to turn to Korea for supplies of computer memory chips, flat panel displays, and other high technology products. South Korea also has real problems. Its persistent internal regionalism—Kyongsang province's continued domination of political and corporate power and its subordination of agricultural Cholla—raises questions about whether the two political halves of Korea can ever get together, when even the elements of the southern half have never been able to do so. At the same time, the persistence of regional loyalties suggests that South Korea is not gripped by a crisis psychology and is confident that it can handle both the North and its internal divisions.

One Hand Clapping

THE FUTURE IS clear for both Korea and Japan: Ten to fifteen years from now Korea will be a unified country and Japan will be a fully independent, fully armed nation-state. Neither of them will depend any longer on American troops for their security. This is the trend of events in both countries; the details concern how fast the Korean and Japanese people can adjust to these new realities.

The peace and stability of East Asia will be maintained not by a perpetuation of an American military presence in the region but through an emerging balance of power. This could take many forms, but its most likely version is already on the horizon: a balance among China, Japan, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in which a unified Korea and Vietnam would act as the main buffers, not unlike the way Poland and Belgium did in the nineteenth-century European balance of power. The United States would contribute to the balance by guaranteeing the security of Korea and Vietnam and by shifting its power among the other three in order to add caution and restraint to their decision-making. Although Vietnam has now joined ASEAN, it will still be the main bulwark in Southeast Asia against excessive Chinese influence. The American role would reflect the United States' unique ability to project power in the Pacific, but it would also require a redesigning and new deployment of American forces.

Reflecting current neo-isolationist thought in America, the Cato Institute puts it starkly in its handbook for the new Congress:

> American taxpayers spent roughly $13 trillion (in 1994 dollars) and sacrificed 113,000 lives to win the Cold War. With the demise of the superpower that threatened the United States and its allies, both directly and through surrogates, the American people should not be expected to surrender more dollars and risk more lives to police East Asia for as long as U.S. allies deem convenient.[13]

Even if the current agreement between the United States and North Korea comes unstuck, that is no reason to revert to Cold War confrontation. What would then be in

[13] *The Cato Handbook for Congress* (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1995), p. 281.

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order would be for the major states of the area that are the most threatened by North Korea's nuclear potential to take the lead in dealing with the problem themselves. North Korea has repeatedly shown that it is willing to deal, as seen in its speedy return of the American helicopter pilots who intruded into its territory in December 1994.

The United States can help South Korea, Japan, and China to resolve their problems, but I believe that to attempt the role of "lone superpower" is like solving that famous Zen riddle: What is the sound of one hand clapping? One hand cannot clap, just as one superpower is a contradiction in terms. With the end of the Cold War, all conflicts are regional and without global strategic significance, which is the only realm in which superpowers make any difference. □

Until the Crunch Comes

A big inversion of roles is taking place across the world—one that prompts a mixture of excitement and loathing. Governments are accustomed to setting the context within which elites and markets operate. But now it is elites and markets that set the limits within which governments govern.

These elites are the living embodiments of Tom Wolfe's "masters of the universe." They run companies which choose where jobs will be distributed across the world. They run the world's media and, thanks to satellites and the digital revolution, the world's media now overwhelm the ability of national government to corral them. Whether as writers, actors or athletes, they star in what the media bosses send unstoppably around the world. Their power over governments lies in their international power of patronage; but also in their direct influence in national politics. . . .

There is nothing new about this leaching away of the power of governments. Ever since the Fuggers traded coinage in the sixteenth century, bankers have irritated princes by testing their whims in the currency markets. But telecommunications put that tendency onto a rising curve, and this steepened sharply in the early 1970s when the markets ousted national treasuries in running international finance. Now all the world's a dish and all the men and women merely data. The curve has become almost vertical. . . .

So what is to be done about those usurping elites? One should remember first that they are a fair-weather problem. National governments will come briskly back into their own if some big crisis of security threatens, for while the jet set may be great at moving money, it is hopeless at passing the ammunition. When the next bloody crunch comes, the elites will come to heel. This is a prediction, not a prescription.

—Nico Colchester, "Government is Dead. Now Money Rules," *The Spectator*, June 3, 1995

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Who Won the Trade War?

Robert B. Zoellick

NOW THAT THERE is an armistice in the latest phase of the trade war with Japan, it is instructive to evaluate President Clinton's settlement, the costs of achieving it, and the implications for U.S. foreign policy in Asia. I believe the United States received too little and paid more than necessary. Even more troubling, this incident affirms that the administration still does not appreciate how and when to wield power. Worst of all, the Clinton team seems chronically incapable of integrating its ad hoc trade and foreign policies. While Clinton's Asian security specialists publish grand strategies, his economic and political advisors proceed case-by-case with Japan and China, applying contradictory and uncoordinated tactics.

The surest predictor of the administration's position on any foreign policy question remains its calculation of domestic political effect. Ironically, Clinton's bad foreign policy habits are fueling the isolationist sentiments he solemnly decries.

The Trade Hawks Lay an Egg

AFTER DISPLAYING front-page photos of Mr. Kantor playfully threatening Mr. Hashimoto with a bamboo sword, newspapers buried in their business sections the first clue that the administration's Japan hawks had laid a modest egg. It turns out that the Japanese auto-manufacturers have purchased almost twenty billion dollars of American-made auto parts in recent years, slightly *exceeding* the voluntary goal Japan presented to President Bush. Although candidate Clinton criticized Bush's efforts, President Clinton has settled for smaller numbers that now have only the standing of U.S. "estimates" because Japan refused to extend the 1991-92 goals.

The use of these voluntary goals involves a dangerous balance both for Americans promoting open markets and the Japanese economic bureaucrats. On the one hand, frustrated U.S. exporters want voluntary goals to help overcome hidden barriers and prejudices against imports in Japan. The theory is that once Japanese business and consumers are forced to examine foreign goods, they will recognize them as satisfactory and the regular forces of market competition can operate more freely. But voluntary goals can slip into quotas, which make it harder to achieve free competition; they can become ceilings (not floors) on exports, and may lead to a counterproductive attitude of disdain toward the export products that Japanese companies are required to buy. Quotas lead to managed trade, which creates an incentive for exporters to concentrate on getting their governments to bargain for market share, instead of focusing

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their businesses on developing competitive products and market strategies. The Japanese government's efforts to persuade its industries to establish goals also undermines the cause of deregulation.

The Bush administration decided that the closed nature of some Japanese sectors and business practices warranted pressing Japanese firms to establish voluntary goals, if the goals were complemented by American companies' adjustments to match Japanese opportunities. In early 1993, Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) probably would have continued to experiment with these arrangements, because the process tended to strengthen MITI's influence within the economy and give it an important role in managing the relationship with the United States.

Unfortunately, the new Clinton administration was oblivious to these subtleties, risks, and tradeoffs. As a result of a failure to analyze Japan's range of flexibility and constraints on trade policy, compounded by poor tactics, Clinton's result fell short of that achieved by Bush.

The administration overplayed its hand from the start by insisting on specific numerical targets in agreements that the United States would enforce with trade law remedies. Given the uncertainties of market conditions, MITI would not accept legal quotas. So MITI retreated from even the idea of voluntary goals and seized the high ground of defending free market principles. The public debate had thus been shifted adroitly from extraordinary measures to overcome Japan's societal and business barriers to Clinton's demands for managed trade. In the end, Clinton blinked, failing to achieve even voluntary goals, much less enforceable targets. Again mistaking rhetoric for reality, the administration trumpeted its own numerical projections, although Japan announced that these projections were "neither shared by the [Japanese Trade] Minister himself, nor the government of Japan."

High Cost, Missed Opportunities

THE CLINTON administration spent much international political capital for this result, and the United States will pay the costs for some time. The administration ignored the costs to the new World Trade Organization (WTO), intended as the enforcer of the global trading system's market rules and for which the United States had fought many years. Following the logic of Pat Buchanan, Clinton dismissed the fact that the highly competitive American economy, the largest exporter in the world, is a primary beneficiary of a WTO that enforces fair competition according to agreed rules. I have no doubt that in the future, other nations will cite Clinton's policy toward Japan as an excuse to evade the very rules we want to apply.

In addition, by focusing American pressure on the auto and parts sectors, Clinton failed to pursue other worthwhile priorities. It is a fact of international political life that governments have to decide which results warrant an expenditure of their "capital." In doing so, they should look for supporters inside other countries whose shared interests or outlook will lead them to help achieve results. Clinton did not commit U.S. power to press Japan to stimulate its moribund economy through tax and spending policies, even though the United States could have enlisted Japanese allies who also favored pro-growth policies. This macroeconomic approach might have connected U.S. aims to Japan's anxieties over an overvalued yen, further strengthening the U.S position. This option also would have made a bigger overall dent in the trade deficit.

Another more fruitful alternative would have been to concentrate on getting the Japanese to clean up the half trillion dollars of losses in its banking system. They must address this problem eventually. In the meantime, Japan's paralysis on the issue is choking off economic growth and preventing the recycling of yen surpluses.

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The administration also chose not to select as a high priority an alliance with Japanese political and economic reformers and journalists, all of whom have been calling for deregulation and competition as a means to lower prices, increase consumer choices, and improve living standards. The recent successes of the New Frontier Party suggest that the movement for change in Japan, although it waxes and wanes, offers an ongoing opportunity to link economic and political openings. Instead, Clinton's blunt demand for legally enforceable quotas united Japanese of all views against the United States. As a result, the United States ended up with little to show for all of its huffing and puffing, and has passed up opportunities to invigorate both macroeconomic and microeconomic changes in Japan.

Where's the Strategy?

THE CLINTON administration began with an appropriate recognition of the importance of the Asia-Pacific region to U.S. security, economic, and political interests. But by confusing tough rhetoric with effective policies toward the two biggest regional powers, Japan and China, the administration has achieved little at significant expense, revealed weakness, and dissipated both its strength and credibility. These failures open the door to isolationists and other narrowly-focused domestic forces, making it even harder to forge an integrated strategy toward the Asia-Pacific region in the future.

In an effort to clarify administration policy, Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye has made "The Case for Deep Engagement" by the United States in East Asia after the Cold War (*Foreign Affairs*, July-August 1995). He opens by observing that "politics and economics are connected," and then outlines a sensible security framework. But his brief nod to the administration's Asian economic policies dodges the fact that these policies are not integrated with the Defense Department's security concept. Mr. Nye's economic policy colleagues have failed to recognize and relate the economic changes in the region that are the counterparts to his observations on security issues. As a result, the economic side of the house is preoccupied with narrow, bilateral trade complaints, while the security side, though taking a longer view, is not integrated within a coherent strategy.

The unintegrated, case-by-case approach of the administration's trade warriors is building up resentments on both sides of the Pacific that will haunt U.S. policy in the future. Japanese and others in East Asia perceive the United States as increasingly hostile, threatening, and ultimately unreliable. Equally bad, they conclude the United States is weak, because rhetorical bluster is not matched by resolve, and U.S. "victories" are transparently hollow. Meanwhile, on the home front, the fierce chest-pounding stirs those Americans who are intent on finding a new enemy. Because the administration's trade results will not prove significant, Clinton will end up fueling the pseudo-realists and geo-economists who argue that Mr. Nye's strategy does not promote American interests. Because the administration's trade and security policies in Asia are based on different interpretations of the political and economic changes in the region, the administration is in effect at war with itself.

The importance of broad strategic considerations *does not* justify ignoring Japan's—or any other Asian nation's—explicit or implicit barriers to U.S. imports; it *does* necessitate evaluating what the United States gets, for what cost, and whether shrewder tactics and assessments of opportunities might work better. The administration's trade team might start, as Mr. Nye does, by examining Japan in the context of its changing politics and place in the region. The same forces inside Japan that are pressing that nation to assume greater regional and global responsibilities are potential allies for deregulating and opening up Japan's economy.

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These movements within Japan will be strengthened by regional economic trends. If Mr. Nye recognizes the need to blend bilateral and multilateral security arrangements in a mutually supportive fashion, why can't his economic colleagues do the same?

As J.P. Morgan's research staff has pointed out, the emerging economies of Asia are now twice as large as Japan's, if valued at purchasing power parity exchange rates; even using market exchange rates, the rest of the region's GDP is close to half of Japan's, and it is closing the gap rapidly. The extraordinary growth of these countries is also changing their economic structures, with the upper tier turning to services and approaching OECD norms and the next economic tier shifting from agriculture to industry and services. Over the past ten years, the share of Japan's trade surplus earned from its Asian trade has boomed from about 20 to 50 percent, in the range of Japan's surplus with the United States. Yet despite the shift in direction of Japan's trade to Asia, Japan is not gaining market share because non-Japanese intra-Asian trade is growing even more quickly.

The stronger yen and higher Japanese production costs have driven manufacturers abroad, but falling profit margins and banks with little capital to spare have limited Japan's capacity for foreign investment. Although Japan's foreign direct investment in the region is increasing, it is doing so at a rate that lags behind that of Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Korea. Japan's foreign direct investment in East Asia is even slipping when compared to that of the United States.

While Japan certainly remains an important financial influence in the region, the extent of its leverage is diminished because high local savings rates are the primary source of investments. Interestingly, the ASEAN economies are also attracting research and development-intensive industries from the United States and Europe, illustrating to Japan the costs of keeping foreigners out.

In sum, the regional economic picture suggests that Japan will face increasing pressure to improve its competitiveness. These market forces could combine with political changes in the country that will support deregulation and a more open economy. Other Asians may also be more willing to help urge Japan to reduce barriers to trade, as long as they do not feel they risk legitimizing U.S. methods that might one day be directed at themselves. Indeed, Japan and other states in Asia might prove more willing to liberalize trade in a multilateral context like the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) or the WTO. The early reports are that Japan is preparing for the 1995 APEC Summit in Osaka by engaging in the serious work of starting to prepare practical plans to achieve the free trade goal adopted at last year's meeting. U.S. bilateral pressure should capitalize on these changes, targeting macroeconomic, deregulatory, and even sectoral opportunities where we can generate support within Japan and the region for positive change.

If the Clinton administration truly viewed Asia strategically, it would adjust its trade and economic policies to match regional conditions, move with the momentum of local political changes, support long-term economic and security goals, maximize the likelihood of success, and minimize the costs. But this administration does not work that way.

Why? President Clinton's approach to Japanese trade and the U.S. future in Asia seems illogical until one considers what truly drives his foreign policies: votes. This is the one gain Clinton may derive from his trade exercise with Japan. When pressed about the weaknesses of the policy at a press briefing, a senior United States trade representative resorted to pointing out the support for it in the polls. Over the next year we will hear Clinton campaign on how hard he fought, how he produced trade gains unlike those of his predecessors, and how American industry and workers can rely on his toughness in the brave new world of aggressive trading states. Just remember what the Asians have learned: that rhetoric precedes retreat at high cost. □

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The Price of Information

Eric Jones

MANY ECONOMISTS, business analysts and especially people in the communications industries are in a state of euphoria about globalization. While this is obviously a feature of the times, parts of the business press give the impression that a single world market is a foregone conclusion, indeed virtually exists already. Analysts are urging that competition for capital will steer governments to provide the conditions that international business wants, like some giant, spontaneous traffic-calming device. The certain near-term victory of this process is too readily assumed, reflecting the fact that economists and business commentators tend to fix their attention on the more mobile factors. Political commentators, on the other hand—particularly those of a "realist" disposition—are more likely to emphasize the less mobile ones. While both perceptions pick up aspects of reality, it is not hard to see that the two must be brought together, since the tensions between them are what cause conflict and, so to speak, sell newspapers.

There are three profound systemic movements now working at the global level. The common element among them is the rapid cheapening of information. This, though speeding economic, political, and social changes of disparate kinds in societies throughout the world, is paradoxically exacting a price in many unexpected ways.

The first process is a speeded-up circulation of factors of production. Great uncertainty is being created by competition to attract and retain industries, especially those using advanced technology.

The second process, labeled for convenience "democratization," is the challenge to the non-Western world posed by rapidly spreading notions of political pluralism. As advanced communications link up across the world, waves of disturbance wash against cultures that lack the West's long preparation for them, in terms of individualism and gradual growth. In countries lacking even a free press, this "democratization" is seen not as a universal tendency that Western society happens long since to have absorbed into its bloodstream, but as a Western threat to traditional cultures and political leaderships.

The third process, summed up here, not without irony, as a "declining work ethic" or "tendency to self-actualization," so far affects only the West. Affluence, magnified by the ease of modern communications, has vastly extended personal choice. Constraints on individual aspirations have lifted, much as in earlier centuries the veils of isolation, ignorance, and hierarchy were peeled back to permit the emergence of Western democracy. In his compelling article, "The *Real* Clash" (*The National Interest*, Fall 1994), James Kurth urges the centrality of the struggle within the West for its own soul. I shall treat Kurth's "real clash" in the West as

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an aspect of my third process, self-actualization, and regard it as only the most recent of the three overmastering movements.

The fact that these three processes are occurring concurrently, yet are regionally out of phase, provokes much of the international disorder we see today. It is only by considering all three movements, and their relationship to each other, that we can hope to reassemble the global jigsaw.

Cheaper Information

INFORMATION HAS BEEN getting cheaper for centuries, since at least the multiple copying of medieval manuscripts. Modern technologies mean that it is doing so faster than ever, producing a great asymmetry as its price plunges away from the prices of other factors of production. Cheaper information propels economic growth, speeds the movement of other factors of production, and reduces economies of scale in the running of industries and political units. It also renders the creation of brand images much dearer, spreads individualistic and pluralistic political ideas, and helps both protagonists and opponents of any given change to combine for or against it.

Reduced information costs have an effect, or take a toll, by eroding economies of scale in running the state. Recent studies suggest that micro-states have become more viable than they were. Electronic access to world markets has permitted them to find niches for their goods and services. A big internal market is no longer vital. Accordingly, and unexpectedly, it has become easier to establish breakaway states within an expanded world market. Insofar as this involves a retreat to units based on ethnicity or religion, it is more dangerous than political nationalism. Civil wars and wars of religion are the bitterest of all. They are scarcely negotiable. They evade such rational instruments of management as centuries of diplomacy have developed to manage political relationships.

The Grip of Sovereignty

WITH THEIR intractable affection for local groupings, people (and peoples) will usually fight to the last against cosmopolitanism. Whether or not the world eventually merges into a benign whole, to believe that it will do so quickly, without hideous pain, defies all probability and every precedent. It disregards the disruptive power of the many who fear they may be the losers in global competition.

Statistics on globalization are hard to come by, as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) admits, but in reality most multinationals are still regional rather than genuinely global in their reach. A recent study confirms that multinationals carry out research and development largely in their home countries. Local ownership and local content laws remain influential. Standardization is more limited than we are led to believe. Tradable goods may look much the same across the world but they cost very different amounts of labor to buy in different countries, and anyone who has worked or set up house in more than one country knows that as far as services are concerned standardization is a joke. Accompanying the euphoria about the global firm, then, is selective inattention to variations among economies and a blindness to the forces that actively recreate local differences.

Nevertheless, a tectonic shift is taking place as relative economic strength relocates across the globe. Fresh voices are bound to be raised in international politics. This is not simply because of the retreat of the superpowers, as the viewpoint of strategic analysis might suggest; it reflects the market shift. The essential point about modern information systems is that they permit more volatile investment. Funds now gravitate fast to regions offering cheap labor and other attractions. The costs of adjustment fall onto the relatively less mobile factors, which occasions political friction. Labor may be more

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mobile than ever before but cannot begin to match the speed of transactions in capital markets. Governments everywhere resent the power of businesses to leave when dissatisfied. They vacillate about offering multinational firms inducements to stay.

External competition need not be serious, or even real, to stir up anxieties. New combinations form; old class antagonists join to preserve the Fordist (or Stalinist) phase of industrialism based on the heavy manufactures, vast plants, huge unionized workforces, and above all economies of scale that decentralized, computer-aided, information-rich technologies are undermining. This is not merely the temporary alliance of those interested in one ailing industry or another. On the assumption that imports from countries with currently cheap labor are more to blame for current woes than are cyclic changes or new technology, one half of modern conservatism rides everywhere on a wave of protectionist sentiment. The other half—owners and investors who have successfully repositioned their assets in rising sectors, workers with the skills appropriate to these sectors—therefore no longer finds all "capitalists" or the entire bourgeoisie to be its allies.

Right-left politics concerned with the shares of income accruing to capital or labor is bifurcated anew, in country after country, on the question of opening or closing the national market. What cannot be guaranteed is that lines drawn up over income distribution or free trade will correspond to conservatism of a social or moral kind, the sort that finds itself embattled because of the flood of alien images transported by information technologies similar to those that circulate investment at the press of a key. Tension is exacerbated between desires for a free market and the comforts of the social order that it may undermine.

Eager globalizers urge that governments today not only should be but already are powerless to resist the threats of capital to leave their jurisdictions. Once firms find labor dearer, taxes higher, the regulatory environment tighter, or the national polity unstable, they may exit. The actual end of the nation-state is prophesied. Perhaps this will come about, but it will not come smoothly. Resistance to losses of sovereignty is expressed by legislators, trades unions, cultures, and (as unemployment continues to increase) a fearful middle class. Whatever the final outcome, this response, muddled in with local and particular considerations, must slow globalization. Ideologues of all kinds have other values than the dollar. This cannot exempt them from economic influences but it can desensitize them. To cite only one example, the fact that one hundred company head offices quit Montreal between 1976-1981 has hardly slowed the Quebec separatists.

The European Precedent

WE CAN GET SOME purchase on the likely course of events by examining historical precedent. A convenient experiment of economic integration has been run before, not on a global scale but on the still sizable canvas of nineteenth-century Europe. An historical analogy can never be exact, but this one reveals how ardently nation-states attempt to retain control when their sovereignty is threatened. It shows that the technological developments behind international integration may work equally to strengthen the nation-state, setting bounds to the coalescence of a unified market. We have already noticed that the reduction of costs, particularly information costs, which promotes globalization may work in the reverse direction, making it cheaper to run small political units.

The proclivities of historians mean that they are given to overrating the unique aspects of Europe's evolution and underrating the blind forces of social change. Consider the background: by 1800, Europe had already benefited from centuries of incremental improvement in transport, industrialization, and urbanization. The arbi-

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trariness of kings had been curbed by the invention of the bill of exchange, meaning that capital could slide away to other realms, just as individuals could escape over the borders of pocket handkerchief-sized states.

In the nineteenth century, industrialization and urbanization took place faster than ever before. Constraints on capital and labor were dissolving, improvements in communications were coming faster, and popular education was expanding. When these changes began to affect Eastern Europe, Czarist Russia, and the Balkans—areas with less preparation than Western Europe—they arrived with percussive force. Not every nineteenth-century change "took." In the Balkans, for example, the building of stable states and inclusive nations was a flimsy thing. Similar inadequate reactions may well occur in contemporary, hierarchical cultures faced with "Westernization." The best comfort lies in noting that there are more and better role models nowadays, communications are easier, and the advantages of joining the world community are greater.

Nineteenth-century European opinions and debates parallel those we are hearing again. As early as the beginning of the eighteenth century writers such as Sir Andrew Freeport in the *Spectator* expressed the conviction of capitalists that "war does not pay." Kant, who died in 1804, thought trade was undermining governments. Cobden saw free trade and peace as "one and the same cause," and Proudhon agreed. In its famous passages that eulogize the achievements of the bourgeoisie, the *Communist Manifesto* spoke of trade creating the "universal interdependence of nations." In 1889 Pareto told the Peace Congress at Rome that economic integration would lead to political integration. In 1910 Norman Angell noted that postal services, the telegraph, and the rapid dissemination of financial and commercial information had put the chief cities of Christendom in closer contact than the chief cities of Britain had been a century earlier. He wrote *The Great Illusion* to show that economic interdependence had made war inconceivable. This brand of "economism" is again prevalent. Certainly, economic growth may *predispose* to political pluralism and interdependence but experience shows that the analysis is dangerously incomplete.

The fifteen countries that participated in the International Labor Convention in 1890 did so because those that had adopted labor laws feared that other countries would undercut them if not persuaded to improve the lot of their workers too. This was akin to the arguments that had been made with respect to Britain's early Factory Acts and to those made today over obliging East Asia to adopt international standards of labor conditions or pollution control.

Links among firms and agreements between governments did advance the interdependence of the nineteenth-century European economy. Threats of spreading epidemics, which had given rise to the earliest international conventions a couple of centuries before, inspired many more conventions during this time. Railways were built to British standard gauge and their cross-border timetables were coordinated, as were postal and telegraphic services. There were plenty of signs of mutual activity. However, all stopped well short of anything deserving the label of full integration.

Because instruments of social change like educational systems were in the hands of governments, they could also be used to strengthen loyalty to the nation-state. "We have made Italy," it was said after the Unification, "now we have to make Italians." Economic growth meant higher tax revenues and full-time bureaucracies which could extend the state's influence still further. Educational and welfare systems, conditions of service and pension schemes, subsidies for ship building, help in export markets—all came to depend on state patronage.

The competence of individual governments was thus increased by tools of the kinds that made for interdependence. Governments were after all still engaged in

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the long process of centralizing the nation-state. It is noticeable, for example, that despite the way railway tentacles extended across borders, many were laid out as spiders' webs centered on capital cities. The whole of Europe was never made kin. Boundaries between nation-states and nationalities hardened, breaking the hearts of idealists when the workers abandoned pretensions to the Brotherhood of Man and flocked to join the armed forces in 1914. "Wherever the photographs were taken, London or Manchester, Munich or Paris," Don Haworth tells us in a Lancastrian memoir, "the faces in the crowds are the same, rapturous at liberation from the endless hum and clatter of machinery."

Externally, European countries sought their own empires and tied markets. At the end of the century, faced by cheap food imports from lands outside Europe, most responded to the anxieties of their citizens by protecting their agricultures. Britain stood aloof; it did not bring back the Corn Laws. Furthermore, countering the argument that only strong countries are free-traders, the Netherlands remained an open economy, as if it were a modern New Zealand. We can look on the late nineteenth century as a period when its own states set about checking Europe's integration.

Does the experience of this earlier time transfer to the present? Not entirely. There is extensive survey evidence to show that young Europeans are less nationalistic and militaristic than any previous generation. The prosperity to which they are accustomed, even in recession, means that they are not tempted to flee grinding toil into the imagined adventure of "joining up." That motive does not exist in remotely the same degree any more. Yet questionnaire data must always be handled cautiously as representing dreaming, which is free, rather than deciding, which may have a high price. Recall how misleading was the expressed pacifism of the Oxford Union between the wars. In any case, we are speaking only of Europe. It may be more significant for international affairs that in much of the rest of the world people have not yet been cosseted like young Western Europeans.

"Democratization:" Supply and Demand

A FURTHER EFFECT of cheaper information is "democratization." This may be taken in the narrower, political sense to embrace pluralism, individualism and human rights; in a broader sense to include an ever-widening agenda of "rights" that is contested even in advanced Western circles. Liberals everywhere may think these things good, but agonizing adjustments are to be expected in conservative societies. The struggle is and will be between regional cultures, or the states embodying them, and universal or world culture. (To see world culture as permanently or inherently "Western," because it first flowered in the West and travels in Western vehicles, underrates its multiple origins, protean nature and breadth of appeal.)

To the extent that there is a directional tendency towards political freedoms and "tender" reforms, we may expect both their extension and efforts to repulse them. Different societies are of course experiencing quite different levels of social challenge. The clash over basic freedoms comes now in societies that have not had the kind of lead-in that the West enjoyed. To the extent that liberalism derives autonomously from new information, developing countries are in a cleft stick: educating their workforces opens the door to seductive written words, screen images, and electronic media which are likely to bring unintended and maybe pernicious consequences.

Even in Europe mass literacy is historically recent. By 1850 the proportion of literate Europeans was about 50 percent, but only about half the "literate" could read easily. Specialists working in adult literacy programs estimate that about 85 percent of Western European adults are functionally literate today, but the minimum standard is

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not high. In the non-Western world, however, literacy is spreading far faster than it did in Europe. As more people learn something of other systems of government and ways of life, the demand side of world politics will alter. On the supply side, governments will be struggling to dampen the calls made upon them.

In 1965 only twenty percent of radio and television sets were owned outside Europe and North America. By 1990 this proportion had more than doubled, with world totals of over two billion radios and one billion television sets. Satellite dishes are being miniaturized. Fax machines have spread widely. The telephone network—the largest single machine in the world—is becoming denser as entrant countries skip over older technological stages. Usage of the Internet is said to be going up by between 12 and 15 percent per month. Although user numbers are probably exaggerated by as much as an order of magnitude (because firms wall off many computers for security reasons), such rates of growth are amazing. International gossip among the computer-literate, mainly the young, leaks material that previously would not have come to light for decades, if ever.

The spread of education and literacy has been expanding the range of informed judgment by individuals from at least the time of Tyndale's translation of the Bible into English in the sixteenth century. Critical ideas flowered in the Protestant churches during the nineteenth century, contributing to a fragmentation of sects. The process began to work within Roman Catholicism early in the twentieth century. A similar ferment faces Islam in the late twentieth century, provoking a strong reaction in places, as in other authoritarian and male-dominated cultures or regimes. In a strictly intellectual sense, Islam is the least pliable of the world religions. Its guiding ideas and sacred works cannot be made over to order, given the "closure of the Gate of Interpretation" as early as the tenth century. Yet Islam has not remained static since then and is not politically homogeneous. Islamic North Africa led the world in science in what the West calls the Middle Ages, and Christendom borrowed heavily from it.

To speak baldly of "Islam" is to risk being misunderstood—though, if so, we ought equally to apologize for referring to "the West." For more refined purposes we would need to decompose such portmanteau categories and recognize not culture clashes but long series of particular conflicts. We might then see that the world's problems lie less in the supposed obduracy of whole religious, cultural, or ethnic systems than in the way communities within them are sometimes hijacked by groups opposed to democracy, human rights, or even peace with neighbors. In a small compass, nevertheless, some virtual stereotyping is unavoidable.

Islamic and other Third World regimes thus span a broad spectrum. Local circumstances will determine the intensity and decide the timing of eruptions there in ways too various to predict. Opinions differ as to whether fundamentalisms represent a return to the past, or its last gasp; the eventual answer may depend on the success or failure of Third World economic growth. Nevertheless, there is a pattern of confrontation between old and new systems of ideas, within Islam and beyond, which promises no early end to unrest over a broad swathe of the earth.

Globalized sources of news and entertainment will doubtless extend the sway of English, but will not make this or any other language universal in the foreseeable future. The next stage is likely to be the replacement of regional by national languages, as in nineteenth-century Europe. Then, the process raised average market size but did not forge a unified market. Rupert Murdoch has claimed that Hindi and Mandarin will expand because the most popular television programs in India and China will be broadcast in them. The number of hurdles for anyone with goods or services to sell will accordingly fall, but the world market will remain segmented.

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Despite the confidence of many people in the telecommunications industry, it remains uncertain whether cheaper means of diffusing information will increase freedoms. For by the same token the costs of governmental propaganda and control will be lowered. Linking up young graduates by the Internet is one thing, but it is another to expect whole populations to participate, or to assume that unfocused interest groups cut much political ice. Nineteenth-century European experience suggests a complex process in which, although the international flow of information is unlikely to be stemmed, it may yet be compartmentalized and its messages altered; at any rate there will be censorship or attempts to induce users not to act on the basis of much that they learn. Manipulation of the news has already become a major issue, in some places an industry. Censorship by the assassination of journalists in Algeria is the limiting case. If even the United States government wishes to have mandatory access to electronic traffic, we can expect overt intervention by authoritarian governments. Press reports state that Singapore examined eighty thousand user files in 1994, looking for "pornography and other outlawed materials." Outrage in many countries at the dissemination of child pornography and political or ethnic messages of hate is likely to be the Achilles' heel of the Internet, much as these things may be defended on the grounds of civil liberty.

That national authorities do wish to control thought is plain. The freedoms conferrable by new technologies will be resisted, and political as well as economic markets will be contested. What makes this so likely is the anguish with which communities possessing their own cultures and professing rigid public standards of morality are greeting the arrival of Western films, broadcasting, and investigative journalism. Examples of objections to Western cultural products are easy to find around the world.

After all, within the West itself there is resistance to cultural borrowing, sometimes between next-door neighbors. When the *Cour Constitutionelle* of France ruled out key parts of the bill to ban foreign phrases (English phrases), the Socialist Jack Lang, who had held the post of minister of culture (meaning minister of French culture), proclaimed this to be "a capitulation to free market ideas." That Lang's side lost, except with respect to documents written by civil servants, is seized on too glibly. A trend in France, accepted by left and right, is to widen the definition of culture. Beyond literature, music, and architecture, even historical food sites have been "listed," including a "Trail of the Fried Carp" in Alsace. The "grammar of taste" is being taught to primary school children. Eighty percent of the funds come from government and the exercises are easy to laugh off as pork-barreling by cultural entrepreneurs. Yet they cast some light on the range of countervailing pressures that exists within the globalizing environment.

To cite a non-European instance, the governor of Tehran has forbidden the sale of clothing bearing Latin characters and T-shirts with images of Western entertainers. Once more, it would be facile to conclude from the incongruity of these prohibitions, from the power of fashion images to captivate youth everywhere, and from reports of the elite corruption that wriggles round the rules in Iran, that cultural conservatives must lose. Professor Timur Kuran, a specialist on Islamic economics, maintains that sheer processing overload may prompt a retreat to comfortable social forms of knowledge, rather than the espousal of the critical forms hitherto associated with the West.

The Decay of Western Harmony

IN WESTERN NATIONS, a sense of economic deceleration and worsening social and cultural ills does seem to be evident, and critical forms of knowledge are under assault. Admittedly every generation complains that wealth accumulates and men

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decay, and neglects less familiar signs of improvement. For all that, current readings of these matters are gloomier than ever. Persisting high levels of unemployment and the frustrations of temporary jobs amidst objective plenty cannot help. There is a sense that the West's world leadership really is in jeopardy, despite trumpetings to disguise the fact. In 1951 John Jewkes noted the anomaly that the concept of the "disadvantage of an early start" had seldom been applied to the United States, despite a century of industrialization there. Yet a sequential transfer of economic leadership has been evident since at least the decline of Venice in the seventeenth century. There is nothing to astonish about the continuation of that trend, except the delusion that it halted before our time. John Powelson recently coined the term "chronocentrism" to describe the giving of undue emphasis to one's own period, as if it had been set apart from historical time. Although there seems no true economic law of "first in, first out," we do seem to have reached a point where whole groups of states rather than single countries are swapping positions in economic and power rankings.

In the West the experience of high average earnings gives point to the question raised by Walt Rostow as early as 1959, when he was writing *The Stages of Economic Growth*: What will lie beyond "high mass consumption"? Rostow was aware as he wrote that the baby boom was substituting for some part of further increases in material consumption, but he believed this was merely deferring the day when his question would have to be addressed, probably in moral terms.

The baby boom is over. Western society has chosen next to consume a high proportion of services. This however implies that average productivity growth will slow, unless extraordinary advances can be made in the efficiency of manufacturing. Sufficient advance on that front to stave off a relative decline of the West is unlikely. The productivity of personal services is hard to lift, even with a computer terminal on every professional's desk, since the essence of personal service is attention from a trained individual. At the same time, the providers of services expect to receive incomes similar to those of people with comparable training. They will raise their charges even though their productivity growth lags behind that in other sectors.

Existing gains in manufacturing productivity have been sufficient to depress blue-collar employment. The fall results from altered mixes of consumption and changes in technologies of production, which render many blue-collar and some white-collar workers redundant. Abstract analysis might say that labor markets are not clearing because real wages have not gone down enough to make poorly-educated workers worth hiring. But wages would have to fall a long way for that to happen, while the typical worker is said to become unemployable if he or she remains jobless for as little as eighteen months (so much for the argument that education prepares us for life). The market-clearing wage (the level at which most employable people could find a job) would need to fall below acceptable levels, pressing down living standards, and thus ending the compression of post-tax earnings which has characterized Western countries since the Second World War. The implications for public harmony would be alarming. Social distances would widen further against a background of rising drug addiction, the easy acquisition of powerful weapons, and the deteriorating family bonds that guarantee a poor socialization of the young, especially inner-city males. We might expect that the premium on education would become so high that learning—the right, true thing—would be eagerly sought, but the current mood apparently forbids this.

The serious social problem is structural (rather than cyclical) unemployment, but the fundamental paradox is that it is being accompanied by voluntary withdrawal from work by youths who actually possess or could acquire modern skills. Their "physical and

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psychological flight from modern employment," as Denis Pym calls it, damages the stock of social capital; more and more people abandon orderly norms. While there is no need to embrace the alarmism of a French commentator who claims that the West is re-entering the Dark Ages, anyone who has seen the encampments of "New Age" hippies in the English countryside can sense the old frisson that gave rise to "Hark, hark, the dogs do bark, the beggars are coming to town." These dismal developments are related to Kurth's "*real* clash." Kurth is right to question whether a new generation, and one might add faintly tribalized multicultural societies, will be willing to fight for the abstract values of Western civilization.

The Most Pampered Generation

THERE IS A PALPABLY anti-scientific air about the present age. Twenty million Americans are said not to believe that a man has landed on the moon. One third of senior executives in Germany are reported to have been selected by astrology. At the extreme, New Agers take command of occasional units of local government and abandon chemical treatments of water supplies. They have been known to resist pest control ("I like rats," said one councilor in a large English city). Fewer children are vaccinated. English animal rights groups have fire-bombed not only shops selling leather goods but those selling fishing tackle and woollen sweaters.

There is a swelling intransigence within otherwise reformist interest groups. Some animal rights lobbyists say they would rejoice if (for example) scientists experimenting on animals were killed in the course of protests. Small wonder government by elected representatives seems to be deliquescing into a stew of consultations, with each and any ad hoc group demanding not merely to be heard but to be heeded.

There is abroad a new intolerance and destructive skepticism, vulgarized from philosophers and sociologists of science like Sir Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn. From them is distilled the opinion that scientific findings are provisional, the outcome of the success of some band of scientists in "capturing the roneo machine." The provisionalists overstate their case. If all findings are provisional, they should avoid flying in heavier-than-air machines for fear of a paradigm shift in mid-air. More significantly, anti-scientific views arise from and reinforce a wider anti-rational mood which has emerged even among academics, accompanied by the growth of post-modernist invisible colleges and the threat to the search for inter-personal knowledge posed by the demonologies of the politically correct.

Established religions give way to what were once fringe activities, and in turn fundamentalist churches with harsh and over-simple messages assert themselves. Book sales indicate a turning inward, toward pop psychology, away from social, economic and political issues or solutions. This is the *reductio ad absurdum* of individualism. Margaret Thatcher may have been more prophetic than she knew when she said there is no such thing as society.

Twenty years ago or thereabouts a study of special-interest magazine subscriptions discovered that Americans were tending to cluster in different parts of the country according to their avocations. Voluntary tribalism seems to have gone beyond that measure of choice in many Western countries, not so much in the form of further regional separatisms as in the proliferation of special interest groups. Affluence, leisure, and the cheapening of travel and communications render easier the formation of like-minded groups of all kinds. Single-issue politics is however just that—unidimensional in a multidimensional world. The common weal shrinks and suffers. The crux is as Rostow recognized: generations do not value what they can take for granted.

A couple of generations of affluence and the "leisure of the theory class" seem to have

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compromised the West's level of effort. Still, decline is not collapse. We can hope that it is historically contingent, resulting from the behavior of the most pampered generation in history, the baby boomers, and from the acceptance of welfare state benefits that Assar Lindbeck thinks has eroded the "Lutheran Ethic" in Sweden. Cultures are not timeless. If they were, we could not ask when they originated. Certainly we cannot speak of a culture without specifying the period intended. The West is extremely labile by world standards and the declining work ethic or tendency to extreme individualism may be corrected by the very next generation's response to fresh stimuli.

The question arises: Can other societies escape a similar challenge and evolution to post-modernism? Those familiar with individual cultures always emphasize current particularities, believe them older than most of them are, and reject the idea of quick or substantial change. This is an unhistorical view of phenomena that are demonstrably the evolving products of history. We can expect future change to flow down broadly similar channels everywhere, as a sheer result of economic growth.

Economic growth necessitates occupational changes. These engender a middle class and induce self-reinforcing developments which we can call "channeling." Even if the middle classes consist at first only of functionaries and technicians, the education and interests of their children are hard to confine to politically innocuous technologies. The expansion of technical and administrative strata ensures a similarity in social development, the emergence of a bourgeoisie with a desire for its own perpetuation. Demand for a range of "lifestyle" goods increases, whatever the nature of an authoritarian regime, and implicit challenges to the establishment are bred. (Thus Gorbachev's reforms depended for support on the class of technicians that had emerged to service those of Khrushchev.) "Channeling" is a blunt forecasting instrument with no edge sharp enough to tell us how soon developing societies may shrug off the repressions of authoritarian governments or the archaic elements that every culture has. Nevertheless it presupposes directional change.

Three Forces of Change

TO RETURN TO the beginning: we face a triple set of changes. First, the accelerating circulation of capital as businesses relocate around the world intensifies the process of industrialization that the West began to experience long ago. This provokes resistance from states that wish to entrench their sovereignty, as Europe's states succeeded in doing at the end of the last century, and which neither they nor other states are likely either to eschew, or find easy, today.

Second, we face the consequences of a cascading fall in information prices, disturbing conservatives everywhere with the offer of unpalatable notions. The worldwide availability of political news and the existence of Western role models make a faster increase in demands for pluralism in the non-Western world more likely than before. We should also expect to see political expectations passing smartly beyond the bread-and-butter stage to calls for non-material "rights." The democratization clash that marked earlier Western history is taking place in East Asia in a context of rising prosperity. It is this clash that has provoked the "Asian values" debate. But democratization also affects Islamic and other parts of the less developed world whose authorities could not afford to gratify rising expectations, even were they willing to do so.

The question that looms is whether non-Western cultures will be successful at frustrating democratization; after all, torture persists in over seventy-five countries. More positive responses may include attempts to revive traditions based on selective readings of non-Western history, or to blend traditional and novel practices. To talk of such

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active responses however implies that governments, religious leaders, and the like will prove capable of shaping the future of their societies. It prejudges the outcome of the struggle between traditional and political elites on one hand and the splintering surge of the market on the other. In that struggle, the exogenous forces of factor movements, urbanization, occupational change, and information technology are likely to do much of the reshaping. Political elites seeking to quell the effects will in any case collide with elements of the same elites allying themselves with outside interests or riding the waves of innovation.

Third and finally, in the more volatile intellectual and political matrix of the West itself, hyper-individualism and new forms of single-interest association compete stridently over the rules that should govern society. This is Kurth's "*real* clash," his answer to Rostow's question as to what comes after high mass consumption. And the spillover of post-modernism may reach the remainder of the world long before more basic political changes have been digested.

We thus see three sets of internal clashes, notionally strung out along history's continuum, in actuality crashing onto one another in our own time. Yet nothing but despair can come from agreeing with H.A.L. Fisher's famous pronouncements that he could see in history "only one emergency following upon another as wave follows upon wave" and that, though there has been progress, "the ground gained by one generation may be lost by the next." Of course it may. Reports of deciviling tendencies fill the media. But, for a long time now, few generations have really lost overall, in terms of population numbers or material conditions.

The facts that regressions can never be ruled out, and that one knock or another is forever denting some part of the world, are simply parts of the political condition. They are reason enough for trying to gather all the insights we may. The problems are familiar enough from historical experience, and if they come now in an unprecedented rush, at least the world has more experience, greater wealth, and more advanced technology with which to meet them. In the West, where the internal clash is essentially a disease of affluence, it will be unforgivable if we cannot overcome our advantages.

The future will bring more of the same, but will arrive in an even greater rush than we are now experiencing. There is no hope of predicting individual events, only of accepting that disturbances will continue to be registered by the tragic events and cacophony of opinions making up the daily news. Intellectually we can cope best with this boiling metabolism by adopting a perspective at least a generation long, recognizing the churning froth and bloody spume of incidents as wreckage created by the historic triad of our era: volatile investment, political choice, and individualism, striving to be born and bedded down in societies very differently positioned to receive them. The challenge everywhere will be to retain social cohesion and international peace without foregoing the many benefits of cheaper information. □

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

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The Limits of Trust

Charles Wolf, Jr.

Francis Fukuyama, *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* (New York: The Free Press, 1995), 457 pp., $22.50.

ONE OF THE standard put-downs of economists maintains that "about half of what economists say is right—the trouble is they don't know which half." In the same vein, Nobel Laureate Paul Samuelson, with a mixture of derision and contrition, has observed that "economists have correctly predicted seven of the last four economic recessions." In *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*, Francis Fukuyama is, ostensibly at least, more generous, conceding that neoclassical economics is "80 percent correct." The "missing 20 percent of human behavior" is the concern of his provocative, insightful, and deftly-written book.

The central thesis of *Trust* can be summarized in the following syllogism:

Premise I: High economic performance—i.e. the "creation of prosperity" (and sustaining it)—is substantially helped by large, private economic organizations.

Premise II: The establishment and progress of large economic organizations (e.g., corporate giants such as IBM, AT&T, Toyota, General Motors, Mitsubishi, Siemens, and Daimler-Benz) are substantially helped by what Fukuyama variously refers to as "social capital," "spontaneous sociability," and "trust."

Conclusion: Therefore, high economic performance is substantially advanced by the prevalence of social capital, trust, and cultural values that sustains these qualities.

Although the syllogism conveys the essence of Fukuyama's argument, it does so at the cost of neglecting the book's broad sweep, sharp insights, and wide-ranging scholarship. (Reflecting the latter, *Trust* contains fifty-seven pages of footnotes and a twenty-page bibliography.) The breadth and scope that are missing from the syllogism are conveyed by the book's four-part structure. In Part I, Fukuyama addresses "The Idea of Trust" and the "Power of Culture" in shaping economic performance. (In doing so he makes plainly evident that the explanatory "power" he ascribes to culture is really considerably more than the minimal "20-percent solution" mentioned earlier; hence my use of the word "ostensibly" in the first paragraph.)

In Parts II and III, which comprise the two-hundred page core of a 362-page text, Fukuyama deals, respectively, with "Low-Trust Societies" and "High-Trust Societies." The low-trust exemplars are China, Italy, France, and Korea, in which "familistic" Confucianism and its cognates ("Italian Confucianism"!) impede rather than propitiate the formation of large, private economic organizations and their attendant contributions to high economic performance. The high-trust societies are Japan and Germany, which Fukuyama ranks number one and two, according to his judgment about their respective "degrees of trust."

According to Fukuyama's argument, high-trust societies benefit from their lower transaction costs in forming the large private business organizations on which prosperity and sustained growth depend. By way of contrast, low-trust, familistic societies and cultures are said to confront higher transaction

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costs that impede the formation of such organizations. The impediment arises because the primary focus of loyalty in these societies is directed to the family, rather than to organizations outside it. In seeking to overcome these obstacles and their attendant higher transaction costs, low-trust societies rely on state intervention, which turns out to be a generally poor substitute for the private organizations whose formation is inhibited.

In Part IV, Fukuyama addresses the special problem posed for his thesis by American society and culture. That problem arises from the fact that, while American culture cherishes and advocates individualism, it has also "pioneered the development of the modern, hierarchical corporation," which foreshadowed the large, private business organizations whose nurturing Fukuyama extols and attributes to the pervasiveness of sociability and trust. This dilemma is resolved by Fukuyama's exposition of America's "dual" cultural heritage. Alongside America's individualistic tendencies, "which separate and atomize individuals," Fukuyama asserts, "there has been a powerful propensity to form associations and to participate in other forms of group activity."

The book concludes with a broad-brush reconciliation between the liberal economic order envisaged as "the end of history," in Fukuyama's 1992 book of that title, and the quite different focus on cultural values and trust in his present work. As part of this reconciliation, Fukuyama advocates "the preservation and accumulation of social capital," as the essential goal of liberal civil societies.

In a book as ambitious as *Trust*, it is perhaps not surprising that its grasp falls short of its reach. One serious shortcoming is the absence of a metric for measuring societal trust. According to Fukuyama, societies can be characterized as "high-trust" and "low-trust, " and "social capital" can be described as something that can be "accumulated," and hence implicitly trades off against tangible capital (i.e. business investment), as well as human capital, in creating prosperity. For these concepts to be meaningful, let alone useful, there should be a *metric*: that is, a way of distinguishing between more and less, larger and smaller, increasing and decreasing.

Fukuyama provides little enlightenment on this score, although several possibilities are alluded to in the course of his exposition. One of these is the number of voluntary community associations and organizations across countries and over time. But use of this as a possible proxy for measuring the amount of trust is fraught with difficulties. For example, are associations to be weighted by their membership or their duration, by their geographic scope, by their budgets, or some other measure of activity, or some combination of all of these?

Moreover, Fukuyama dismisses interest-group associations, in contrast to "voluntary associations," because the former are brought together for reasons of self-interest rather than "sociability." This seems to me a dubious distinction because many, and perhaps most, interest-group associations—like those of doctors, lawyers, economists, workers, businessmen, social scientists, engineers—involve *both* sociability and advocacy. And many so-called "voluntary associations"—like PTAs, church groups, and the Association for the United Nations—often engage in lobbying activity as well as community sociability.

Several other candidate metrics come to mind that are not considered in the book. One example is the size of voluntary community contributions, as well as efforts-in-kind, in response to natural disasters. (Incidentally, the Los Angeles earthquake of January 1994 elicited considerably larger community contributions than did the more devastating Kobe-Osaka earthquake of January 1995, notwithstanding the supposedly higher-trust Japanese society compared to the presumably "lower-trust" culture of California!) Other possible metrics might include voluntary enlistments in a nation's armed forces, membership and attendance in religious groups and services, and so on. To enumerate such

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groups and services, and so on. To enumerate such possible metrics only highlights their manifest shortcomings as proxy indicators of Fukuyama's concept of trust and spontaneous sociability.

To be sure, not everything that counts can be counted, and not everything that can be counted counts. Nevertheless, in an exposition that repeatedly talks about *degrees* of trust, the *extent* of sociability, and the *expansion* or *erosion* of social capital, one would like to see some serious attention devoted to how to measure and reify these concepts. This is not an issue of the difference between the "touchy-feely" thinkers and the "quantoids," as one of my students has recently written. It is simply a requisite of serious analysis. Incidentally, with such a metric or metrics to concretize the concepts that Fukuyama is elaborating, it would be entirely possible to include them in economic models to test empirically the hypotheses he advances.

Were that to happen, I would not expect them to survive the test. For the central argument of the book does not stand up to careful scrutiny. While the syllogism I introduced earlier to summarize the book's central thesis can properly be criticized because it ignores the nuanced and allusive exposition by the author, it nevertheless has the advantage of exposing the essentials of the argument. When they are thus exposed, it seems clear that both the first and second premises in the syllogism, and hence the conclusion drawn from them, are not sustainable.

"High economic performance" and "prosperity" can be properly defined as relatively high per capita levels of gross domestic product, or personal consumption, or sustained rates of growth, in these indicators. There is abundant empirical work indicating that these performance measures are directly dependent on high levels and rates of growth in both labor and capital productivity; and high rates of growth in labor productivity depend on increases in capital per worker and on the rate of technological progress. Productivity does not depend uniquely on the size of business organizations. While there are some types of efficiencies and lower transaction costs associated with large-scale organizations, there are other sorts of inefficiencies and higher transactions costs associated with large scale organizations—a point I have elaborated elsewhere.[1]

Moreover, the corporate size at which scale efficiencies can be realized has been shrinking in the past decade as a result of advances in information technology, and this trend will probably continue. Recent corporate mergers and acquisitions do not contradict this point. These mergers reflect potential synergies among different business fields—for example, entertainment and telecommunications—rather than the benefits of larger size in a single field.

So it is unpersuasive to assert, as does the first premise of the syllogism, that high performance and prosperity depend significantly on large economic organizations.

It is also arguable whether, as the second premise of the syllogism presumes, the creation and sustenance of large economic organizations is decisively affected by "spontaneous sociability," "social capital," and the pervasiveness of "trust." There are, indeed, many other competing explanations for the prevalence, endurance, and sometimes resuscitation of large private corporations. A participative, yet decisive, management style is one such explanation. The management styles adopted by Jack Welch at General Electric and Louis Gerstner at IBM are cases in point. Management style can do a lot to enhance the performance of large as well as small corporations, as can regular communication, clear and simple administrative rules, incentive bonuses, and even binding legal contracts—quite apart from the prevalence of "social capital" and societal "trust."

[1]See "The New Mercantilism," *The Public Interest* (Summer 1994).

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premise is belied by common experience. For example, New York is the headquarters of some of the country's and the world's largest business corporations (IBM, Citicorp, Exxon, and others), yet it is part of New York's culture that trust and spontaneous sociability are definitely *not* part of its culture! In the same vein, one of America's most strikingly successful companies, Walt Disney—now Disney-Capital Cities—and its charismatic CEO, Michael Eisner, flaunt a corporate culture pervaded by a minimum of trust and a maximum of internal as well as external competitiveness. Still another counterexample is provided by a recent survey in Los Angeles that showed a rate of participation by Angelenos in community activities less than half the national average. Yet, once again, the prevalence of large business organizations in Los Angeles is manifestly higher than the average among the nation's communities.

If, then, the major and minor premises of the syllogism are spongy, the conclusion deduced from them is compromised. Whether high economic performance depends predominantly, heavily, moderately, or slightly, if at all, on trust and "the social virtues"—whether these are 20 percent of the solution or much less—remains an open question.

Even within the broad socio-cultural domain that Fukuyama emphasizes, there are many competing perspectives, apart from trust and sociability. For example, Samuel Huntington credits "pluralism" with a major part of the explanation for Japan's successful and sustained modernization. "Pluralism," Huntington contends, "made possible the existence of people who could espouse a new way of thinking," thereby providing a "major factor in the success of Japan's modernization."

Another socio-cultural perspective is advanced by Toshiro Shimoyama, chairman of one of Japan's large corporations. He has suggested that successful modernization in Japan has been due to the absence of a religious commitment to Islam or Confucianism, rather than to sociability or trust. Others, like James Heckman and Gary Becker at Chicago, have argued that a critical ingredient in high economic performance is the effectiveness of a society's educational system in building human capital.

Finally, to explain high economic performance and the creation of prosperity, such diverse commentators as Joseph Schumpeter and John Maynard Keynes, as well as recent management gurus like Tom Peters, Peter Drucker, and David Osborne, accord top billing to entrepreneurial vision and drive. And entrepreneurship—whether in large, small, or start-up firms—is no less socio-cultural in character than are "trust" and "spontaneous sociability," yet is probably either independent of, or even inhibited, by them.

Trust concludes on a refreshingly candid note of agnosticism that can as well be applied to other socio-cultural analyses of prosperity as to Fukuyama's own. "What we can say," Fukuyama concludes, "is that the impact of cultural differences in the propensity for sociability will have a large, but at the moment indeterminate, impact on economic life." Indeterminacy hardly provides a basis for policy. □

Charles Wolf, Jr. is dean of the RAND graduate school of policy studies in Santa Monica.

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Look, No Tocqueville!

Harvey C. Mansfield

Michael Lind, *The Next American Nation* (New York: The Free Press, 1995), 436 pp., $25.00.

MICHAEL LIND IS not lacking in ambition. His first book is the "first manifesto" of a "real, not merely metaphorical revolution in politics and society" leading to a new America to be known as Trans-America. Lind compares his revolution to the Civil Rights revolution of the 1960s and expects it will come by election. He offers his personal guarantee that it will be bloodless. His analysis makes a book that, while too long for a genuine manifesto, does suit his ambitious goal: a new understanding of the American nation supported by a new interpretation of American history.

Believing that America is a nation-state—a state arising from a nation—Lind calls himself a "liberal nationalist." As nationalist, he opposes those who define America as an idea, while also distinguishing himself as a liberal from nativists, who define America by its race or religion. Liberal nationalism in his view sees the nation as formed essentially by language and culture, even though up to now America has been held in the grip of a "white overclass" bent on racial and religious domination. But the discrepancy between what a nation has been in the past and what it can be in the future cannot be removed by politics purging the nation of its excrescences, he believes, because politics comes from within a nation and cannot impose solutions from outside.

Lind therefore deprecates politics together with ideas in the formation of the American nation. The two suffer together because ideas would become effective only through conscious, concerted, deliberate politics. Lind more than deprecates; he subjects American statesmen, all but Alexander Hamilton, to relentless denigration throughout his book, and he reduces their ideas to instruments of rule by the white overclass. Disputes over first principles, he says in regard to the Lincoln-Douglas debates, were results, not causes, in the formation of the American union. Most Americans before World War II, he continues, would have been "puzzled by the idea that the American people was created in 1776." That was when their government, not their nation, was established.

Many of these Americans, though fewer these days, would have learned by heart at least the first sentence of the Gettysburg Address, and so would not have felt the puzzlement Lind attributes to them. For Lincoln said that a new nation was brought forth in 1776, one dedicated to a proposition; the government came later after a false start. That proposition is everything and nothing to Michael Lind. It is nothing because he never discusses it and everything because he takes it for granted. He despises Jefferson, the "sainted author" of the Declaration of Independence, together with Jefferson's friend Madison, whom he calls "rich farmers." That all men are created equal, however, Lind takes for self-evident truth. He cannot understand how any decent person could believe otherwise or how, once believed, that proposition could fail to be put into immediate practice. So he does not hesitate to condemn Jefferson or bother to consider why slavery might have been a problem. He does not remark, much less counter, Jefferson's memorable discussion of slavery in Query 14 of the *Notes on the State of Virginia*. Lind has no sympathy for anguished candor; his way is to find some discrediting fact or opinion by

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which to score a point and dismiss a reputation. His wisdom on the slavery question is that of the abolitionists, but without their fears and doubts. He does not seem to have had any difficulty in thinking things through by himself, such that he would have found it useful to collect and examine diverse opinions from sources both usual and new.

Lind organizes the development of the American nation into three stages that he calls "republics," a political designation contradicting his view that culture precedes politics. The first republic is "Anglo-America;" the second is "Euro-America;" the third, "Multicultural America." Each is called by a racial name, thus contradicting his view that nation is language and culture rather than race and religion. But he meant that a nation *should be* culture, rather than race and religion, despite past history. Lind calls himself a nationalist while asserting that up to now the American nation has been misdirected by nativism and racism. There is, to be sure, a certain progress of democratization from Anglo to Euro to Multi, but Lind does not explain why this has come about. Tocqueville's theme, democratization in America, does not receive the treatment that it deserved and that Lind badly needs. For Lind leaves it to be inferred that all our ills come from inequality and all will be resolved through purer democracy. If this review had to be confined to one sentence, it would say that the author tried to write a book on American politics without coming to terms with Tocqueville.

Although America in Lind's analysis is getting more and more inclusive, the present stage of multiculturalism is far from satisfactory to him. Lind sharply distinguishes himself from those on the left who have forsaken color-blind liberalism. He regards multiculturalism as a corrupt compromise arranged by the white overclass to buy off the resentment of blacks with racial preferences, while simultaneously denouncing that compromise so as to appeal to the resentment of working-class whites. It's a complicated strategy, but Lind has worked it out on his own, again without having to weigh the arguments of the parties involved. So, to progress to the Fourth Republic of Trans-America, Lind proposes going back to the truly color-blind quality of the melting pot. His nationalism has no nativism; it is *liberal* nationalism, purged of racial and national prejudice. But where did the *liberal* come from if not from Thomas Jefferson's Declaration of Independence? And is it not an idea vaguely the same as that which inspires the democratic "idea-state" that Lind scornfully rejects? "One should cherish one's nation, as one should cherish one's family, not because it is the best in the world, but because with all its flaws, it is one's own," says Lind. But the same modest recommendation could be made for one's race, or indeed for one's daily evacuations.

The notion of America as an idea-state is beautifully stated by Lind's hero Alexander Hamilton on the first page of *The Federalist*: The American people is to

> decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force.

Here is American exceptionalism in the sense of a people having an exceptional opportunity to establish the feasibility of an idea *not* peculiar to them. The opportunity consists of circumstances favorable to the idea, perhaps including the racial composition of Americans. Lind misrepresents the position that America is defined by an idea when he supposes it to mean that the idea is totally abstracted from material conditions. No: as Aristotle said, the form is *in* the matter it defines.

Thus, it is a perfectly reasonable, indeed necessary, question to ponder, as the Founders did, whether a certain people is suited for the establishment of a universal

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truth. A universal truth is not necessarily universally applicable, or indeed applicable at all; one must make an experiment to see whether men can in fact live in equality. It is not racism or nativism for thoughtful Americans to consider whether a certain racial "stock" is better suited for a people living in freedom and equality. Precisely because it is true that every people will have its own nation or culture one must look to see which is more receptive to the idea. The idea that all men are created equal is universal, but every application of it will be particular. The application will be more or less successful, as, for example, in America compared to Liberia, and certainly it will be distinctive. Equality in America will be *American* equality.

Of course, many or most of those who speak of racial differences are prejudiced; but their prejudice only makes sober consideration more necessary. It is incumbent on Lind to show that the liberalism he believes to have developed in company with nativism is truly separable from it. He simply asserts that the ethics of religion does not require religion. As he leaves it, the recognition of nation on which he so prides himself does not at all accept the American nation as it has been according to his own account. Surely nationalism, if it means anything, means embracing national prejudice as opposed to universal truth. So the question arises: Which prejudices will liberal nationalism nourish, which will it tolerate, and which will it oppose? A *nation*, as opposed to a universal idea, simply cannot be free of all prejudice.

Perhaps we get the answers in the last chapter, entitled "The National Story." Instead of a national *idea*, America has a postmodern *story* with museums featuring murals imagined by Lind to illustrate his jaundiced view of each of the three racial republics he has conceived for us. Not incidentally, the museums that are supposed to be purely cultural are in fact purely political. In Lind's own Trans-American pantheon Jefferson ("a Southern reactionary"), Madison ("a relatively inconsequential figure"), and Lincoln (a great man but "symbol of the white common man") are replaced by Hamilton and Frederick Douglass, despite Hamilton's status as a Founding Father and without mention of Douglass' praise of the Constitution as color-blind and his denunciation of the *Dred Scott* decision (contrary to Lind) as brazenly unconstitutional. In the story of his groundless America, Lind tries to make us see what it would look like without the "absurd overemphasis on the eighteenth-century Founding Fathers in conventional American discourse." Our history gets in the way of his story. His nationalism is for a nation made by himself that he is pleased to call "liberal."

Lind develops a class analysis of American politics in the course of his critique of multicultural America, the third republic said to be dominated by a white overclass. This "small group," with its dependents, amounts to about a fifth of the American population, constituting a national oligarchy. Apparently these people—snug in their outsized oligarchy of fifty million—do not accept Lind's dictum that culture is more important than politics because they spend their lives in dominating others rather than visiting museums or singing folk songs. And it is their removal from power through a politics of egalitarianism that will make possible Lind's next nation.

Will there be an overclass in Trans-America? The non-Marxist theorists to whom Lind reassuringly refers—Aristotle, Montesquieu, the authors of *The Federalist*, and the Progressives—did not suppose that class interest and class conflict could ever be abolished, but the implication of an egalitarian politics is that they can be. Lind does not say which inequalities he regards as permanent or just. On the one hand he claims to be a genuine populist because he wants to abolish the influence of the rich in campaigns, introduce proportional representation in elections, and make the Senate proportional to population. These democratizing mea-

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sures, he assures us, will "conserve the essence of our constitutional system"—a system not so bad after all! On the other hand is the Big Government required for enforcing anti-discrimination statutes and for "unsubtle, crude, old-fashioned redistribution of wealth"? Will this not give opportunity to an oligarchy of bureaucrats just as conservatives now say? And will not the government handouts he proposes (to be called "consumption vouchers") corrupt the morals and independence of the people he wants to elevate into equality? In a book that touches many things the most glaring omission is any discussion of virtue or character. Yet the American nation would seem to be the American national character.

Lind also wants to mount a "war on oligarchy" attacking our "caste-like educational system," especially the preferences given to alumni children in college admissions. This practice he greatly exaggerates, for the supposedly caste-like educational system has been carrying on the war he wants since World War II, and with considerable success. And besides, is not the selection of alumni children a preference for "one's own" of the kind he likes when it is called nationalism? Novel ideas such as these will bring America closer to the "goal of a meritocratic social order" that will nurture a "new nationalist counter-elite." The new counter-elite could not possibly be or become an oligarchy because it will be allied with the four-fifths of Americans presently excluded from influence. How ingenious!

On reflection, Michael Lind *is* lacking in ambition to write a book carefully and well. He is funny if you like sarcasm. His many diverse conceits and formulations are certainly clever, but just as certainly they remind one of the difference between cleverness and intelligence. He is given to exaggeration. He unguardedly left a gauge of his inaccuracy when he said that "David Hume...wrote his own Tory history of England to refute Macaulay's Whig history." His work is characterized throughout by want of study and reflection, and so his ambition to reform America—which is more noble that he allows to appear—comes across as levity and pretentiousness. It is a pity because his wit is formidable and his contempt for orthodoxy is admirable. His best friend would advise him to wait many years before publishing another book, years of preparation that would also serve as penance for this effort. Why do I think this advice would go unheeded? □

Harvey C. Mansfield is professor of government at Harvard University.

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Hobsbawm's World:

"IF MEN WERE Angels..." by James Kurth (Summer 1995) is an illuminating and provocative critique of Eric Hobsbawm's thought, but, like Hobsbawm, Kurth labors under certain economic misconceptions.

Kurth seems to believe that the creation of a federal government empowered to enact protective tariffs was a precondition to the industrialization of America. I do not believe that this is a view that is widely shared within the economics profession. It is more likely that the federal government's role in *preventing* the creation of tariffs and other trade barriers among the states was critical to rapid industrialization.

Kurth also appears to believe that the American economy has been in a long slide since 1973, that the United States has "de-industrialized" in the last quarter of the twentieth century, and that this de-industrialization resulted in the creation of an urban underclass.

The first two propositions are simply not consistent with the weight of the evidence. The U.S. economy may have grown more slowly since the extraordinary post-World War II era, but it has continued to grow. It is also, of course, subject to much higher governmentally-imposed costs and restrictions on growth than in the 1945-73 "golden age," a period when environmental regulation, for example, was virtually nonexistent compared to today. It is true that employment in the manufacturing sector relative to the total number of jobs has declined, but this is no more an indication of de-industrialization than the long shrinkage in the number of jobs on the farm indicates the decline of agriculture. In fact, the industrial sector is thriving in the United States. As for the notion that fewer manufacturing jobs have led to the pathologies of the urban underclass, this strikes me as astonishingly naive. Does Kurth seriously believe that if only more assembly line jobs had existed these pathologies would have never arisen? It might have been possible to make such an argument in the 1930s, or even the early 1960s, but no longer.

I agree with Kurth that the church, the local community, and the family are threatened, but not by "unrestrained capitalism." If capitalism has ever been unrestrained, it was in the Victorian age, yet the Victorians had strong families, churches, and communities. Blaming our problems on selfishness, an eternal aspect of human nature, and capitalism, which is another name for economic freedom, simply isn't convincing any longer.

J.J. Jewett, III
Midlothian, Virginia

Kurth replies:

J.J. JEWETT'S letter is a pure example of ideology, i.e., taking a good idea and carrying it to its radical, even maniacal extreme so that it crowds out all other good ideas. Communists took the good idea that the state was a necessary part of the solution to some problems and carried it to the totalitarian extreme that it was the only solution to any problem. Jewett's thought process is similar; he replaces the state with the market and the profit-seeking individual, but his conclusions are also radical and unbalanced.

Jewett would benefit from reading or talking with the leading economic theorists and economic historians at the major universities (e.g. Paul Krugman on international trade). He would also benefit from looking at the real world and the actual history of economic development. Every country (including the United States) that has successfully

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industrialized has done so by tariff protection of its infant industries, until they in turn became successful competitors in international trade. If Mr. Jewett knows of an exception, he should tell us what it is.

Similarly, every historian of capitalism has emphasized the importance of particular cultural values and institutions in providing the conditions for its success. Conversely, a large number of permanently unemployed persons always breeds social pathologies. Jewett needs to explain how his total reliance on the market will turn the underclass into productive high-tech workers instead of destructive drug-pushers. On the issue of the relation between culture and the market, Jewett would benefit greatly from simply reading and reflecting on another article in the Summer 1995 issue of *The National Interest*, the one by Frank Fukuyama that is aptly entitled "Virtue and Prosperity."

Bernadotte and Shamir:

AN AUTHOR SHOULD be gratified when a reviewer in a serious journal takes time to discuss her book. Nonetheless, and mindful that the reviewer usually gets the last word, I feel compelled to register my surprise at Barbara Amiel's essay on my book, *A Death in Jerusalem*. As Ms. Amiel mentions in her review, we met briefly at a Washington evening. Ms. Amiel manages to turn our very short exchange about my book and a discussion she had recently had with former Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir into fodder for derision and innuendo. I am puzzled by the remarkably personal tone of the review, from someone with whom I have spent a total of five minutes. "In the case of *A Death In Jerusalem*," Amiel notes ominously, "the questions are not only about the book's subject but about the personality and motivation of its author." What is she talking about?

Except for accusing me of "formidable ambition," Amiel never actually tells us what it is about my personality and motivation which fills her with such unease. Why my background as a Hungarian refugee "and the daughter of Hungarian Jews who were persecuted by the communists" (one of the review's few accurate allegations) would lead me to the "left-liberal low road" she claims I pursue, is not explained or explainable.

While bemused by Amiel's armchair shrinkage of me, I am more concerned by the review's factual distortions. She alleges I rely chiefly on two sources for the bulk of the work, "like a journalist who parachutes into a country and simply has dinner with the wrong people." She chooses to ignore the scores of Swedish, Israeli, British, Dutch, and American sources I cite, to say nothing of the exhaustive archival searches I pursued in London, Jerusalem, Stockholm and Washington, also cited in my chapter notes.

With others, however, she is generous to the point of gullibility. Yitzhak Shamir's own version of his pivotal role in the assassination she accepts at face value, even though Shamir has not only refused to dispute the substance of my findings, but implicitly confirms them in his own memoirs, saying, "I offered no resistance" to the decision to assassinate Bernadotte.

Amiel also accepts British historian Trevor-Roper's claim that "he has no record" of my request to interview him. In fact, I wrote him in early 1992 and, when he failed to reply, sought to reach him by telephone, and then asked the intervention of a mutual friend—again without success. (I can furnish a copy of my letter if the reviewer remains in doubt as to my efforts.) In fact, much of Trevor-Roper's version of the story of Felix Kersten, Himmler's masseur, has been rejected by the Amsterdam-based Institute for War Documentation, which is in possession of Kersten's papers. Kersten, Dutch historians have long since established, fabricated a great deal of the material that won him Trevor-Roper's support—a rush to judgment that would foreshadow the British historian's subsequent endorsement of the bogus Hitler "diaries."

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Although Ms. Amiel still doubts my findings about Bernadotte's extraordinary negotiations in 1945 with Heinrich Himmler, at least one rather more important group has seen fit, after re-examining the long dispute between the Bernadottes and Trevor-Roper—in light of my book—to rectify a forty-seven year injustice. I refer to the Israeli government, which, on the evening of May 14, 1995, in a moving ceremony in Jerusalem attended by the murdered man's sons, finally acknowledged that Bernadotte, notwithstanding his naive 1948 plan for Jerusalem (for which he died), had in fact saved thousands of Jews and others from extermination. The Israeli delegation at the ceremony was headed by Foreign Minister Shimon Peres.

Strangely, having attributed to me so many vague, unsubstantiated motives, Ms. Amiel cannot ultimately find cause to dispute my conclusions. "So Kati Marton and this review arrive at the same point in a sense: we both condemn Shamir." Yet Amiel condemns my "deadly, plodding evenhanded reporting that to some extent is the hallmark of modern American journalism," after earlier offering a more generous assessment: "Miss Marton is a skilled journalist who writes well." To be charged with evenhanded reporting is almost as preposterous as the charge against my parents in 1955 in Budapest: that they were CIA agents guilty of straight reporting of the uniformly dismal events of the day in communist Hungary. They were, and are, my role models—journalists who sought to report the truth as they saw it.

Kati Marton
New York

Amiel replies:

I DID NOT rely on my personal meeting with Ms. Marton to assess her personality and motivation but on the two sources available to me—the book itself and the extensive comments Marton has made on her own psychological makeup.

Some excerpts from an interview in the *Boston Globe* (October 28, 1990):

> We [speaking of her previous husband, Peter Jennings] are two people with big egos, big needs and big appetites to succeed. . . .My parents never said, 'Marry well.' They never said, 'Become the lady of a rich accomplished man.' They said, 'Be successful.' When I married they denounced the fact that I put aside my own career ambitions. Even now these realities are still a big part of my quest to succeed in my own way.

Marton's letter quarrels with what I would have thought an unimpeachable source, namely herself.

Miss Marton is a practitioner of the deadly plodding evenhanded school of moral equivalency. There is, unfortunately, no contradiction between having the mark of this school on one's work and having the research and writing skills of an accomplished journalist.

I don't doubt Marton wrote a letter to historian Hugh Trevor-Roper nor do I doubt Trevor-Roper's statement that he never heard from her. Letters do get lost. I have never met Trevor-Roper and so I resorted to the diabolically cunning idea of picking up the telephone and calling him, since, unlike Kati Marton, I did not have a "mutual friend" to do it for me. Trevor-Roper's telephone number is listed, he has no secretary and he answers his own telephone.

As for Felix Kersten, the question at issue is not Kersten's character (complex and dubious) but the historical facts. The important role played by Kersten in rescuing prisoners-of-war and Jews is attested to not only by his own (sometimes exaggerated) claims, but by the evidence (often reluctant) of the Swedish Foreign Minister Christian Gunther, the statements of Schellenberg under interrogation and in Schellenberg's draft account for Bernadotte (excised by Bernadotte), and the official White Paper on the Relief Expedition of 1945 published by

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the Swedish Foreign Office in 1956. The Dutch Institute of War Documentation concluded in 1972 that Kersten was an unreliable witness but did not deny the facts as I stated them. They wrote that

> in numerous cases [Kersten] took great trouble to secure the release of Dutch and other prisoners and condemned persons. . .and in the measures which Himmler took to save some 10,000 Jews, and that in these efforts he risked his own life. These are important services to humanity.

Since Miss Marton's book and my review appeared there was a small ceremony in Israel attended by Shimon Peres. It took place in Tel Aviv (not Jerusalem as Miss Marton states) and was not to settle the dispute between Kersten and Bernadotte but rather for Israel to (finally) apologize to Sweden for the assassination of Count Bernadotte by Shamir's Lehi group. It is an amusing sidelight that the ceremony almost came to naught because the Swedish representative wanted to go to the PLO's Orient House headquarters in East Jerusalem, but cut short her visit to Israel instead, presumably to avoid proving Lehi's point posthumously.

Inchon in the Desert:

HENRY ROWEN'S "Inchon in the Desert" makes a number of important points about the strategic import of Iraqi Scud missiles during the Gulf War, and the difficulty of stopping mobile missiles through air power alone. Yet his reading of the planning of Desert Storm is based upon an incomplete or selective reading of events, a faulty understanding of the military options that shaped the war, and a questionable interpretation of the strategic risks and rewards.

First, Rowen's "Western Excursion" was in itself a large land campaign. According to contingency plans formulated at the time, merely seizing and occupying the Scud fields in the Iraqi Western Desert would have required the entire 82d Airborne Division, plus elements of the 101st Airborne Division and/or the entire 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment. Second, it also would have been risky. The Iraqi Scud fields were located near two air bases (dubbed H2 and H3) surrounded by heavy air defenses; the initial assault would have been a hazardous operation. Third, preparing such an occupation force would have required great effort. The 82d Airborne was the first unit deployed during Desert Shield, and in the rush to get them to Saudi Arabia they were sent without the gear needed for an airborne drop. In addition, they had been unable to practice airborne operations while on Desert Shield duty, and the number of cargo planes needed for such an operation would have diverted much of the airlift required to sustain the Desert Shield force and build toward the Desert Storm force. Fourth, these units represented roughly a third of the U.S. ground troops available at the time, and would have required an even greater share of logistics troops to support and sustain an attack so far removed from the main area of operations. The burden on the limited Desert Shield force structure is indicated by the estimate, quoted by Rowen, that two hundred thousand additional troops would have been necessary to carry out the Western Excursion.

Carrying the attack farther toward Baghdad would have required still more troops. In the days following the ground war cease-fire, as the Iraqis proved recalcitrant in negotiations, the U.S. Army developed just such a plan; it called for an additional two divisions plus a cavalry regiment. Even this estimate must be considered low in relation to Rowen's Western Excursion; the postwar maneuver against Baghdad would have been conducted from a starting line closer to Baghdad, with a shorter logistics lifeline, and after five weeks of war.

In sum, Rowen's plan would have

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demanded huge forces to execute, but would not have guaranteed strategic success: the threat to Baghdad might have forced Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait, but would not have ensured it. Nor did Rowen's plan guarantee an engagement with the Republican Guard, let alone its destruction. Moreover, the likelihood that this would have forced a change in Baghdad—absent an actual occupation—must be seen as slim. After all, the war as conducted inflicted far greater losses on the Iraqi army, Iraqi society, and on Iraq's ability to build weapons of mass destruction than Rowen's option would have promised. The location and size of invading forces at the end of the land campaign were much more threatening to Baghdad than those envisioned under the Western Excursion. And still Saddam has survived. It is hard to imagine that anything short of physically evicting the Ba'ath Party from Baghdad would have changed that.

In the final analysis, Rowen's plan was rightly rejected. His hope to defeat Saddam without either a major air or big ground campaign is reminiscent of eighteenth-century "cabinet" wars, or of Sun Tzu's maxim that the highest object in war is to defeat one's enemy without having to fight a battle. Indeed, if anything, we were insufficiently ruthless in prosecuting Desert Storm; but given our own view of the proper conduct of war, particularly as refracted through a most unlikely coalition, the Gulf War was destined to be a limited affair. "Operation Scorpion" certainly would have inflicted less material damage on the Iraqi armed forces; with Saddam still in charge of a larger army, yes, we would have been worse off in October 1994.

Thomas Donnelly
House Committee on
National Security

Rowen replies:

I WISH TO MAKE only one comment on Mr. Donnelly's letter: He vastly underestimates the effectiveness of air power in the desert of Iraq.

Air power could not kill mobile Scud launchers but it could disrupt and destroy the few Iraqi ground forces there or that might be foolish enough to venture across the Euphrates. In the actual air campaign the air force demonstrated that it could even kill buried tanks. The notion that coalition ground forces in the Western desert would have been at risk from the Iraqi army seems to be based on the false premise that they would not have truly commanding control from the air.

Although Operation Scorpion would have been a large, indeed daunting, logistics operation, it would not have been a very risky one. As to the larger issues raised by Mr. Donnelly, reasonable people can disagree. □

As a general rule, might it be more prudent, though less dramatic, not to push the UN into the fireman's suit unless we are sure the alternatives are worse and, above all, that we are not seeking to evade our own responsibilities?

—Senator Henry M. Jackson
National Press Club, Washington, DC
March 20, 1962

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On Letting Go

Owen Harries

AS VIRTUALLY ALL the readers of this magazine will agree, the Cold War was a conflict of monumental importance. It defined an era. We believed that the fate of Western civilization—and thus of civilization as such—depended on its outcome, that it could fairly be represented as a conflict between democracy and totalitarianism, freedom and tyranny, good and evil.

Because of this, the Cold War called for an unprecedented commitment on the part of the United States. It was in terms of the conflict's extraordinary, Manichaean, life-threatening character that the overriding priority given to foreign and security policy needs over forty years—a priority that involved the subordination and neglect of many other needs—was justified, and rightly so.

Bearing all this in mind, consider a simple proposition: If the Cold War was a happening of such monumental, compelling importance, one that profoundly shaped American policies and priorities, then surely the *end* of the Cold War was a happening of comparable importance, calling for an equally profound reassessment of American policies and priorities.

If you have not been paying close attention to recent arguments about foreign policy, your first reaction to this proposition may well be that its truth is so obvious, so banal, that it is hardly worth stating, and certainly not worth discussing at length. If so, you are wrong. To a marked degree current arguments about the foreign policy of this country—particularly within the conservative and neoconservative community—turn on the question of whether this proposition is or is not valid.

There is a substantial and influential school of thought that maintains that it is not. This school resists any proposal to change significantly the strategic posture and level of diplomatic and political commitment assumed by the United States during the Cold War. It proposes that America's all-encompassing Cold War foreign and security policies—justified at the time of their adoption, it should be remembered, by claims of a clear and present danger in the form of the unrelentingly hostile "Soviet colossus"—be now regarded as the norm for an indefinite future and not tampered with in any significant way. Holders of this position are inclined to characterize any proposal to modify the Cold War posture as "neo-isolationism."

Anyone wanting an articulate and honest version of this position (one that does not indulge in "neo-isolationist" name-calling) should consult the recent writings of Robert Kagan in *Commentary*.[1] According to Kagan, the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War have done nothing to secure

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[1] "The Case for Global Activism" (September 1994) and "A Retreat From Power?" (July 1995).

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a "world order that serves American material and spiritual needs." All that has happened is that, as the fall of the Soviet Union "removed restraints on foreign leaders. . .and unleashed new struggles for power," the threat to that order has changed its form—from a single large adversary to a number of smaller but collectively serious challenges.

Rather inconsistently, Kagan does admit to the fact of "today's relatively benign international order," but it is not a serious inconsistency for he hastens to add that this benign order represents "a fragile, temporary situation" rather than a stable state of affairs. It will rapidly disappear, he insists, unless it is propped up by "high levels of American power, influence, and engagement." Indeed, Kagan evidently believes, along with those he identifies as "conservative internationalists," that, if anything, the United States should "assume greater, not lesser, responsibilities for the peace and stability of the present international order" than it did as the leader of the free world during the Cold War.

So instead of scaling down we should scale up. If all this is true, if things are no better—are possibly worse—in terms of threats to American interests than they were before, the question arises: What was the point of fighting and winning the Cold War? Might it not all have been a ghastly mistake—a case of jumping from the frying pan into the fire—or at least wasted effort? Before yielding to such a dismaying conclusion it is worth looking closely at the arguments used to justify Kagan's policy prescriptions.

Much of his two articles is spent attacking the "realist" approach to foreign policy, with its emphasis on limits and caution. I am not spared on this score, because, as between what I was writing in 1988 and what I have written more recently, Kagan finds my opinions "much-changed." That, indeed, they are, as far as they bear on American foreign policy; but, of course, the world had changed rather a lot during that period as well, and when thinking about policy it is usually sensible to take circumstances into account. As I wrote in the 1988 article to which Kagan refers (it was a critical review of Paul Kennedy's *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*,[2] and I was responding to Kennedy's emphasis on the importance of balancing defense requirements and economic capacity):

> Now, it is indisputable that balancing is an essential part of making policy. But deciding where and how to strike a balance is a difficult business, involving more than the weighing of arms against resources. In particular, and crucially, it depends on the *seriousness of the threat* a country faces. If the threat is dire. . .the balance will have to be different from what would be appropriate in a more benign environment. [Italics in original]

During the Cold War there was such a dire threat, and now there is not. A simple enough point, but not one that Kagan can accept. He cannot accept it for a reason that, given his attack on realism, is ironic: because in order to justify the foreign policy he wants, he must advance a view of the world that—the United States excepted—is itself an ultra-realist, crudely Hobbesian one. The crust of world order is paper thin; the world is full of predatory states; a return to a normality not closely policed by the United States will inevitably result in a return to wholesale aggression and conflict. Possible and potential threats must be treated with the same urgency as real, existing ones. Minor threats must be aggregated so that they collectively provide the equivalent of a deadly threat (a process roughly equivalent to maintaining that a bad head cold plus a slipped disc plus an ingrowing toenail are together as deadly as, say, a brain tumor). Only a virtuous America provides an exception to this Hobbesian state of nature, and the only secure and desirable world will be one dominated—apparently forever—by U.S. power.

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[2]"The Rise of American Decline," *Commentary* (May 1988), p. 32-36.

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It is the normal fate of realists to have to fight on two fronts simultaneously, combating both those who deny their views and those who enthusiastically embrace and caricature them. It is one of Robert Kagan's distinctions that he denies and embraces in the same breath.

While he insists on the superior virtue of the United States, and while he severely reprimands realists for allegedly doubting the good sense and enthusiasm for world leadership of the American people, Kagan himself seems to have little faith in the powers of discrimination and judgment of his fellow countrymen. Thus the United States must involve itself in all matters large and small, must interfere everywhere, because "[t]here is no certainty that we can correctly distinguish between high-stake issues and small-stake issues in time to sound the alarm." So habit must be substituted for judgment. Americans must, so to speak, keep in training by developing the habit of meddling *everywhere*, since otherwise they will get out of practice and fail the crucial "tests of American strength, character and endurance" when those appear. As he has no confidence in their power to select and choose, to calculate probabilities and degrees of seriousness, American foreign policy must be a matter of all or nothing at all; and as nothing at all is unthinkable, it must be all.

So we arrive, finally, at the ideal of an absolutely undiscriminating foreign policy for which *everything* matters—and the condemnation of discrimination and moderation as nefarious and subversive tendencies that would only undermine American manhood.

Robert Kagan's views are interesting because he articulates clearly and honestly what many are thinking. It is partly, I believe, a matter of overlearning the lessons of the past, overcompensating for past errors—a process that usually results in a different set of mistakes. Having stood apart from the world in the past and having been late on the scene in some earlier crises, there is now a determination that from here on the United States must regulate the world closely and anticipate every possible crisis before it occurs. Among sections of the foreign policy-security elite, it is also partly a matter of having come to enjoy the role of superpower and leader of the free world—even while complaining of its burdens—and of being reluctant to have it modified. In any case, the conclusion is that the level of activism and commitment reached during the Cold War must be seen not as a temporary burden, tolerated in response to a uniquely dangerous set of circumstances, but as an appropriate level to be maintained in perpetuity.

Hence, the struggling democracy in Russia must be viewed with the same suspicion as its communist predecessor, and so we must take advantage of its weakness to extend NATO as near as we can to its borders. Despite its aging population and the destruction of its military culture, Germany must be contained by an indefinite American military presence in Europe. To prevent the Japanese from rearming, we must keep scores of thousands of troops in that country and act as balancer of first, rather than last, resort in its region. Our reaction to China's economic growth, effective abandonment of communism, and advance toward global power status must be to treat it more harshly than we treated it in the later years of the terrible "Cultural Revolution," to contain it, and to deny it any of the extension of influence that normally goes with the attaining of such a status.

During the Cold War, we conservatives denounced the doctrine of "moral equivalence." That we were justified in doing so depended at least as much on the quite exceptional vileness of our Communist adversary as it did on American virtue. The United States does indeed behave better than the great majority of states most of the time, but it is a matter of degree, not a difference in kind. When the chips are down, all states do what they have to (and can do) in order to protect their vital interests.

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If, now, in the absence of an evil empire and in its dealings with the more or less ordinary states in the post-Cold War era, the United States continues to insist on applying different standards to itself and others—if, say, it claims that it is perfectly proper for it to intervene with force in the internal affairs of small neighboring states, but absolutely impermissible for other large powers to do the same—it will be storing up trouble for itself in the form of cumulating resentment and lack of credibility.

Realism, properly understood, is simply a serious commitment to trying to see things as they are, without distortion or illusion. Everything else that goes by the name—all the precepts and formulae of the schools—is conditional and in the last resort expendable. The most celebrated enemy of realism is utopianism—seeing things as we would like them to be—and it is still alive and well: witness the claims that the spread of democracy means the demise of power politics, and the revival of the old claim that "interdependence" spells the end of the nation-state.

But an enemy of realism that is hardly less formidable is habit—the inclination to see things not as they are, but as they *were*—and thus to cling to old policies after the rationale for them has disappeared. In this issue, Ian Gambles argues brilliantly that we are already forgetting, are letting go of, the Cold War. But perhaps the Cold War is more reluctant to let go of us. □

On the one hand, the public continues to expect American dominance in the world; on the other hand, there is no public willingness to pay the price, either with blood or money. The point came home earlier this year when Lake joined Shalikashvili for a day at the battleground at Gettysburg. They toured Rodes's Hill and Little Round Top and the scene of Picket's futile charge, walking across the fields where three days of fighting produced more than 40,000 casualties. Then, in the battlefield bookstore, they reflected on a Somali mission that had been labeled a disaster because it claimed the lives of 18 soldiers. "Something has broken down in the debate about the use of force," Shalikashvili said, in words especially noteworthy coming from the leader of the notoriously cautious Pentagon.

—Jason DeParle, "Inside Mr. Inside"
New York Times Magazine, August 20, 1995.

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

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TOPICS

America's Contract with the World

•

Democratic Consolidation and Economic Integration in Latin America

•

The Russian Agenda: Reform or Regression?

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